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Abstract
The last years have seen a surging interest in inequality in our society and in the world, with particular
emphasis on economic inequality. Both long-run trends and the recent economic crisis have contributed
to an increase in the gap between the rich and the poor, raising new questions on why this happened
and on whether society should (or shouldn't) counteract these forces. The three main chapters of this
dissertation aim at understanding the reasons behind inequality in the probability of being unemployed,
inequality in test scores influenced by parental investment, and persistence of employment status across
generations.
Chapter 1 studies the concentration of lifetime unemployment and its determinants. Using panel
data from the US, I document three new stylized facts on unemployment. First, 10% of workers account
for two-thirds of unemployment in prime-age. Second, young unemployment predicts prime-age unem-
ployment. Third, differences in job-finding rates between the most unemployed and the rest increase
over the life cycle, while differences in separation rates shrink. I show that a model of heterogeneity
across workers and information frictions, in which agents learn workers' types from their labor market
history, is quantitatively consistent with all these facts. I find information frictions to be responsible
for the whole decrease in job-finding rates of the most unemployed workers over the life cycle. The
concentration and persistence of prime-age unemployment are mainly explained by heterogeneity across
workers, while information frictions have a negligible role.
Chapter 2 focuses on the relation between returns to parental investment and the way parents decide
to spend their time. Time allocation choices of households and test scores of children exhibit regular
patterns in the data. First, households spend more than twice as much time in child care when their
child is under 6 years old than in later years, and reduce labor supply by almost 10 % in the same years.
Second, college-educated parents spend more time with their children than noncollege ones. Third,
cognitive test scores are intergenerationally correlated. In order to analyze the mechanisms behind
these facts, I build a model of parental choices and both cognitive and noncognitive skills formation,
which embeds the technology of skills formation estimated by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
I find that the model, jointly with the properties of the technology, can account qualitatively and
quantitatively for the bulk of such patterns. I also use the model to simulate the effect of applying the
German scheme of child allowances to the US economy. Consistently with the empirical literature, such
a policy is found to have little effect on the intergenerational persistence of cognitive skills.
Chapter 3, jointly developed with Salvatore Lo Bello, investigates the relation between the employ-
ment status of parents and the employment prospects of offspring. We study how parental links affect
employment prospects, using monthly job histories from the BHPS. We motivate our empirical strat-
egy by means of a stylized model of intergenerational transmission of networks. We find that having
the father employed rather than unemployed increases the employment rate by about 8 p.p. and the
monthly job finding probability by at least 50% (5-6 p.p). The effect is even larger when the father and
the offspring work in the same occupational group. The empirical evidence suggests that such results
are due to informational advantages rather than human capital transmission, direct hiring or common
shocks.
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Chapter 1
Information Frictions, Match Quality and
Lifetime Unemployment
1.1 Introduction
Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I document three novel facts on
lifetime unemployment. First, two-thirds of observed prime-age unemployment between 1985 and 2010
is accounted for by 10% of workers1. Such concentration is due to both lower job-finding rates and higher
job-separation rates of the most unemployed workers. Second, time spent in unemployment when young
is a powerful predictor of time spent in unemployment during prime-age. By means of regression analysis,
I show that this is not due to observable heterogeneity such as education, occupation, or health. Third,
I show that the 10% most unemployed workers and the rest start their careers with similar job-finding
rates, and that the job-finding rate of the most unemployed declines over the years while the one of the
rest of workers stays relatively constant. Instead, differences in monthly job-separation rates2 shrink:
they start as large as 4 percentage points at age 20 and descend to two percentage points at age 35.
Why are separation rates so heterogeneous and persistent over the life cycle? Why does the job-
finding rate of the most frequently separated workers decline? And why do the same workers experience
both low finding rates and higher separation rates? The fact that those with a low job-finding rate tend
1This is true even within education-sex subgroups. Bad luck alone cannot explain why unemployment is so concentrated:
the standard search-and-matching framework is at odds with this fact, because it features too many transitions in and
out of employment for the majority of workers.
2Conditionally on facing a separation, I find that the likelihood of experiencing a firing/layoff/temporary job ended/quit
does not vary between lifetime unemployment groups. Thus, this is not because one group was more frequently fired than
the other, for instance.
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to have a high separation rate is crucial to account for heterogeneity in lifetime unemployment: since
unemployment is a nonlinear function of both, theories that account only for one or the other cannot
reproduce the concentration of unemployment observed in the data.
The challenge is to build a theory that is consistent with all the micro facts presented above. I
propose a directed-search model which succeeds in this regard. In the model workers can be of two
types, high and low. A worker's type is initially unobserved by all agents in the market, who are allowed
to learn workers' types from labor market histories. This feature allows the model to be consistent with
the fact that, while differences in job-finding rates increase over the career, differences in separation
rates become smaller. In the model, this is because workers who face frequent separations when young
progressively find fewer jobs, but keep sampling jobs until they find one in which they are productive.
Information is symmetric: at the start of a worker's career, no agent in the market (including the
worker herself) knows her type. Search is directed in the sense that workers decide to search for a
job delivering a certain lifetime value. Upon matching with a firm, workers draw match quality from
type-specific distributions, which is constant for the whole duration of the match. Firms write complete
contracts and matches are destroyed whenever their surplus is negative. Match quality is an experience
good as in Jovanovic (1979); output of a match is unobserved until a shock is realized, upon which
output becomes known to the firm-worker match. Then, the match is kept or destroyed, leaving the
worker unemployed in the latter case. Past realizations of match quality for each worker are observed by
the market, which updates the probability that the worker is of high type accordingly. The probability
of being high-type formalizes a notion of résumé based on the worker's labor market history: low
values of match quality will lead the market to believe that the worker is more likely to be of low type,
while high values will have the opposite effect. Thus workers' types are slowly learned from labor market
histories and workers with different résumés apply to different submarkets. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first model in which job-finding rates, job-separation rates and the speed of learning are all
endogenously determined at the same time, because workers are allowed to choose the submarket in
which they search, understanding that each lifetime values entails a different job-finding rate, and the
outside option of the worker evolves dynamically with her history determining both her future desired
lifetime value and her probability of separating from a job.
Heterogeneity in lifetime unemployment comes from three sources in the model. First, it can be the
result of bad luck, because any given type might draw low match qualities, which will ultimately lead to
separations. Second, it can be the result of information frictions, that is low-type workers wrongly infer
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from lucky draws that they are likely to be good types, leaving their current jobs in order to sample a
better job, only to experience a bad draw later and get unemployed again.
I estimate the model using data from the NLSY/79. The model is very successful in reproducing the
observed concentration and persistence of unemployment, as well as the patterns of job-finding rates,
job-separation rates and wages over the life cycle. The model delivers concentration of unemployment
because low-type workers have a higher probability of drawing low-quality matches than high-type
workers, and have a lower expected productivity; thus such workers face a higher separation rate and a
lower job-finding rate at every age. It delivers persistence because low-type workers tend to experience
frequent separations both when young and when prime-age, and job-finding rates that decline with age
as the market recognizes them as low-type workers. Information frictions are crucial to match the life-
cycle patterns of job-finding and job-separation rates by unemployment groups. I argue that a model
based on human capital, rather than information frictions, would be inconsistent with these patterns
because it would have the counterfactual implication that differences in separation rates increase over
the life-cycle.
I calibrate an array of competing models and find that neglecting heterogeneity across workers makes
it impossible to match the concentration and persistence of unemployment observed in the data. While
uncertainty in match quality draws helps in matching the life-cycle profile of job-separation rates and
the concentration of unemployment, heterogeneity across workers is crucial to match the persistent
differences in job-finding and job-separation rates across workers I document. Furthermore, uncertainty
in match quality draws is important because it slows down learning: if there is no uncertainty and workers
only differ in mean match quality, learning is too fast and it is impossible to match the progressive
decrease in job-finding and job-separation rates by prime-age unemployment groups.
Information frictions play an important role in the first part of workers' lives. In a quantitative
exercise, I shut down information frictions and show that they are responsible for the entire decline in
monthly job-finding rates of the top 10% of prime-age unemployed (from 23 % at age 20 to 17 % at age
35). This is because 94% of the top 10% unemployed are low types: while their type is initially unknown,
it is slowly revealed by their labor market histories. This translates in progressively lower job-finding
rates for these workers. Information frictions also explain a portion of the decline in the separation rates
of the most unemployed workers. However, the role of information frictions later in life is negligible: by
age 30 types have effectively been learned for most of the population, so that most of the concentration
and persistence of unemployment after this age are due to heterogeneity across workers.
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This paper mainly contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it relates to the large empirical
literature that investigates the composition of the unemployment pool and heterogeneity in job-finding
rates; Clark et al. (1979) were the first to show that most of unemployment is accounted for by workers
experiencing long spells of unemployment, rather than by workers going in and out of unemployment.
In this paper, I make a different point and argue that most of the prime-age unemployment pool is
composed by a relatively small group of workers continuously going out of employment, and staying
unemployed for a long time, during all their lives. The literature on lifetime unemployment is relatively
scarce, possibly due to the limited availability of long panel data. My results on the concentration of
unemployment in the US are mirrored in the empirical work of Schmillen and Moller (2012), who use
long time series from administrative data from Germany, and in Brooks (2005), who looks at workers
in Canada in the years 1993-2001. Neither of these studies compares concentration to what is implied
by standard models of unemployment. My approach at studying inequality in unemployment risk is
similar to the one used in Michelacci, Pijoan-Mas and Ruffo 2011: using NLSY/79 data, the authors
show that unemployment over the lifetime is more unequally distributed than what the standard search
and matching framework implies. However, none of the studies above looks at the concentration in
prime-age unemployment, nor documents young-prime-age persistence, nor decomposes concentration
into job-finding and job-separation rates. A vast literature studies heterogeneity in job-finding rates and
unemployment duration, both empirically (Addison and Portugal 1989) and theoretically (Lockwood
1991; Shimer 2008; Gonzalez and Shi 2010; Fernàndez-Blanco and Preugschat 2014; Wiczer 2014).
Second, I develop a model of unemployment and learning from job histories in which wages, job-
finding rates, job-separation rates and the speed of learning are all jointly determined in equilibrium; this
is also the first model to be estimated on (and to study) lifetime unemployment data. Other models of
job search have proposed learning as a candidate explanation for the scars of unemployment (Michaud
2014) and duration dependence in job-finding rates (Gonzalez and Shi 2010). The model I develop
shares a mechanism similar to Michaud (2014) regarding separations, but adds résumés, learning from
labor market history and heterogeneity in the shape of match quality distributions across types: I find
that all these ingredients are important to match heterogeneity in lifetime unemployment. My model's
environment is similar to Menzio and Shi (2011), but in their model workers are heterogeneous in their
ability to find jobs, and learn about their ability by finding jobs or not. Instead, in my model workers
are heterogeneous in productivity and learn from their employment history, which maps into differences
in job finding rates and job-separation rates. Similarly to Gonzalez and Shi (2010), my model also
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features a duration dependence relation because workers who have a higher probability of being high
types tend to find jobs faster. Also, this paper shares with theirs having learning in a directed search
framework, although Gonzalez and Shi model learning about the workers' ability to find jobs while
I model learning workers' types (and thus, their distribution of productivity draws) from their labor
market outcomes. My results on the speed of employer learning are similar to those of Lange (2007),
who finds that employers learn relatively quickly and expectation errors on productivity decline by 50%
in the first 3 years of employment. Other empirical work focuses on employer learning as a source of
increase in wage heterogeneity over the career: see for instance Kahn and Lange (2013).
This paper also relates to the empirical literature that looks at the effect of unemployment on
subsequent earnings and labor market outcomes. Since the pioneering study by Heckman et al. (1980),
many papers have addressed whether unemployment leaves scars on subsequent wages and increases
chances of future unemployment; see for instance Von Wachter, Manchester and Song (2009), Von
Wachter and Bender (2006), Barnett and Michaud (2012). See also Couch and Placzek (2010) for a
review of the studies on the effects of job displacement on earnings. Other recent studies (Kahn 2010;
Oreopoulos et al. 2012) look at individuals who graduated from college during a recession, and find that
this has negative, persistent effects on the earnings of otherwise identical workers. My model generates
ex-post heterogeneity in labor market outcomes by allowing the market to separate workers using their
job history, and in principle could be extended to allow for other additional channels discussed in the
literature.
Finally my model is, in spirit, a life-cycle model of search and matching. Menzio, Telyukova and
Visschers (2012) is the closest model to the one presented in this paper, having in common directed
search and job-specific match quality. However, while they want to provide a life cycle theory of the
transitions in and out of unemployment and employment over the life cycle, I want to understand the
sources of heterogeneity in lifetime unemployment, and study the role played by information frictions
in determining lifetime outcomes. I find that models without heterogeneity and learning (like Menzio,
Telyukova and Visschers 2012 or Chèron, Hairault and Langot 2013), despite featuring potential sources
of persistence such as human capital accumulation, cannot replicate the amounts of concentration and
persistence of unemployment I document.
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1.2 The Data
I use weekly job histories from NLSY/79 data to compute lifetime unemployment statistics. The NLSY
is one of the best-known panel datasets available for the US, following a cohort of more than ten thousand
individuals from 1979 onwards. Those who are being followed in the NLSY/79 ranged ages 14 to 22 in
1979; information has been gathered annually until 1994, and biennually since then.
I use only the cross-sectional representative sample of the NLSY, and exclude every worker who has
less than 100 weeks of reported employment/unemployment from age 20 to 30, and 100 weeks from
age 35 to 55; this gives me a sample of 5422 workers3. Further, I restrict attention to the relatively
narrower sample of males who are only high-school educated at age 304. This leaves us with a total of
1029 individuals followed for 30 years. However, results are robust to more inclusive definitions of the
sample5.
1.2.1 Prime-age unemployment is concentrated
I first document that prime-age unemployment is concentrated in relatively few individuals. I start by
defining young-age unemployment as the fraction of the work history an individual spent in unemploy-
ment, over total weeks employed or unemployed6, from age 20 to 30:
u¯yi =
T yi∑
t=1
uyi,t
T yi
(1.1)
where uyi,t is a variable taking value 1 in weeks in which individual i was unemployed, and 0 if
individual i was employed, and T yi is the number of weeks that individual i was either employed or
unemployed between ages 20 and 30. Similarly, I define prime-age unemployment as the fraction of
work history spent in unemployment from age 35 to 55. Since I will show that there are important
connections between young and prime-age unemployment, the five-years gap is necessary in order to
3This is to address measurement error issues when computing lifetime unemployment statistics. I study the extent of
measurement error in Appendix 1.B.3.
4This means that I include in the sample only individuals who have completed no more and no less than high-school at
age 30. I do this to have as homogeneous a sample as possible. High-school males are the biggest sex-education subgroup
in the NLSY/79. Moreover, Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2012) show that, in terms of labor market outcomes, this
subgroup is a good representation of the behavior of US labor market aggregates over the life cycle. In appendix 1.B.2 I
show that findings are robust to other education-sex subgroups.
5For results on the whole sample, see Appendix 1.B.2.
6My definitions are similar to Schmillen and Möller (2012).
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avoid that part of the correlations are not artificially due to the aftermath of a recession, or to long
unemployment spells that connect between subsequent years.
As shown in table 1.1, there are large differences in unemployment outcomes across workers. The
first finding is that prime-age unemployment is concentrated in relatively few workers. After ranking
individuals by the fraction of time spent in unemployment, I compute the fraction of weeks spent in
unemployment by the bottom 90% of the sample7:
u¯pup<q90 =
N∑
i=1
1(u¯pi < q90(u
p))
T pi∑
t=1
upi,t
N∑
i=1
1(u¯pi < q90(u
p))T pi
(1.2)
where 1(upi < q90(u
p)) is an indicator function taking value 1 if prime-age unemployment of individual
i was below the 90th quantile of the prime-age unemployment distribution, and 0 otherwise, while T pi
is the number of weeks in which individual i was either employed or unemployed during prime-age8.
The 10% most unemployed individuals account for about 2/3 of prime-age unemployment observed
in the data. Moreover, about half of these individuals have never been unemployed in the reference
period. Notice that the fact that prime-age unemployment is concentrated in relatively few workers is a
very different point from the one raised for instance by Clark et al. (1979), who show that most of the
unemployment pool is accounted for by workers staying unemployed, rather than workers going in and
out of unemployment.
I then proceed to compute monthly average job-finding/job-separation rates for workers in their
primes9. I find that the concentration of unemployment is both due to a (' 3 times) lower finding rate10
7These measures are common in the literature on income inequality; see for instance Atkinson (1970). Their application
to lifetime unemployment is relatively uncommon, with the exception of Schmillen and Möller (2012) and Brooks (2005).
8Clearly this is not the only way of computing this average. Another possibility is to compute instead
u˜pup<q90 =
N∑
i=1
[
1(u¯pi < q90(u
p))upi
]
N∑
i=1
1(u¯pi < q90(u
p))
(1.3)
that is, the average of each individual's prime-age unemployment. The two averages are different since T pi differs across
individuals, because some are observed for more weeks than others; in particular, there can be a significant difference if
COV(T p, up) 6= 0, for instance if those often unemployed tend to be more often out of the labor force. In fact, this is
indeed the case (see Appendix 1.B.1). I find that there is relatively little difference between the two ways of computing
the average, and that this does not matter for results on the concentration of unemployment, which is even larger (about
70% accounted for by top 10%) if using this second methodology (see Appendix 1.B.1).
9Since I will calibrate the model to monthly probabilities, I do not adjust for short-term unemployment as in Shimer
(2012).
10I describe how I compute job-finding and separation rates in appendix 1.7.
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NLSY/79 Unif. Match
300 wks 500 wks
Avg. % time in unemployment 3.6 (target) 3.6 (target) 3.6
Avg. % time in U, excluding top 10% 1.5 2.5 3.1
Avg. % time in U, excluding top 20% 0.6 1.9 2.6
% never unemployed: 56 29 5
Table 1.1: Left column: averages computed on NLSY/79, individuals aged 35-55. Sample includes only
high school educated, male individuals with more than 100 observations of weekly job histories in their
prime-age, ending 2010. Right columns: averages computed by simulating sequences of 300 (column
2) and 500 (3) job-finding - job-separation events using flow equations of Mortensen-Pissarides model,
calibrated to average job-finding and job-separation probabilities in NLSY/79 sample.
and a (' 9 times) higher separation rate for that top 10% (see table 1.2); this group of workers appears
to have both longer unemployment duration and shorter employment duration. Since unemployment is
a nonlinear function of both finding and separation rates, failure to account for both at the same time
means not getting the distribution of unemployment right. Interestingly, the difference in separation
rates accounts for a larger fraction of the heterogeneity in unemployment outcomes than the difference
in finding rates.
Top 10% Rest of Sample Ratio Top 10 / Rest
Avg. % time in unemployment 29 1.5 19.1
δ: Prob. of U → E (monthly%) 8 26 0.3
f : Prob. of E → U (monthly%) 3.5 0.4 8.75
Predicted % time in U of top 10%, δ alone: 12
Predicted % time in U of top 10%, f alone: 5
Avg. Log Wage (2000) ' - 40%
Table 1.2: Summary statistics by parts of the prime-age unemployment distribution. Source: own
calculations on NLSY/79. Male, high-school educated individuals aged 35-55. Predicted % time in U
calculated using the formula u = δ/(δ + f).
Similarly to what happens when discussing income inequality, measures of concentration might not be
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meaningful if they are not compared with what a standard framework would imply for the distribution
of unemployment. If only one person out of 10000 was unemployed, the fact that unemployment is
concentrated would not be very interesting. Moreover, it is important to stress that these numbers do
not represent accurately differences in the underlying job-finding and job-separation rates for groups
of workers. My estimates of job-finding and job-separation probabilities are likely to be biased estimates
of the underlying probabilities, because by creating groups based on the amounts of unemployment
experienced in prime-age I am selecting those individuals who experienced exceptionally high amounts
of unemployment, who might be the most unlucky among a specific group. In order to understand the
magnitude of these results, I compare the concentration of unemployment observed in the data to what a
standard search and matching framework à-la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) would imply. I produce
simulations of 300 and 500 weeks of transitions because in my NLSY/79 sample I observe prime-age
workers for about 700 weeks on average; 95% of workers are observed for more than 470 weeks, and less
than 1 % of workers is observed for less than 250 weeks. This is for robustness: increasing the number
of simulated weeks leads to worse performance of the standard model, so I construct at least one case
that is favorable to it.
Simulations show that the standard model, calibrated to reproduce the job-finding and job-separation
rates of the sample, has trouble replicating the observed concentration in prime-age unemployment: the
standard search model features too many transitions in and out of unemployment for the majority of
workers. This fact is important, because it suggests that heterogeneity across workers is likely to be
crucial to make sense of labor market outcomes, and of the ins and outs of unemployment, during
prime-age.
1.2.2 Unemployment is persistent over the life-cycle
I now document that young and prime-age unemployment are strongly correlated. Workers who were
in the top 10% of the young-age distribution are five times more likely to be in the same part of the
distribution when prime-age. In short, young and prime-age unemployment are connected and, among
a wide range of observables available in the NLSY/79, young unemployment is the best predictor of
prime-age unemployment. Noticeably, regression analysis (see table 1.7 in the Appendix) confirms that
young unemployment is a very strong predictor of prime-age unemployment, and that this is not due to
observables such as education, marital status or IQ.
Little additional information can be obtained by decomposing further the separation rate: using
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All sample
Rest Top 10% when (35-55)
Rest 92.68 7.32
Top 10% when (20-30) 65.94 34.06
High-School Workers
Rest Top 10% when (35-55)
Rest 93.53 6.47
Top 10% when (20-30) 58.82 41.18
Table 1.3: Markov Transition Matrix, from distribution of young (ages 20-30) unemployment to prime-
age (35-55) unemployment. Overall sample (top panel) and only high school males (bottom panel).
Source: own calculations on NLSY/79.
the matched employer-employee dataset available along the NLSY/79, I show that workers who were
in the top 10% most unemployed in prime-age had about twice the likelihood of separating from their
employers for any reason than the rest of the sample, without one single particular reason being more
important than others (see table 1.13 in Appendix).
Finally, notice that such persistence is not due to observable heterogeneity: one might think for
instance that such differentials could be explained by differences across occupations (the choice of an
unlucky occupation when young, as in Schmillen and Möller (2012)) or in health status (worse health
means worse labor market outcomes). I perform several batteries of regressions (see Appendix 1.B.4)
including ethnic origin, education, prior occupations and current occupations, ex-post health and IQ and
find that none of these variables substantially reduces the amount of persistence I observe in the data.
This result is particularly strong because current occupations and ex-post health are endogenous to prior
labor market experience, and as such are bound to capture part of the persistence of unemployment.
For instance, a worker that has been unemployed often when young will tipically work in more unstable
occupations in prime-age, and this should capture part of the young-prime-age correlation I find. Similar
considerations are valid for ex-post health.
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1.2.3 Job-finding and job-separation over the life cycle
As a final piece of evidence, I compute job-finding and job-separation probabilities depending on age,
from age 20 to age 35, by groups of prime-age unemployment. I want to show that those who have
experienced large amounts of prime-age unemployment had different labor market outcomes during the
first years of their career too. I compute marginal effects from linear regressions of job-finding rates
and job-separation rates on a 4-th degree polynomial on age, controlling for year-specific fixed effects in
order to clean the effect of recessions11. I can see that, at ages 20-30, the job-separation rate of the top
10% of prime-age unemployed is 4 percentage points higher than the job-separation rate of the rest of
the sample (higher than the sample average), and this difference declines to 2 p.p at age 35. Instead,
between the two groups there is only a 4 percentage points difference (about 1/7 of the sample average)
in job-finding rates at age 20, but this difference becomes more pronounced as workers age, particularly
because of the decline in the job-finding rate of the top 10% of prime-age unemployed.
Figure 1.1: job-finding (left panel) and job-separation (right panel) probabilities, by group of prime-age
unemployed. Sample of male, high-school educated workers. Source: own calculations on NLSY/79.
Shaded areas are 95% confidence bands.
This suggests that, in the eyes of potential employers, the two groups of workers were not substantially
different at the beginning of their working careers, because they were hired with similar probabilities,
but such differences became more pronounced later12; however, the high separation rates experienced
by the top 10% of prime-age unemployed during their 20s suggest that such workers were recognized
to be different during an employment relationship. That is, before an employment relationship had
been established, young workers who came to experience substantially different careers looked similar;
11Results are substantially identical if I compute the averages using 5-years long age groups instead of restricting to a
functional form. I choose the polynomial shape for presentation purposes; results under the age-group specification will
be used to identify the model and will be reported in figure 1.4.
12I address why human capital-based explanations are insufficient to explain such patterns in section 1.6.
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however, as they accumulated jobs and separations, workers experienced increasingly different job-finding
rates, suggesting that information on them had slowly become available.
The wages of the top 10% unemployed progressively fall over the life cycle, relatively to those of
the rest of the population (see figure 1.2), confirming that differences across workers become larger over
workers' careers. This suggests that, after many separation events, such workers may sort into different
jobs in order to avoid frequent future separations, or that they may fail to accumulate skills that lead
to higher wages.
Figure 1.2: Log difference in Hourly Wage, between Top 10% Prime-Age Unemployment Group and
Rest. Sample of male, high-school educated workers. Source: own calculations on NLSY/79. Shaded
area is 95% confidence bands.
These facts motivate the need for a theory of unemployment that is capable of replicating the
concentration of unemployment in relatively few workers and the persistence of unemployment over the
life cycle; such concentration and persistence can have important consequences for the design of labor
market policy. For instance, the concentration of unemployment suggests that relatively few people are
likely to obtain the bulk of unemployment insurance, and will be the most affected by it. However, I argue
that the relatively low ex-ante difference in job-finding rates and the large ex-post differences in both
job-finding rates and wages suggest that important information frictions are at work in the first years
of workers' careers, and that workers are being slowly sorted by employers over their careers. My model
will feature this mechanism, which has important implications for understanding the concentration of
unemployment, the connection of young and prime-age unemployment, and the effects of labor market
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policies.
1.3 Model
I now proceed to set up a model of heterogeneity in labor market outcomes, roughly based on Menzio
and Shi (2011) and Gonzalez and Shi (2010); the ingredients of such model are inspired by the evidence
presented in the previous section.
In order to obtain believable life-cycle profiles of separation rates, I add heterogeneity in match
quality draws as in Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2012). Heterogeneity across workers, information
frictions, and a notion of `résumé' of the worker are added in order to capture the fact that a group
of workers experiences higher separation rates at the start of the career, and that such separation rate
diminishes later. This can be because such workers are being separated often (similarly to Gibbons and
Katz 1991) and are learning that they have low productivity, thus their outside option decreases and
reduces their probability of separating from a job. Moreover, such workers progressively find less jobs
and earn lower wages: this can be rationalized by the fact that their résumé gets worse over their career,
thus reducing their expected productivity in the eyes of potential employers. Moreover, heterogeneity
across workers can rationalize the high levels of persistence of unemployment found in the data.
1.3.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a measure of firms M > 1 and a measure one of workers, who are either
employed or unemployed. Every period, a fraction λ of workers die, and are replaced by newly born,
unemployed workers. Each worker is born either of type H or L, High and Low respectively, unknown
both to firms and workers; low types occur with probability l, high types with probability 1 − l. All
agents are risk neutral and discount the future at rate 1/(1 + r).
Let p be the probability of a worker being high-type. There exists a continuum of submarkets
indexed by {v, p}, the expected lifetime value v earned by the worker in that submarket and the prior p
of workers applying to that submarket13. Matches are endogenously destroyed when the surplus of the
match is negative. Some matches end randomly with probability δ.
13This is to make less assumptions on the distributions of match quality that follow. In principle, the model can be
rewritten to feature submarkets indexed only by {v}, provided that further assumptions on the match quality distributions
are made so that workers with different p will apply to different submarkets. In the current version, I allow workers with
different p to apply to the same lifetime value, but in equilibrium for every value of p ∈ [0, 1] only one submarket {v(p), p}
will be active.
26 Information Frictions, Match Quality and Lifetime Unemployment
1.3.2 Search and Matching
Firms can post vacancies in any submarket at cost κ. Search is directed, in the sense that workers with
prior p¯ can choose in which submarket {v, p¯} to search. Thus, each submarket has tightness θ(v, p), the
ratio of vacancies to searching workers. The number of matches in each submarket is determined by the
matching function m = g(θ), such that the job-finding probability is f(θ) = m/u, which satisfies f ′ > 0,
f ′′ < 0, g(0) = 0 and lim
θ→∞
= 1, and the job-filling probability is q(θ) = m/v = f(θ)/θ. Unemployed
workers can search for a job while employed workers cannot. When unemployed, workers get benefit b.
1.3.3 Information and Learning
Denote by H(x) and L(x) the cumulative distribution functions of match quality, for high and low types
respectively, with support X ⊆ [0, x¯], such that H(x) strictly first order stochastically dominates L(x);
that is, H(x) < L(x) ∀x < x¯. Once a match with a worker has been established, a match-specific quality
shock is drawn from the workers' type distribution. Match quality is constant over the whole duration
of the match14.
At the beginning of a firm-worker match, output of the match is unobserved. Match quality is an
experience good as in Jovanovic (1979): after a match with a worker with belief p has been established,
in each period the match produces expected payoff15 E(x | p), until the worker/firm pair gets to observe
output or a random separation occurs. With probability 1−pi, output is not observed. With probability
pi, output of the match is observed.
Upon observing output, agents gain information on a worker's type: higher output realizations signal
that the worker is more likely to be of high-type, while lower output realizations signal the opposite.
1.3.4 Contracts
I assume that employment contracts are complete, in the sense that they specify a wage w paid by the
firm to the worker and a probability of separation d at every point in time, as a function of the promised
expected lifetime utility, the history of the worker and that of the firm-worker match16. As Menzio and
14Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2012) find that, in a similar model, the probability that a match changes quality
during an employment relation is around 1%, thus making the constant match assumption a reasonable simplifying
approximation.
15From the perspective of writing the surplus of a match, this is equivalent to assuming that both parties get zero value
until productivity is observed and then get the sum of flow utilities of all previous periods.
16This assumption reflects the idea that matches can be kept as long as they are profitable to both parties, so that
the relation between labor market histories and learning is not strongly dependent on the contract environment, but on
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Shi (2011) prove, since contracts are complete and utility is transferable, it is optimal for firms to offer
contracts that are bilaterally efficient, so that they maximize the sum of the firm's lifetime profits and
the worker's lifetime utility. Thus, the firm finds optimal to offer a probability of separation d delivering
bilateral efficiency (matches are kept as long as their lifetime value is higher than the outside option of
the worker) and a wage w such that the expected lifetime utility v is delivered to a worker in a {v, p}
match. However, there are many different sequences of w that deliver the same lifetime utility to the
worker; in this paper, it is not important to solve this indeterminacy as the object of discussion are the
patterns of job-finding and job-separation rates17.
The intuition is that jobs will be endogenously destroyed whenever the value of the match is lower
than the outside opportunity of the worker: thus, low-type workers will face more frequent separations
if they typically draw match qualities that are below the value of unemployment. Thus, pi and the
properties of the match quality distribution H(x) and L(x) measure the informational content of job
duration. If pi = 0, match quality is never observed and job duration is not informative of the worker's
type.
Since the history of past match qualities drawn by a worker is observable by potential employers, it
follows that p is a sufficient statistic for the whole history of match qualities a worker experienced, and
can be considered the worker's `résumé'.
Timing is as follows:
1. Workers die w.p. λ, replaced by unemployed workers with belief 1− l.
2. W.p. pi, firms and workers observe output of a match.
3. Workers revise beliefs: p′ = p if match quality is still unobserved and no shocks occur, p′ = P (x, p)
if match quality is observed today.
4. Production occurs, wages are paid.
5. Unemployed workers search for a job. They choose to search in submarket {v′, p′}.
6. Workers match w.p. f(θ(v′, p)). Separations (exogenous and endogenous) occur.
the features of match quality distributions. The idea that types are being learned over workers' careers does not hinge
necessarily on the particular contract space assumed here, but its quantitative implications might change. For instance,
it is possible to think of an environment in which match quality is the firm's private information and workers learn from
whether they are kept or fired by the firm.
17When thinking about how to map wages in the model to the data, it can be useful to rewrite the equilibrium definition
including wages as equilibrium objects. I will discuss this issue in more detail in the Equilibrium subsection.
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7. Newly matched workers draw match quality from H(x) or L(x) depending on their type.
Bayes' rule implies that beliefs of employed workers who observe the realization of match quality
evolve according to
p′ = P (x, p) =
p h(x)
p h(x) + (1− p) l(x) (1.4)
where h(x) and l(x) are the density functions of match quality draws for high and low types respec-
tively.
Heterogeneity in job duration across workers and the update of p are closely related: when a worker
is observed and the match continues, it must mean that match quality was high enough to support
the match, an event that is more likely for high types because H(x) first order stochastically dominates
L(x). Viceversa, when a worker's productivity is observed and the match is destroyed, it must mean that
match quality was not high enough, an event that is more likely for low types. Clearly, this depends on
how high the flow utility of unemployment is with respect to the tipical match quality draws of low types.
However, depending on the features of the match quality distributions, matches might be destroyed also
because workers prefer to have the opportunity to sample a new job with a higher productivity.
1.3.5 Bellman Equations
The value function of an unemployed worker with prior p can be written as
U(p) = b+ β
[
max
v
[
f(v, p)(v − U(p))]+ U(p)] (1.5)
where β = 1−λ
1+r
.
The joint firm-worker value of a match which output is known can be written as
S(x, p) = x+ β
{
max
d∈[δ,1]
[
(1− d)S(x, p) + dU(p)
]}
(1.6)
Thus, the joint value of a match in which output is unknown and a worker of prior p is working can
be written as
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Su(p) = (1− pi)
[
E(x | p) + β
(
(1− δ)Su(p) + δ U(p)
)]
+ (1.7)
pi
(
p
ˆ
S(x, p′) dH(x) + (1− p)
ˆ
S(x, p′) dL(x)
)
where I denote by p′ = P (x, p) the next period's prior depending on the realization of match quality,
suppressing the dependence on p and x for readability.
The value of a firm posting a vacancy in submarket {v, p} is
V (v, p) = −κ+ q(θ(v, p))β(Su(p)− v) (1.8)
and the tightness function must satisfy
κ ≥ q(θ(v, p))β(Su(v, p)− v) ∀v, p (1.9)
which makes θ consistent with the firm's optimal vacancy creation; 1.9 holds with equality if θ > 0.
Basically, condition 1.9 implies that if θ = 0, such tightness is consistent with the firm's optimal choice
only if the benefit from creating a vacancy is smaller than the cost.
1.3.6 Equilibrium
Definition 1. a Bayesian Markov Perfect BRE (Block Recursive Equilibrium) for this economy consists
of a value function for the unemployed worker U(p), a policy function for the unemployed worker v′(p),
value functions for the joint value of a match Su(p) and S(x, p), a separation policy d(x, p), a tightness
function θ(v, p) and a law of motion for beliefs p′(x, p) such that
1. U(p), v′(p), S(x, p), Su(p), d(x, p), θ(v, p) are independent of the aggregate state ψ
2. θ(v, p) satisfies 1.9 ∀ v, p and θ(v, p) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
3. U(p) and v′(p) satisfy 1.5 ∀ p
4. S(x, p) and d(x, p) satisfy 1.6 ∀ w, x
5. Su(x, p) satisfies 1.7 ∀ w, x
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6. p′(x, p) satisfies 1.4
The BRE is much easier to solve than a Recursive Equilibrium, because value functions and policy
functions of agents depend only on the individual states {p, x} and not on aggregate states. Aggregate
statistics can be computed, after solving the individual problem, from the aggregation of individual
choices. Moreover, computing transitions out of the steady state is easy because all policy functions and
laws of motion are independent of the aggregate state.
1.3.7 Characterization of Equilibrium
Lemma 1. Given p ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ [0, x¯], S(x, p) is increasing in x. Also, d(x, p) is a step function
that takes value 1 if x < U(p)(1− β) and δ otherwise.
The intuition is simply that match quality must be high enough to be higher than the value of
unemployment. Clearly, distributions of match quality that have more probability mass on values that
are lower than b will lead to more frequent separations.
Lemma 2. In the BRE of the economy, the unique solution to equilibrium condition 1.9 is
θ(v, p) =
q
−1(k/(β (Su(p)− v) if β (Su(p)− v) ≥ k
0 otherwise
(1.10)
Since the function Su(p) is continuous in p for p ∈ [0, 1], the market tightness function θ is continuous
in p. Furthermore, since V (v, p) is a decreasing function of v, θ(v, p) is a decreasing function of v. The
intuition is that, as firms have to pay higher wages in order to deliver the promised level of lifetime
utility, their expected profits are lower, so that a higher job filling probability is required to pay for the
cost of creating a vacancy, thus implying a lower tightness in that submarket.
Remark: P (x, p) is continuous in x and p ∀x < x¯. Moreover, ∂P/∂p > 0.
Continuity of posterior belief P and the fact that it is increasing in p stems trivially from the
functional form. However, first order stochastic dominance is not sufficient to ensure that beliefs are
monotone in x, which would require further restrictions on the shape of the distributions.
Lemma 3. The optimal choice of a worker can be written as the choice of a tightness θ∗(p), ∀ p ∈ [0, 1],
and is unique given p.
Proof. Notice that, by using the fact that f(θ)/q(θ) = θ, equation 1.5 can be rewritten as:
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U(p) = b+ max
θ
{
f(θ)β(Su(p)− U(p))− κθ
}
+βU(p) (1.11)
by using equation 1.9 for submarkets with a positive tightness.
Given p this is a well-defined, concave problem in θ because by the assumptions on the matching
function f(θ) is an increasing, concave and twice-differentiable function. Thus, the derivative of the
value function with respect to θ is
∂U
∂θ
= f ′(θ)β(SU(p)− U(p))− κ
which admits a zero for θ > 0. 
Lemma 4. Under the assumption that H(x) < L(x) ∀x ∈ [0, x¯), U is strictly increasing.
The complete proof can be found in appendix 1.C. The intuition is that higher résumés p will translate
into higher expected productivity, thus to a higher expected job-finding rate for every promised lifetime
utility, thus to a higher value of unemployment. This also means that workers will trade off higher
job-finding rates with lower promised lifetime utility when choosing the submarket in which to search.
1.4 Quantitative Model and Identification
The model is identified by estimating parameters in order to replicate features of job-finding rates, job-
separation rates and wage patterns observed in the NLSY/79. The idea behind identification is that the
concentration and persistence of unemployment, and the differences in job-separation and job-finding
rates by parts of the prime-age unemployment distribution, are informative of the amount of low-type
workers present in the economy and of the differences between the match quality distributions of types,
while the life-cycle profile of wages are informative of differences both in the match quality distribu-
tions and in skill multipliers. This strategy is partly inspired by Menzio and Shi (2011) and Menzio,
Telyukova and Visschers (2012), who use the life-cycle patterns of job-finding rates, job-separation rates
and employment-to-employment transitions in order to identify the parameters of the match quality dis-
tribution and the probability of observing productivity during a match. My model works similarly during
a match's duration, so I apply the same strategy but I distinguish between the job-finding/separation
rates experienced by the top 10% prime-age unemployed and the rest of the population.
To see why the match quality distribution affects separation rates, consider the separation policy
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d(x, p). Given a résumé p, the probability that a firm destroys a match upon descovering match quality
is H(U(p)(1− β)) for high types and L(U(p)(1− β)) for low types, which means that the way in which
the probability mass is distributed over match qualities determines separation rates for different types,
which are also heterogeneous in their labor market histories.
Turning to how the match quality distribution affects job-finding rates, consider equation 1.9, which
states that in equilibrium the tightness of submarket {v, p} depends on the expected surplus of the firm
for a worker with prior p. In turn, the expected surplus depends on E(x | p) and on S(x, p), that is on
current expected productivity and on future productivity if the match will not be destroyed. Basically,
job-finding rates depend on expected match quality given the prior, and on the expected match quality
for the part of the distribution above the separation cutoff.
Summing everything up, a distribution featuring high mass on low values of match quality, but a long
right tail, will deliver high separation rates and high job-finding rates. On the other hand, a distribution
featuring high mass on low values of match quality and a short right tail will deliver high separation
rates and low job-finding rates. Finally, a concentrated distribution, such that uncertainty about match
quality is low, will deliver low separation rates.
I now explain why the concentration and persistence of unemployment is informative on the amount
of low-type workers and the match quality distributions. Consider a case in which workers have the
same starting résumé p (the population prior), and the match quality of low types has more probability
mass on low realizations than the match quality distribution of high types. This means that young,
low-type workers who are starting their careers will typically experience a larger-than-average amount of
separations during their youth. As information on their type accumulates, these workers will slowly sort
into lower-wage jobs, but will still experience higher separation rates because of the worse match quality
distribution, and will experience lower job-finding rates because their expected productivity will be
lower. The mechanism does not necessarily apply only to low types: high types who have been unlucky,
and drew many low-quality matches, will experience frequent separations and will be considered low
types with a high probability, thus experiencing lower job-finding rates when older.
Young-age separation rates depend on how fast output is observed (parameter pi), while the speed
of learning depends on how far apart the two distributions of match quality are: if types draw match
qualities from very similar distributions, learning will be slow, job finding rates will be similar and the
concentration of unemployment will be low too. If the two types draw from very different distributions,
learning will be fast and unemployment will be concentrated in few workers. The scale and shape of
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the match distributions will thus influence the life-cycle profile of job-finding rates, job-separation rates
and wages. Notice that it is possible to obtain concentration of unemployment even with only one
type of workers, just by changing features of the match quality distribution. However, this would be
inconsistent with the fact that unemployment is persistent over the life cycle, and with the life-cycle
patterns of job-finding rates and job-separation rates by unemployment groups.
Persistence of unemployment depends on how far apart the two distributions of match quality are,
how risky they are and how large the measure of low-types is. If low-types have always high risk of being
unemployed (that is, of drawing low match quality values) while high-types are almost never unemployed,
persistence will be high and will be determined almost uniquely by the measure of low-types. To see
why, suppose that low-types are 10% of workers: in that case, persistence as measured by the probability
of ending up being in the top 10% of prime-age unemployment, given that one has been in the top 10%
of young unemployment, will be 100%. However, there will be no additional persistence at the top 20%
because the rest of the population is never unemployed both when young and in prime-age.
Instead, if the two distributions of match quality are very close, persistence of unemployment will
depend also on how fast learning is, and on the role of luck in determining unemployment for both types.
In all cases, however, the persistence of unemployment over the life-cycle can be used to pin down the
measure of low-types present in the economy.
1.4.1 Calibration
I now proceed to simulate the lives of a large sample of workers in order to compute lifetime statistics,
and calibrate the model to replicate as closely as possible the observed patterns of wages and transition
rates in the NLSY79. Estimation is performed by applying the Simulated Method of Moments: I
minimize the loss function
L(ω) = m(ω)′W m(ω) (1.12)
where ω is the vector of parameters of the model, m(ω) is a column vector of the differences between
the model-generated moments and the data moments, and W is a weighting matrix18.
18Computation of variance-covariance matrix of moments and of standard errors is not trivial, because one moment
restriction comes from the estimates of Hall and Milgrom (2007) and its covariance with the remaining moments cannot
be computed. At the moment, W is set in such a way that moments are scaled to their data average, that is I minimize the
sum of the square differences m(ω)mˆ , where mˆ are the data moments: in this way, I minimize the sum of relative distances
from data averages.
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I set the model period to be one month. I assume workers are born at age 20, the starting age of my
data, and choose the death probability λ in order to match an average working life of 40 years. I choose
the interest rate r as to give a compounded annual interest rate of 4%.
In line with many other models of directed search (Shimer (2005); Mortensen and Nagypal (2007);
Menzio and Shi (2011); Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2012)), I restrict the matching probability to
be of the form f(θ) = min{θ0.5, 1}.
The flow value of unemployment b is considered as including both the value of leisure and unemploy-
ment benefits, and is chosen as to match a ratio between b and average wages19 of 0.71, in line with the
estimates of Hall and Milgrom (2007).
The two match quality distributions H and L are assumed to be Weibull distributions20 with scale
parameters σH , σL and shape parameters φH , φL. Shape and scale of match quality distributions, the
probability pi of observing a worker's output, the random separation probability δ and the measure of
low-type workers l, are calibrated to match the observed patterns of job-finding rates, job-separation
rates over the life cycle by rest of population and top 10% unemployed, and the observed concentration
and persistence between young and prime-age unemployment of top 10% and of top 20%, as in the
tables presented in section 1.2. Notice however that the model is unit-free, so one of the scales has to
be set exogenously. I normalize σH = 1.
The vacancy creation cost κ is calibrated as to match the job-finding rate of bottom 90% of the
prime-age unemployment distribution at ages 20-25.
The calibration table reports only singleton targets: patterns of job-finding/separation rates and
wages are vectors and are shown later in graphs for readability. Overall, the estimation algorithm fits 8
parameters with 30 restrictions.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Calibration results
Despite being calibrated with over-identifying restrictions, the model does a very good job in replicating
the main features of the data. As can be seen in table 1.4, the model is quite capable of delivering realistic
19This requires to compute wages implied by the choices of workers in terms of lifetime utility v. For calibration
purposes, I assume that wages are determined by the firm as the constant piece-rate of productivity (that is, a constant
fraction of productivity) that delivers the promised expected lifetime utility v (provided the match continues).
20The Weibull distribution is a common choice in this regard. See for instance Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2012).
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Parameter Symbol Value Target Data Model
Interest rate r 0.0034 Yearly discount rate = 0.96
Prob. of Death λ 0.0021 Avg. career length = 40 yrs
Scale param, high type σH 1.0000 JS rate profiles,
Scale param, low type σL 0.4335 JF rate profiles,
Shape param, high type φH 15.4297 % prime-age U acc. by top 10 0.60 0.46
Shape param, low type φL 1.3051 % prime-age U acc. by top 20 0.83 0.68
Prob. observing output pi 0.0558
Flow value of Unemp. b 0.5384 Ratio b/avg. wage 0.70 0.65
Vacancy Creation Cost κ 2.9225 JF rate, bottom 90, age 20-25 0.29 0.31
Random Sep. Rate δ 0.0042 JS rate, bottom 90, age 40-50 0.007 0.007
Measure of Low Types l 0.2722 Persistence of U, top 10 0.41 0.39
Persistence of U, top 20 0.45 0.45
Table 1.4: Baseline calibration results. Targets calculated on NLSY/79.
amounts of concentration and persistence of unemployment. The model fits very well the persistence as
measured by the Markov transition matrix between being unemployed when young and when prime-age:
the probability of being in the top 10% of the unemployment distribution when prime-age, after having
been in the top 10% of the unemployment distribution when young, is 0.39 in the model and 0.41 in the
data. At the top 20%, the same statistic is 0.45 in the model and 0.45 in the data.
The model falls a bit short in replicating the observed concentration of the distribution of prime-age
unemployment: the top 10% accounts for 46% of prime-age unemployment in the model and 60% the
data, while the top 20% accounts for 68% of prime-age unemployment in the model and a bit more
than 80% in the data. However, this is a drastic improvement with respect to the standard Mortensen-
Pissarides model, which only predicts one-third of observed concentration at the top 10%.
The match quality distributions of high- and low-type workers are substantially different: at the
calibrated values, the match quality distribution of low types has more mass close to zero, and a long
right tail, while the match quality distribution of high types is narrower and more concentrated on
higher match qualities (figure 1.3).
The calibrated value of the probability of a firm observing the worker's output pi = 0.0558 implies
that the average duration of a bad match is about 18 months.
The calibrated measure of low-type workers in the economy is around 27%, a relatively large number.
36 Information Frictions, Match Quality and Lifetime Unemployment
Figure 1.3: Match quality distribution of high types (red) and low types (blue), under baseline calibration
As I will show in the discussion section, this number has important implications for the composition of
the unemployment pool and for the concentration and persistence of unemployment over the life cycle.
Figure 1.4: Model versus data; job-finding rates (left) and job-separation rates (right) of top 10%
prime-age unemployed (red) vs rest (blue). Results under baseline calibration.
Figure 1.4 shows that the job-finding rate of the top 10% of prime-age unemployed declines over
the life cycle as in the data, while the job-finding rate of the rest of workers rises during prime-age.
The model is very successful in fitting the patterns of job-separation and job-finding rates by prime-age
unemployment groups, both for the most unemployed and the rest.
Figure 1.5 plots the probability that a worker is of high-type depending on her age, by low and high
types and by part of the prime-age unemployment distribution. The figure depicts what I term learning
over the life cycle: as separations and continuations occur, the market slowly learns who are high-type
and who are low-type workers. The patterns of job-finding and job-separation rates are a consequence
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of this mechanism.
Figure 1.5: Probability of being a high type: by high/low type (left) and by top 10% of prime-age
unemployment (right). Model results under baseline calibration.
Let us look first at the job-finding rate: as the market learns who are low- and who are high-type
workers, the gap in job-finding rates between workers widens. This can be seen by comparing job-finding
rates and job-separation rates of high and low-type workers in the model (figure 1.6). The result follows
from this mechanism, and from the fact that more than 70% of the unemployment pool is made of low
types (figure 1.10 in Appendix). Thus, the job-finding rate of the top 10% unemployed is essentially
the job-finding rate of the most unlucky of low types: the model predicts that 94% of the top 10%
unemployed in prime-age are low-type workers.
Figure 1.6: job-finding rates (left) and job-separation rates (right) of low types (blue) vs high types
(green). Model results under baseline calibration.
Job-separation rates are substantially higher for the top 10% unemployed, both when young and
when prime-age; the model replicates quite well both the descent in the job-finding rate of the most
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unemployed workers and the increase in the job-finding rate of the rest over the life-cycle. If anything,
the model undershoots slightly the separation rate of the most unemployed workers until age 35, while
it overshoots it a bit for the same workers later on.
Similarly to job-finding rates, the job-separation rate of low-type workers is affected by learning over
the life cycle. At ages 20-30, the job-separation rate of low-type workers declines because these workers
typically draw low values of match quality and face frequent separations. However, both workers and
the market learn from these separations, so that the workers' outside option declines and these workers
become progressively less likely to separate from a job. Moreover, a luck effect exists: sooner or later,
every worker can find a job in which she is productive and stay there. The subsequent rise in separation
rates observed for the top 10% of prime-age unemployed is due to selection bias: this empirical strategy
is selecting the most unemployed individuals, who tend to be the most unlucky of low-type workers.
1.5.2 Counterfactual Simulations
I now simulate what would happen in alternative scenarios, removing model features one by one to study
their relative importance in fitting the data. Results are summarized in table 1.5. All models have been
recalibrated on the same loss function of the baseline model.
First, I calibrate a version of the model featuring uncertainty about match quality, on-the-job human
capital accumulation and stochastic human capital depreciation when unemployed (column 1): such a
model can get close to the data in terms of concentration of prime-age unemployment (at the top 10%,
44% against 60% in the data) thanks to uncertainty in match quality draws. Moreover, this feature
allows to replicate some of the life-cycle profile of separation rates: the top 10% prime-age unemployed
start with a job-separation rate of 2.80 at age 20-25, against 5.51 in the data, and the separation rate at
age 40 for these workers is almost matched (4.01 against 3.86). However, such a model fails completely
in delivering sufficiently large persistence of unemployment (at the top 10%, 12% against 41%). This
is because human capital accumulation and depreciation introduce reshuing in the skill level of
workers: instead of having fixed differences in productivity, every worker can now become unskilled
if he stays unemployed long enough, or skilled if he manages to get a sufficiently high level of match
quality. Moreover, model 1 cannot replicate the patterns of differences in separation rates at young ages
by unemployment groups, because it does not feature enough heterogeneity in match quality draws: the
bottom 90% of workers have about the same separation rate of the most unemployed at ages 20-30,
differently from the 3.6% difference existing in the data. Finally, such model cannot replicate the fact
Information Frictions, Match Quality and Lifetime Unemployment 39
(1) (2) (3)
1 type 2 types 2 types Baseline Data
VAR(x) > 0 VARl = 0 E(x|l) =
HC VARh = 0 E(x|h)
Separation rates, top 10
age 20-25 2.80 1.22 2.84 4.45 5.51
age 25-30 2.21 1.17 2.09 3.24 4.12
age 40-45 4.01 2.21 4.21 4.56 3.86
Separation rates, rest
age 20-25 2.63 1.13 2.61 2.16 1.95
age 25-30 1.68 1.11 1.54 1.23 1.34
age 40-45 0.66 1.00 0.62 0.72 0.77
Finding rates, top 10
age 20-25 24.06 26.00 24.14 22.79 23.88
age 25-30 23.61 18.19 23.33 18.57 20.41
age 40-45 18.72 14.65 18.77 17.02 16.73
Finding rates, rest
age 20-25 24.01 32.38 24.17 30.66 30.90
age 25-30 24.15 30.66 23.98 26.85 29.33
age 40-45 28.86 36.85 29.02 36.04 32.62
Concentration - Prime-age
U acc. by top 10 38.11 29.29 37.70 45.71 60.00
U acc. by top 20 59.91 46.58 65.96 68.21 83.00
Persistence
Top 10 young - Top 10 primes 12.27 23.73 14.62 38.79 41.00
Top 20 young - Top 20 primes 25.19 26.99 24.26 44.82 45.00
Table 1.5: Baseline calibration results vs counterfactuals. Column 1 is a model with no unobserved
heterogeneity, no uncertainty in match quality and fixed observable skills. Column 2 adds uncertainty
in match quality and accumulation/depreciation of skills. Column 3 is a model with heterogeneity in
average productivities, but no match quality uncertainty. Column 4 has heterogeneity in match quality
uncertainty, but not in average productivities. All numbers are percentage points. All models have been
recalibrated on the same loss function.
that the job-finding rate of the most unemployed falls at the beginning of their career.
I now calibrate a model with no human capital, heterogeneity in mean productivity across types,
but no uncertainty about match quality (column 2): that is, I estimate a model forcing the distribution
of match quality to be degenerate. Such model cannot predict the higher separation rate at age 20-25
for one group of workers, because as soon as workers draw their first job, they immediately learn that
they are low types and give up looking for a better job forever. In synthesis, learning is too fast and
bad luck plays little role: when there is no uncertainty about match quality, a worker will learn her
type with certainty at the first observation of output. Moreover, since the distribution of match quality
is degenerate, there is no other mechanism that delivers heterogeneity in separation rates. Such model
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also predicts a too sudden and too large decrease in job-finding rates, which start substantially higher
than the data at age 20. This is another consequence of excessively fast learning, and of the struggle
of the model in delivering concentration of unemployment by having to rely solely on heterogeneity
in job-finding rates. Finally, this model can improve over the model without heterogeneity (model 1)
in delivering persistence of unemployment (24% against 41% in the data at the top 10%), but fails
dramatically in delivering concentration, underperforming even the model without heterogeneity (model
1) in this regard; this is because there is no uncertainty in match quality, and thus no heterogeneity in
separation rates.
In the last experiment, I calibrate a model with heterogeneity in the variance of the match quality
distribution, but no differences in mean productivities21 (column 3). Such model performs very simi-
larly to the model without heterogeneity, delivering too little heterogeneity in job-finding rates and job
separation rates of young workers, while performing better for old workers.
These quantitative exercises confirm that all ingredients are important for explaining the patterns
observed in the data. Heterogeneity in the mean of match quality draws is important for explaining
differences in job-finding rates. Heterogeneity in the variance of match quality is important for explaining
heterogeneity in job-separation rates, for obtaining concentration of unemployment and for slowing
down learning at the start of the career: slower learning translates into a more realistic descent of
job-finding rates and job-separation rates for the most unemployed workers. Notice that even a model
with homogeneous types, but uncertainty in match quality draws (model 1), is capable of delivering
concentration of unemployment: this is because such concentration can be obtained if there is sufficient
heterogeneity in separation rates across workers, which can be the consequence of bad luck in match
quality draws.
1.5.3 Decomposing Learning over the Life Cycle
In this section I keep the baseline calibration but shut down information frictions by making types known
right from the start, to understand their importance in explaining the data. Results are presented in
table 1.6
21In practice, this is done by letting the shape parameters φi of the Weibull distributions be estimated freely by the
algorithm, while σl solves the nonlinear equation
µh = µl
where µi = σiΓ(1 +
1
φi
) is the mean of the Weibull distribution and Γ(x) is the Gamma function.
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Types known Baseline % Difference
Separation rates, top 10
age 20-25 3.90 4.45 -12.16
age 25-30 2.96 3.24 -8.38
age 30-35 3.11 3.19 -2.40
age 40-45 4.58 4.56 0.37
Separation rates, rest
age 20-25 2.14 2.16 -1.13
age 25-30 1.19 1.23 -2.93
Finding rates, top 10
age 20-25 18.67 22.79 -18.08
age 25-30 18.46 18.57 -0.60
age 40-45 16.88 17.02 -0.81
Finding rates, rest
age 20-25 18.67 22.79 -18.08
age 25-30 18.46 18.57 -0.60
Concentration - Prime-age
U acc. by top 10 45.36 45.71 -0.76
U acc. by top 20 68.11 68.21 -0.15
Persistence
Top 10 young - Top 10 primes 39.17 38.79 0.97
Top 20 young - Top 20 primes 44.96 44.82 0.30
Table 1.6: Baseline results vs counterfactuals. Column 1: types are known from the beginning. Column
2: baseline model. Column 3: percentage difference between column 1 and 2. All numbers are percentage
points.
First, I shut down entirely learning over the career, by making types already known at the beginning.
This reduces the separation rate of the most unemployed at age 20-30 by about half a percentage point
(one-eigth), because these workers are already aware that they are low types, so their outside option is
already low and they do not separate from jobs after lucky draws. The persistence and concentration
of unemployment are barely affected, as these are mainly due to heterogeneity across workers and bad
luck in drawing match quality values. Finally, information frictions account for the whole decline in
job-finding rates from age 20 to 40 for the most unemployed workers: if types were already known, firms
would already anticipate their low average productivity and these workers would find jobs with lower
probability right from the start.
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1.5.4 Duration dependence
The model is also capable of reproducing a duration dependence relation in job-finding rates (figure
1.7), similar to the one documented by Hornstein (2012) and Wiczer (2014). The relation arises because
of a composition mechanism similar to Gonzalez and Shi (2010): workers with higher market prior find
jobs first, followed by workers with lower market priors. I plan to expand this section in the future by
decomposing the duration dependence relation in effects of learning vs observable skills.
Figure 1.7: Model-generated data: duration dependence relation in job-finding rates, at 1, 3, 6 and 12
months of unemployment duration.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Heterogeneity or Human Capital?
I have shown that a theory of information frictions and heterogeneity is capable of explaining at the
same time the patterns of job-finding rates, job-separation rates and (part of) the patterns of wages
by unemployment groups over the life cycle. An alternative explanation might be that workers who
are often unemployed tend to lose, or fail to accumulate, human capital because they lack on-the-job
training and face human capital depreciation (as in Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998)). To the extent that
human capital is observable, if workers started with some level of human capital, depreciation would
lead the most unemployed workers to experience lower job-finding rates, possibly explaining one of the
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facts. However, even if lower human capital yielded higher separation rates, depreciation would imply
that heterogeneity in job-separation rates rises along the career, because the most unemployed would
lose human capital and possibly face higher separation rates, while the rest of workers would experience
fewer separations. As a result, we should observe a divergence in separation rates by unemployment
groups, and not a convergence such as the one I document.
Column 1 of table 1.5 partially tests for these implications by calibrating a version of the model
featuring no ex-ante heterogeneity across workers, match quality draws and human capital accumula-
tion/depreciation as the only source of persistence in unemployment. Such model delivers almost no
young-prime-age persistence of unemployment, and patterns of job-finding rates and job-separation rates
by prime-age unemployment groups that are completely inconsistent with the data.
1.7 Conclusions
Using NLSY/79 data, I show that unemployment during prime-age is concentrated in relatively few
workers, who experience both long spells of unemployment and frequent separations from their jobs.
Moreover, unemployment is persistent in the sense that those who were often unemployed when young
tend to be often unemployed during their primes. I build a model that delivers both high concentration
of unemployment during prime-age and persistence of unemployment over the life-cycle, and that is
consistent with the patterns of job-finding rates and job-separation rates by prime-age unemployment
groups. The model delivers such result by a combination of incomplete information and heterogeneity
across workers. I find that information frictions are important for explaining workers' labor market
outcomes at the beginning of their career; in particular, a model without information frictions delivers
a too high job-finding rate gap between different workers at the start of their work life and a higher
separation rate than the one observed in the data for most young workers. Finally, I find that unobserved
heterogeneity, rather than differences in observed skills, is responsible for the bulk of my results.
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Appendix
1.A Construction of job-finding and job-separation probabilities
Following Clark and Summers (1979) and Wiczer (2014), I consider workers who exit the labor force as
if they were not in the at-risk population; for each group of workers Nj, which can be the whole sample
(Nj = N), or the top 10% of the unemployment distribution and its complement, I use the formulas
Fj =
∑
i∈Nj
Upi∑
t=1
fi,t∑
i∈Nj
Upi
(1.13)
Sj =
∑
i∈Nj
Epi∑
t=1
si,t∑
i∈Nj
Epi
(1.14)
where fi,t is a variable defined only in weeks spent in unemployment, which were followed by weeks
spent in either unemployment or employment, and takes value 1 if the following week the worker was
employed, and 0 otherwise; si,t is defined only in weeks spent in employment, followed by weeks spent in
either employment or unemployment, and takes value 1 if the following week the worker was unemployed,
and 0 otherwise; Upi is the number of weeks worker i was unemployed during prime-age; and E
p
i is the
number of weeks worker i was employed during prime-age.
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Dep. Variable: % U when 35-55
(1) (2) (3)
Only HS, Males All, with controls All, No Young U
% U when young (20-30) 0.3635∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.02)
N 1029 3127 3127
R2 0.186 0.218 0.127
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.7: Source: own calculations on NLSY/79. Regression of % of prime-age unemployment on %
of young unemployment: only for high-school educated males (1), for all workers + controls (2), for all
workers with controls only and no young unemployment (3). Controls include sex, education, ethnic
group, age in 2010, marital status, AFQT test score quartile.
1.B Supplementary Data Analysis
1.B.1 Impact of Labor Force Participation
In this subsection I investigate whether the labor force participation margin is relevant for the results I
present on the concentration of unemployment. One possibility is that the most unemployed individuals
get discouraged about their possibilities of finding jobs; thus, they might tend to permanently drop out
of the labor force more frequently than the rest of the sample. To study whether this is the case, I
compute the average participation rate of individuals by unemployment groups. It is easy to see that
the top 10% of prime-age unemployed tends to participate less often to the labor force. The two groups
follow a substantially parallel trend until age 40, after which the top 10% do tend to drop out of the
labor force more frequently. However, when we look at individuals who did not participate for a full
year, this difference reduces dramatically, suggesting that although the top 10% tends to spend more
time out of the labor force, this does not mean that they always drop out completely.
It is unlikely that changes in sample composition are driving most results on the concentration of
unemployment; however, I address this concern by studying how much the participation margin matters
for computing lifetime statistics and the concentration of unemployment. As explained in section 1.2,
another possible way to compute the average by unemployment groups is
u˜pup<q90 =
N∑
i=1
[
1(u¯pi < q90(u
p))upi
]
N
(1.15)
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Figure 1.8: Labor Force Participation rate; by prime-age unemployment groups and by 5-years age
groups. Left: fraction of weeks spent either in employment or unemployment by group. Right: fraction
of individuals in group who worked at least a week during a year.
so that every individual has the same weight in the computation of the average, regardless of the
number of periods he has been employed or unemployed. I will refer to this as the equally-weighted
average, and to the average presented in the paper as the participation-weighted average.
In principle, it is not clear which of the two averages should be used. Since the top 10% of prime-age
unemployed tends to be out of the labor force more often, these individuals have a lower weight in
the participation-weighted average than in the equally-weighted average. Thus, the latter represents the
concentration of unemployment if we were to observe the top 10% in the labor force as often as the rest of
the sample. With respect to this logic, the participation-weighted average is likely to bias downward my
estimates of aggregate prime-age unemployment, and of the concentration of unemployment. As shown
in table 1.8, the equally-weighted formula indeed imply substantially identical averages when excluding
the most unemployed, but a higher average of overall prime-age unemployment. Thus, this implies a
higher concentration of unemployment, compared to the results with participation-weighted averages;
the performance of the standard model is even worse in delivering concentration of unemployment when
using equally-weighted averages for comparison.
1.B.2 Sample selection
In this subsection I show that sample selection plays little role in computing both the concentration and
persistence of unemployment. I compare the statistics computed in section 1.2 with the same statistics22
computed using the whole sample of workers by education and gender.
22In this case, the average time in unemployment during prime-age is the participation-adjusted average.
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NLSY/79 Unif. Match
Avg. % time in unemployment 4.6 (target) 4.6
Avg. % time in U, excluding top 10% 1.6 3.1
Avg. % time in U, excluding top 20% 0.6 1.9
Table 1.8: Left column: equally-weighted averages computed on NLSY/79, individuals aged 35-55.
Sample includes only high school educated, male individuals with more than 100 observations of weekly
job histories in their prime-age, ending 2010. Right column: averages computed by simulating sequences
of job-finding - job-separation events using flow equations of Mortensen-Pissarides model, calibrated to
average job-finding and job-separation probabilities in NLSY/79 sample.
Only HS Whole Sample
Prime-age unemployment Avg. % time in U 3.6 3.4
Avg. % time in U, exclud. top 10% 1.6 1.4
Avg. % time in U, exclud. top 20% 0.6 0.6
Persistence Prob. top 10 prime-age given top 10 young 41.18 34.06
Prob. top 10 prime-age given Rest young 6.47 7.32
Prob. top 20 prime-age given top 20 young 44.88 43.07
Prob. top 20 prime-age given Rest young 13.71 14.23
Table 1.9: Participation-adjusted averages computed on NLSY/79, individuals aged 35-55. Left
column: only high school educated, male individuals with more than 100 observations of weekly job
histories in their prime-age, ending 2010. Right column: whole cross-sectional sample of NLSY/79,
satisfying the same restriction on weekly job histories.
I also investigate whether concentration and persistence of unemployment, as well as differentials in
job-finding rates and job-separation rates I document, vary significantly across education subgroups. I
keep only males and divide the NLSY/79 into high-school dropouts, high-school educated and some-
college and above (those who took some college courses but did not complete college, and college-
educated). Results are summarized in table 1.10. For all subgroups, all facts stand. Unemployment
is more concentrated than what the Mortensen-Pissarides standard model implies; high young un-
employment predicts high prime-age unemployment; and inequality is more due to heterogeneity in
job-separation rates than job-finding rates.
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Dropouts High-School ≥ Some College
% U Accounted for by top 10 47 59 70
Predicted by MP 23 24 44
% U Accounted for by top 20 69 83 92
Predicted by MP 38 39 70
Persistence: prob. of top 10 prime-age
from top 10 young 26 41 22
from rest young 7 6 7
Avg. % time in unemployment
top 10% prime-age 53 29 15
Rest 4.2 1.5 0.5
δ: Prob. of U → E (monthly%)
top 10% prime-age 4 8 11
Rest 18 26 35
f : Prob. of E → U (monthly%)
top 10% prime-age 5.0 3.5 2.0
Rest 0.8 0.4 0.2
Predicted % time in U of top 10%, δ alone: 21 12 5
Predicted % time in U of top 10%, f alone: 16 5 2
Table 1.10: Summary statistics by parts of the prime-age (35-55) unemployment distribution and by
education subgroups. Source: own calculations on NLSY/79. Predicted % time in U calculated using
the formula u = δ/(δ + f).
1.B.3 Measurement Error
When computing lifetime unemployment statistics, it is crucial to have enough observations per indi-
vidual. If an individual had been observed only for few weeks, and was always unemployed, taking the
average over those weeks would incorrectly attribute a lifetime unemployment of 100% to that individ-
ual. To address the extent of measurement error, I compute the concentration of unemployment in top
10 %, top 20 %, and the persistence of unemployment for different values of the lower bound of weeks of
reported employment/unemployment, both when 20-30 and when 35-55. Results are reported only for
the high-school subsample. Although measures of persistence and unemployment tend to fall, because
the most unemployed also tend to stay out of the labor force more often, results on concentration are
substantially unchanged, and persistence remains high: in the worst-case scenario in which the sample
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is required to have at least 500 weeks of reported employment/unemployment both when young and
when prime-age (totaling 1000 weeks over 1560 maximum weeks available), the top 10% most unem-
ployed when young still have between 4 and 5 times the likelihood of being the most unemployed when
prime-age, and the most prime-age unemployed still account for two-thirds of unemployment.
100 weeks (baseline) 300 weeks 500 weeks
Prime-age U 3.6 3.3 2.6
Prime-age U, without top 10% 1.5 1.3 0.9
Prime-age U, without top 20% 0.6 0.5 0.3
Persistence (top 10 - top 10) 41% 35% 29%
(rest - top 10) 6% 7% 8%
Persistence (top 20 - top 20) 45% 41% 35%
(rest - top 20) 14% 14% 16%
N. Individuals 1029 918 633
Table 1.11: Accounting for possible measurement error: concentration and persistence of unemployment
according to alternative definitions of the sample. High school males with at least 100 weeks (column
1), 300 weeks (2), 500 weeks (3) of reported employment/unemployment. Source: own calculations on
NLSY/79.
1.B.4 The role of Occupations and Health
One might think that differences across occupations are behind the strong young-prime-age correlations
found in the data. For instance, the choice of a bad occupation when young might lead a worker to
experience high unemployment both when young and in the future. I show that occupations explain
relatively little of the observed young-old persistence by augmenting previous regressions with occu-
pational controls (table 1.12). I use the CENSUS 1970 classification at the major category level, and
I control both for the most prevalent occupation between 1979 and 2001 (that is, the occupation in
which the individual worked the most during those years) and for the occupation in 1990. Sample size
diminishes because occupation codes are not always available for workers in the NLSY/79; however, the
strong predictive power of young unemployment remains substantially unchanged. Occupation in 1990
appears to be the most important correlate variable, diminishing the young-prime-age persistence of un-
employment by 0.06. However, one must consider that occupational choice in 1990 is not independent
on past labor market history, and its relevance is likely to be upward-biased because of reverse causality.
I finally consider whether the deterioration of health correlates with prime-age unemployment. I
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use ex-post health (in 2006) as a control as to construct a worst-case scenario: since health in 2006
can be the result of past unemployment, it will partly correlate with young unemployment and prime-
age unemployment, thus in principle lowering the estimate of the impact of young unemployment. I
find that, although health correlates with prime-age unemployment, it has a negligible influence on the
predictive power of young unemployment.
Figure 1.9: Difference in wages between top 10 % prime-age unemployed and rest; data (dashed) versus
model (continuous) under baseline calibration.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Educ Educ+Occ Educ+Occ 2 Ed+Occ 2+Hlth
% U when Young (20-30) 0.299∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age -0.000262 -0.000233 -0.000144 -0.000159 -0.000195
Female 0.00128 0.00211 0.000769 0.000910 -0.000363
Ethnic Group
Black 0.0204∗ 0.0170∗ 0.0160∗ 0.0165∗ 0.0145∗
Hispanic -0.000845 0.00827 0.00744 0.00760 0.00623
Marital Status
Married -0.0340∗∗∗ -0.0334∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗∗ -0.0319∗∗∗
Separated -0.0139 -0.0130 -0.0132 -0.0141
Divorced -0.0119∗ -0.0111∗ -0.0114∗ -0.0119∗
Widowed -0.00665 -0.00637 -0.00631 -0.00508
Education, age 30
Some College 0.00770 0.00477 0.00505 0.00429
High School 0.00929∗ 0.00578 0.00564 0.00289
Dropout 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗
AFQT Quartile
2 -0.00499 -0.00562 -0.00518 -0.00323
3 -0.0106∗ -0.0108∗ -0.00999 -0.00688
4 -0.0128∗ -0.0122∗ -0.0113 -0.00896
Health 2000
Very Good -0.00167
Good 0.00367
Fair 0.0196∗∗
Poor 0.0685∗∗∗
Constant 0.0403 0.0440 0.0369 0.0371 0.0373
Standard Controls X X X X X
Education, AFQT and MaStat X X X X
Prevalent Occ. (1 digit) X X X
Occupation in 1990 (1d) X X
Health Status (2000) X
N 3896 3896 3896 3896 3896
R2 0.151 0.179 0.183 0.185 0.195
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.12: Source: own calculations on NLSY/79. Complementary regressions of % of prime-age un-
employment on % of young unemployment for all workers. Sample restricted to individuals for which all
controls are available for all models. Controls always include sex, ethnic group and age in 2010. (2) adds
AFQT test score quartile, education and marital status, (3) adds prevalent occupation during working
life dummies, (4) adds occupation in 1990 dummies, (5) adds health status in 2000 dummies. Omitted
categories: male, white, never married, college-educated, 1st quartile AFQT, Technical/professional oc-
cupations, Excellent Health. Occupation coefficients and standard errors (with the exception of young
unemployment) are not reported for reading convenience.
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Rest Top 10% (35-55) Ratio
Top 10 / Rest
When young (20-30):
Fired 0.06 0.14 2.33
Involuntary 0.43 0.78 1.8
Quit to Look 0.4 0.6 1.5
In Primes (35-55):
Fired 0.02 0.1 5
Involuntary 0.09 0.4 4.44
Quit to Look 0.02 0.09 4.5
Table 1.13: Weekly probability of job termination, by reason and group of prime-age unemployment.
Third column gives ratio of probability between top 10 and rest. Source: own calculations on matched
employer-employee data of NLSY/79. `Involuntary' category merges layoffs, establishment closures and
temporary jobs ended.
Figure 1.10: Share of workers who are low types, by age; under baseline calibration.
1.C Proofs not included in Paper
Lemma 1: Given p ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ [0, x¯], S(x, p) is increasing in x. Also, d(x, p) is a step function
that takes value 1 if x < U(p)(1− β) and δ otherwise.
Proof: Given a match quality value x and a résumé p, the problem of a firm-worker pair can be
rewritten as:
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S(x, p) = max
d∈[δ,1]
[
x+ β dU(p)
1− β (1− d)
]
(1.16)
which is clearly increasing in x. As both x and p are given, so is U(p). By taking first derivative it
can be shown that the function on the right hand side of the expression is increasing in d if and only if
x < U(p)(1− β) (1.17)
Denote by d∗ the optimal choice for d. If condition 1.17 is verified, maximization implies that d∗ = 1.
If instead x
1−β > U(p), the function is decreasing in d and thus d
∗ = δ which is the lowest possible
probability of separation. If x = U(p)(1− β), the firm-worker match is indifferent between any value of
d ∈ [δ, 1]. 
Lemma 5: Under the assumption that H(x) < L(x) ∀x ∈ [0, x¯), U is strictly increasing.
Proof. Let TU(p) denote the right hand side of equation 1.11 so that U is a fixed point of the mapping T .
It must be proved that the operator T maps from the set of continuous, bounded, increasing functions
(denoted by C1) into the subset of itself containing continuous, bounded and strictly increasing functions
Cs1 . Thus, it must be proved that TU(p2) > TU(p1) ∀ p2, p1 ∈ [0, 1] such that p2 > p1. Since T is a
contraction mapping, it will follow that U is strictly increasing. Denote by θ ∗ (p) the optimal tightness
choice of a worker with prior p. Hence,
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U(p2)− U(p1)
= max
θ
{
f(θ)β(Su(p2)− U(p2))− κθ
}
+ βU(p2)
−max
θ
{
f(θ)β(Su(p1)− U(p1))− κθ
}
− βU(p1)
≥ f(θ∗(p1))β
[
SU(p2)− SU(p1)
]
+ (1− f(θ∗(p1))β
(
U(p2)− U(p1)
)
≥ f(θ∗(p1))β
[
SU(p2)− SU(p1)
]
= B
{
(1− pi)[E(x|p2)− E(x|p1)]+ β(1− pi)δ[U(p2)− U(p1)]
+ pi
[(
p2
ˆ
S(x, p′2)dH(x) + (1− p2)
ˆ
S(x, p′2)dL(x)
)
− pi
[(
p1
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dH(x) + (1− p1)
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dL(x)
)]}
≥ B
{
(1− pi)[E(x|p2)− E(x|p1)]
+ pi
[
(p2 − p1)
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dH(x) + (1− p2)
ˆ
S(x, p′2)dL(x)
+(1− p2)
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dL(x)− (1− p2)
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dL(x)− (1− p1)S(x, p′1)dL(x)
]}
= B
{
(1− pi)[E(x|p2)− E(x|p1)]
+ pi
[
(p2 − p1)
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dH(x)− (p2 − p1)
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dL(x)
+ (1− p2)
[ˆ
S(x, p′2)dL(x)−
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dL(x)
]}
> 0
The first equality is obtained by substituting equation 1.11. The second inequality is because max-
imization implies that a worker's optimal choice θ ∗ (p2) will always deliver a higher or equal value
than if he chose θ ∗ (p1) instead. The fact that U is increasing delivers the next inequality. The fourth
equality is obtained by simply substituting the solution to equation 1.7, where B = f(θ
∗(p1))
1−β(1−pi)(1−δ) The
fifth inequality stems again from the fact that U is increasing, so that also S(x, p) is increasing in p, and
from the fact that posterior beliefs p′i are increasing in p, so that
ˆ
S(x, p′2)dH(x) ≥
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dL(x);
notice that at this step I add and subtract the same quantity (1−p2)
ˆ
S(x, p′1)dL(x). The sixth equality
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is obtained by regrouping terms; notice that at this point the first line is strictly positive due to First
Order Stochastic Dominance, the second line is positive for the same reason, the last line is positive
because S(x, p) is increasing in p, and all quantities are positive. Thus, this proves that TU : C1 → Cs1 ,
completing the proof. 
A Quantitative Theory of Early Skills Formation and Parental Choices 57
Chapter 2
A Quantitative Theory of Early Skills
Formation and Parental Choices
2.1 Introduction
Heterogeneity at age 20 has been shown to be one of the most important determinants of lifetime
inequality1. A significant part of such heterogeneity builds up during childhood, which is known to be a
crucial phase for skills development2. Patterns of child care time suggest that parental investment plays
an important role in shaping inequality in skills accumulation: for example, more educated parents tend
to spend more time with their children in the US. Moreover, parents who perform well in cognitive tests
tend to have children who perform well too3. Understanding the origins of such patterns is crucial for
understanding inequality and evaluating the long term impact of redistributive policies. In this paper
I develop a theory of parental investment in which heterogeneity in rates of returns (that is, gains in
children's skills per unit of investment) provides an explanation for the cross-sectional patterns of child
care time and the intergenerational correlation of test scores.
For this purpose I introduce the estimates of the technology of cognitive and noncognitive skills
formation proposed by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) in an heterogeneous agents decision
1See Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011); Lee and Seshadri (2012); Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009); Keane and Wolpin
(1996).
2The empirical evidence dates back to the Perry Preschool Project (1962) and the Coleman Report (1966); see for
instance Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto and Savelyev (2010b) and Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev and Yavitz (2010a), and
also the Head Start and Early Head Start programs.
3See Guryan, Hurst and Kearney (2008), Ramey and Ramey (2010) on child care time differentials; Black, Devereux
and Salvanes (2008), Anger and Heineck (2009) on intergenerational correlations of test scores.
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theoretic model of parental investment choices and skills development. In my model, households care
for their children's skills and invest time and goods in them; time trades off with work hours and leisure,
while goods trade off with consumption. The main mechanism is simple: higher returns give a higher
incentive to invest, hence parental choices are influenced by the structure of the technology of skills
formation.
My goal is twofold. First, I want to understand the role played by parental time versus goods as
investment inputs. To do so, I calibrate the model to replicate features of the US economy and to
stylized facts on early skills development. I find that time with children is the most important input
of parental investment, in line with the existing literature. Then I investigate whether the theory, joint
with the properties of the technology, can account for noncalibrated facts observed in the data. I find
that the model accounts very well for the bulk of cross-sectional variation of child care time and for
correlations of test scores.
The technology of skills formation estimated by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) has a num-
ber of properties which are crucial for the success of my theory in accounting for the data. First,
childrens' skills exhibit self-productivity: higher initial skills lead to higher skills later on. Also, early
parental investment produces long-lasting effects because increasing skills at the beginning affects all
the subsequent path of skills development. Second, during early childhood (ages 0-6) investment is more
productive than during later childhood (ages 6-14). These first two properties imply that parents invest
more during early childhood.
Third, higher-skilled parents are more productive in raising skillful children: this implies that higher-
skilled parents have a higher incentive to invest. Also, higher-skilled parents are more likely to be
college-educated: despite the fact that they earn higher wages, I find that productivity differentials can
offset differences in the opportunity cost of time, providing an explanation for why college-educated
parents spend more time with their children. Fourth, investment in early and later childhood are
strongly complementary, which means that some amount of investment during late childhood is needed
in order to sustain previously accumulated skills. All previous properties imply that parents who invest
more during early childhood will tend to do so also later on, in order not to lose skills accumulated
by their children: this explains why college-educated parents invest more both during early and late
childhood. Cross-households productivity differentials and complementarity of early and late investment
also contribute to explaining the observed correlation of cognitive skills at age 14 between mothers and
children: higher incentives to invest for higher-skilled parents lead to persistence in skills inequality.
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Lastly, the elasticity of substitution between inputs of skills formation varies widely across early and
later childhood: that is, increasing skills during early childhood is relatively easy, while in subsequent
years it becomes almost impossible due to a combination of low productivity of investment and strong
complementarity between inputs.
In short, if parents invest only during early childhood and then forget about their child later on,
the child's skills will diminish greatly. If instead they do not invest during early childhood, increasing
the child's skills later will be extremely costly. Since households anticipate future phases of skills
development, they trade off easy gains during early childhood with the fact that increasing skills too
much requires more investment to sustain them later. Hence the effect of such property on the life cycle
dynamics of parental investment is nontrivial. I find that, quantitatively, the difference in elasticities of
substitution estimated by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach accounts very well for the ratio of early to
late child care time observed in the data. By contrast, when this property is not accounted for, I obtain
early/late ratios that are inconsistent with the empirical evidence.
The theory is succesful in accounting for several facts on child care time as observed in the 1975-1985
American Time Use Survey. In particular, the model matches well the average ratio of early (ages 0-6)
to late (ages 6-14) child care time, the fact that households partly give up labor supply when a child is
born, the fact that higher-educated parents invest more time in their children. As a calibration result,
I find that parental time accounts for the largest share of investment, consistently with the results of
Schoelmann (2012) and Del Boca et al. (2012), although goods do play a role.
The model also reproduces well the pattern of intergenerational correlations of parental and children's
skills observed in the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth 1979. I find that, to get this result, it is
very important to account for the time structure of the technology, i.e. build a model that has as many
time periods as the estimated technology: three periods of early childhood (0-6) and four periods of late
childhood (6-14). Simplified models can explain the patterns of child care time, but fail in delivering
quantitatively consistent persistence across generations4. The reason is that such correlations build up
over time, and that many time periods are needed for parental skills to account for a larger fraction of
their children's skills.
While several papers try to understand how parental choices interact with child development, returns
to investment are usually very difficult to identify, because few data sets provide enough consecutive
measurements of children's skills. Moreover, data on early achievement of children are often plagued
4For instance, Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) use a two-period model with one period of early childhood and
one period of later childhood to discuss the effects of different investment policies.
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by measurement error issues5. The data of Cunha et al. allow to overcome this last problem, because
they contain many measurements of children's skills. However, such data do not have information on
parental time. Hence in their work parental investment is identified using different measurements6. My
model provides a theory of how returns (as identified by the technology) affect investment decisions
of households on time and goods. As a result, the patterns of child care time produced by the model
are a consequence of returns to parental investment, but I emphasize that they do not simply replicate
patterns of the data used to identify the technology.
Finally, I use the model to perform a policy experiment applying the 2012 German scheme of child
allowances in the model. The policy could improve slightly average cognitive skills at age 14; gains in
skills are higher among children from poorer families. Also, such a policy would reduce the correlation
between household income and offspring's cognitive skills by 4.5 % and the intergenerational persistence
of noncognitive skills by 1.5 %, while having a negligible impact on the intergenerational persistence
of cognitive skills. This result is compatible with the fact that the US and Germany have very similar
intergenerational correlations of cognitive test scores (Anger and Heineck (2009)), despite having very
different institutional setups regarding child allowances. The intuition for my results is that, while a
flat transfer can reduce relative differences in income across households by diminishing the relevance of
income per se, it cannot compensate for the fact that higher-skilled parents are more productive in
raising skillful children.
The paper is organized as follows. I present a brief review of the related literature in section 2.
Section 3 describes in detail the features of the technology of skills formation and the theoretical model.
Section 4 describes the data used to identify the parameters and the calibration. Section 5 presents
quantitative results and external validation; section 6 presents several robustness checks. Section 7
describes the results of the policy experiment. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2.2 Related Literature
The central ingredient of my model, the technology of skills formation, is taken from the work of Cunha,
Heckman and Schennach (2010), who employ a novel identification strategy based on measurement-
error models and estimate such technology. They find that measurement error is extremely relevant
5See Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) on the first-order importance of measurement error in estimating skills
formation technologies.
6For instance, questions such as how many push/pull toys does the child own?? See Cunha, Heckman and Schennach
(2010) for details.
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for measures of child development and parental investment; that cognitive and noncognitive skills, both
as child's and parental endowments, contribute to each other's production; that cognitive skills can be
heavily influenced in early childhood, but not in late childhood; that accounting for both cognitive and
noncognitive skills production makes a big difference in the discussion of optimal policy. The work
of Cunha et al. is not the only attempt to estimate technologies of skills formation; see for instance
Helmers and Patnam (2011), Todd and Wolpin (2007) or Hanushek and Woessmann (2008). I choose
the former technology because of its generality7.
To the best of my knowledge, not many papers try to quantify the causes of the patterns of child
care time in a structural model. Several papers build models for policy analysis using data on both time
with children and cognitive achievement, for instance Bernal and Keane (2010) (2011), Del Boca, Flinn
and Wiswall (2012), Griffen (2011) and Brilli (2012). I take a different route: I use external estimates
of the technology of skills formation and try to understand whether differences in returns to investment
can account for facts on time with children and cognitive/noncognitive test scores. The paper by Del
Boca et al. is in many respects complementary to the present one; the authors estimate a structural
model of cognitive skills formation and parental choices using data from the Child Development Supply
of the PSID. The main message of their paper is that household choices regarding investment in children
cannot be understood without also considering labor and consumption choices. While their model is
built in order to understand the average effect of policies, I focus on inequality in children's skills and
in parental investment that arises from the interaction of household tradeoffs and the properties of the
skills formation process. Moreover, the policy results of Del Boca et al. are substantially negative,
as they find that a governmental contribution to parental investment goods as large as about 25 % of
median yearly household income increases latent childrens' skills by a relatively small amount over the
baseline. As I show in the Policy subsection, due to big differences in the specification of the technology
of skills formation I use, my policy results are substantially more encouraging in this regard.
I use the model to understand what drives the variation in time spent with children across households;
a vast empirical literature studies these patterns. In particular Bianchi (2000), Guryan, Hurst and
Kearney (2008) and Ramey and Ramey (2010) provide analyses of child care time in the US. I isolate
two facts from this literature: parental time with children has been remarkably stable from 1960 to
1990s, and college-educated parents tend to spend more time with their children in the US8.
7I also show that a technology which takes into account only cognitive skills performs poorly on several noncalibrated
moments.
8Guryan, Hurst and Kearney (2008) show that college-educated parents spent about 35 % more time with their children
in the 2000s. In a comment to the paper of Ramey and Ramey (2010), Hurst shows that such child care time differential
62 A Quantitative Theory of Early Skills Formation and Parental Choices
Finally, whether parental time or purchasable goods are more important for investment in children
is an open question, and a very relevant one for my work. The empirical study of Schoellmann (2012)
on Indochinese refugees suggests that goods are quantitatively unimportant in explaining differences
in human capital. The model I develop predicts a greater role for parental time compared to income,
consistently with his results.
2.3 The model
The model features three key ingredients: the technology of skills formation, time-allocation choices of
households and ex-ante heterogeneity in skills for parents and offsprings.
Since most of the results are a direct consequence of returns to investment, the next subsection
summarizes the main features of the technology of skills formation estimated by Cunha, Heckman and
Schennach (2010) (CHS from now on) and the main mechanisms behind differentials in returns.
2.3.1 The technology of skills formation
CHS estimate the technology of skills formation assuming there exist two different developmental stages,
j = {1, 2}, which correspond to early childhood (ages 0-6) and later childhood (ages 7-14) respectively.
Early human capital of the child is assumed to be a two dimensional, time varying vector of skills; the
latter are of type k = {C,N}, respectively cognitive and noncognitive skills.
Parents provide three different inputs for child development: their cognitive and noncognitive skills
sC,P , sN,P , which are assumed to be time-invariant, and parental investment It. Parental skills are
assumed to be those of the mother.
The technology of skills formation has the common Constant Elasticity of Substitution form
sk,t+1 = [γj,k,1s
φj,k
C,t + γj,k,2s
φj,k
N,t + γj,k,3I
φj,k
t + γj,k,4s
φj,k
C,P + γj,k,5s
φj,k
N,P ]
1/φj,k (2.1)
which states that next period's skills sk,t+1 are a function of investment It, offspring's cognitive
and noncognitive skills {sC,t, sN,t} at time t and parental cognitive and noncognitive skills {sC,P , sN,P}.
Notice that there are two stages j but many time periods t, which belong to one of the two stages.
In the work of CHS, periods t are two years long and stages 1 and 2 correspond to ages 0-6 and 7-14,
was already around 11 % in 1985. Evidence on the increasing gap in parental investments between college and noncollege
parents has raised concerns on whether future persistence of inequality might rise as a consequence. See for instance
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/opinion/brooks-the-opportunity-gap.html?_r=3&src=me&ref=general&
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respectively. All parameters γj,k,i and φj,k vary across developmental stages j = {1, 2} and across skills
k = {C,N}. The parameter φj,k ∈ (−∞, 1] is crucial, because it determines the elasticity of substitution
1/(1− φj,k) between inputs.
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach estimate the technology of skills formation under a number of
alternative assumptions (household-specific heterogeneity and endogeneity of investment); their findings
are robust to the alternatives. I summarize below the findings that drive results in the present paper.
1. Self-Productivity: skills exhibit self-productivity in the sense that γj,C,1 > 0, γj,N,2 > 0 for
j = {1, 2}; higher initial skills lead on average to higher skills later on. Also, early investment
produces long-lasting effects because increasing skills at the beginning affects all the subsequent
skill development.
2. Cross-Productivity: skills positively contribute to each other, in the sense that γj,C,2 > 0, γj,N,1 >
0 for j = {1, 2}. Higher cognitive skills increase noncognitive skills, and viceversa.
3. Efficiency: in the first stage, investment is more productive than in the second stage, for both
cognitive and noncognitive skills; that is, γ1,k,3 > γ2,k,3 for k = {C,N}.
4. Complementarity: in the first stage of cognitive skills development, the elasticity of substitution
between inputs is roughly four times larger than in the second stage; this means that, during early
childhood, parental investment can make up for adverse initial conditions (i.e. below-median
initial cognitive endowments) and for low parental skills. During later childhood, instead, inputs
become strongly complementary, so that increasing skills in this phase becomes extremely costly.
Noncognitive skills, instead, exhibit roughly the same elasticity of substitution across stages.
The features of the technology, along with its estimated parametrization (available in table 2.14 in
the Appendix), produce a number of derived results that give insights on how parental investment should
behave if households knew the technology of skills formation. First of all, in the first stage it is easier
to increase cognitive skills; the amount of investment required to increase skills by 1 % of a standard
deviation is lower in the first stage with respect to the second, as figure 2.1 shows. Noncognitive skills,
instead, do not exhibit such a clear pattern for the productivity of investment.
Given that returns to investment are larger in the first stage, if parents care more for cognitive rather
than noncognitive skills of their offspring, we should expect investment to be higher in early childhood
rather than in later childhood.
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Figure 2.1: Amount of investment required to increase skills by 1 % of a standard deviation, by level
of log standardized initial skills, in the first stage (red line) and second stage (blue line); parental skills
fixed at the median. Graph includes magnification for lower-than-median initial cognitive skills.
Another feature of the technology is that investment in the second and first stage are strongly com-
plementary: this happens because first stage investment enters second-stage skills production through
the self-productivity of future periods' skills. Hence, the more investment is performed today, the more
it is required tomorrow, even only to keep skills constant.
Figure 2.2: Amount of second-stage investment required to maintain skills constant, by initial invest-
ment, against 45◦ line; child's initial skills and parental skills fixed at the median.
Figure 2.2 shows how much investment is required in order to keep skills constant in the second
stage, after investing x units in the first stage, for a median household.
A Quantitative Theory of Early Skills Formation and Parental Choices 65
The natural consequence of these two features is that we expect investment to be smoothed across
phases, on average; moreover, household groups who invest more in the first stage will, on average,
invest more also in the second stage.
The final feature I discuss here is that high-skilled parents are more productive in raising skillful
children; figure 2.3 summarizes this feature of the technology.
Figure 2.3: Gain in skills (as fraction of a standard deviation) by log standardized parental skills and
by developmental stage; initial child's skills fixed at the median.
For instance, when a mother's cognitive skills are one standard deviation above the median, the first-
stage gains in the child's cognitive skills are higher by 10 % with respect to what the median mother
would produce. In general, higher parental skills yield to higher offspring's skills; and these gains are
larger during early childhood than later childhood.
2.3.2 Investment in Children
The technology of skills formation estimated by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach allows to quantify
returns from investment in children; in order to link these returns to the patterns of child care time,
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a mapping between observables and the abstract concept of investment is required. CHS identify
investment from a large number of measurements which include whether the child has access to education
goods (such as theatres, museums, musical shows, books, musical instruments), the number of specific
toys children own and others. In the present paper, I make the assumption that investment at time t
can be expressed as
It = Ax
α
t e
1−α
t (2.2)
where xt is primary child care time spent by the household with its offspring, and et is the amount of
goods spent as complements of child care. The complementarity of time and goods introduces a degree to
which richer households are advantaged with respect to poorer households9; in the preferred calibration,
the mechanism is shown to be important in explaining differentials in investment by education groups.
2.3.3 The Model
Finally, a decision theoretic model that embeds the two previous ingredients is developed, in order to
rationalize the observed cross-sectional patterns of investment in children. The model is a parental choice
model in the spirit of Becker and Tomes (1976) (1979), and is mainly based on the one which Cunha and
Heckman (2007) use to rationalize the technology of skills formation. There are three main differences
between this model and theirs: I include a time tradeoff, consider investment as a combination of child
care time and goods and I assume parents to care for the quality of their child in every period.
Households face a time allocation problem and a resource allocation problem. Time is limited and
must be allocated among work, time invested in children and leisure; resources come from labor income
and must be allocated between consumption and goods invested in children.
2.3.4 Environment and Timing
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure 1, each of which has one offspring
as in Cunha and Heckman (2007). Time is discrete (indexed by t) and there are T + 1 time periods,
t = 1, 2, ...T1, ..., T + 1 where periods 1, ..., T1 belong to early childhood, T1 + 1, ...T belong to late
childhood and T + 1 denotes the terminal period.
9In a robustness check, I show that if time and goods are more substitutable, the model generates some counterfactual
predictions.
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In the first period, parents are endowed with cognitive skills sC,P and noncognitive skills sN,P , which
are assumed to be time-invariant; these will be referred to as parental skills. Every child is also
endowed with initial skills {sC,1, sN,1}, which will be referred to as offspring's skills. Households
are heterogeneous in initial conditions
{
sC,1, sN,1, sC,P , sN,P
}
and, as is standard in the literature, are
assumed to have full knowledge of them.
In the economy there exists only one good, which is used as the numeraire; such good can be
indifferently consumed or used for investment in children.
2.3.5 Preferences and Choices
In periods 1, ..., T + 1, households decide how to allocate one unit of time into working nt, time with
their offspring xt and leisure, how much good ct to consume and how much to spend in goods et for
their offspring. The household gets labor income w(sC,P , sN,P , 
w
P ) nt, where the wage is a function of
parental skills plus additional household-specific heterogeneity wP , and nt is the amount of time spent
working in period t10.
Following Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), there is no financial asset that allows redistribution of
resources between time periods 1 and 2.11 Hence the budget constraint of an household can be written
as
ct + et ≤ w(sC,P , sN,P , wP )nt for t = 1, ..., T + 1 (2.3)
The consumption good ct gives CRRA utility
c1−θt
1−θ . Leisure gives utility
ζ(1−nt−xt)1−σ
1−σ ; households
discount future outcomes at the common rate β.
Finally, using the terminology of Becker and Tomes (1976), at each period the quality of children
in terms of both cognitive skills sC,t and noncognitive skills sN,t maps into parental utility W (sC,t, sN,t),
weakly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave (that is, WsC,t ≥ 0, WsN,t ≥ 0 and the Hessian
of W is negative definite for every level of skills)12.
10The underlying assumption is that time of the father and of the mother are perfect substitutes. One might think that
some activities can exclusively be performed by the mother, i.e. breastfeeding; however, empirical evidence suggests that
although children of single mothers are at a disadvantage, such disadvantage is too small to be reconciled with strong
complementarity between fathers' and mothers' time. For instance Carlson and Corcoran (2001) show that the difference
between children in cognitive scores of single-parent households with intact households is statistically insignificant after
controlling for income and Army Force Qualification Test score of the mother.
11In a sense, this is a very strong form of borrowing constraint; however, inside each period resources can be freely
moved in time. The assumption is simplistic but allows to take into account long-term constraints in resources in the
simplest way.
12Such assumption is standard in models of parental choices, see for instance Del Boca et al. (2012) and Brilli (2012).
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2.3.6 Investment in children
Offspring's skills evolve according to the two-stage production function described in the first subsection13:
sk,t+1 = [γj,k,1s
φj,k
C,t + γj,k,2s
φj,k
N,t + γj,k,3I
φj,k
t + γj,k,4s
φj,k
C,P + γj,k,5s
φj,k
N,P ]
1/φj,kexp(ηj,k) (2.4)
for time t = 1, ...T1, ..., T , stages j = {1, 2} and skills k = {C,N}. The technology exhibits constant
returns to scale, that is,
5∑
i=1
γj,k,i = 1, for j = {1, 2} and k = {C,N}. Investment It is given by the
combination of time xt and goods et described in equation 2.2. Finally, shocks ηj,k are assumed to be
independently normally distributed and realize at the end of the period, hence households have to form
expectations on next period's skills of the child for all possible realizations of the shocks.
2.3.7 Dynamic Problem
The state of each household at time t can be described by the current period's skills of her offspring
plus the additional income variability wP , where the household-specific characteristics sC,P , sN,P , 
w
P are
constant while offspring's skills sC,t, sN,t evolve over time. Hence the problem of a household in period
t which belongs to developmental stage j ∈ {1, 2} can be written as follows:
Vt(sC,t, sN,t, sC,P , sN,P , 
w
P ) = max
ct,et,nt,xt
c1−θt
1− θ + ζ
(1− nt − xt)1−σ
1− σ +W (sC,t, sN,t)+
βE
[
Vt+1(sC,t+1, sN,t+1, sC,P , sN,P , 
w
P )
]
Other models assume that parents only care for the future continuation value of their children. However, in the technology
of skills formation I assume, investment depreciates over time. In a robustness check, I show that if parents get utility
only from the final quality of their children, this implies that investment is increasing over time, because investment in
the first periods depreciates. Such a pattern is completely counterfactual, as the data show that time invested in children
is decreasing in the age of the child.
13One potential concern is that, by assuming the functional form estimated by Cunha et al., I am already assuming my
results; however, it is not straightforward to generate patterns of investment compatible with the stylized facts on child
care time and with the correlations observed in the data. Different parametrizations of the utility and investment function
yield counterfactual implications on the NLSY79/CNLSY79 and on the AHTUS data. Also, I use a simplified investment
function that I compare to time use surveys, while the data with which Cunha, Heckman and Schennach estimate their
technology do not include any information regarding parental time.
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s.t. ct + et ≤ w(sC,P , sN,P , wP )nt
It = Ax
α
t e
1−α
t
0 ≤ nt + xt ≤ 1, nt, xt ≥ 0
sC,t+1 = [γj,C,1s
φj,C
C,t + γj,C,2s
φj,C
N,t + γj,C,3I
φj,C
t + γj,C,4s
φj,C
C,P + γj,C,5s
φj,C
N,P ]
1/φj,C exp(ηj,C)
sN,t+1 = [γj,N,1s
φj,N
C,t + γj,N,2s
φj,N
N,t + γj,N,3I
φj,N
t + γj,N,4s
φj,N
N,P + γj,N,5s
φj,N
N,P ]
1/φj,N exp(ηj,N)
ηj,C ∼ N (0, σ2ηj,C ), ηj,N ∼ N (0, σ2ηj,N ).
At the end of skills development, parents still get utility from the quality of their children, but cannot
influence them anymore. Their maximization problem becomes
VT+1(sC,T+1, sN,T+1, sC,P , sN,P , 
w
P ) = max
cT+1,eT+1,nT+1,xT+1
c1−θT+1
1− θ + ζ
(1− nT+1 − xt)1−σ
1− σ +
W (sC,T+1, sN,T+1)
s.t. cT+1 + eT+1 ≤ w(sC,P , sN,P , wP )nT+1
0 ≤ nT+1 + xT+1 ≤ 1, nT+1, xT+1 ≥ 0
2.3.8 Economic Mechanisms and trade-offs
First order conditions imply that households trade off consumption and leisure following the equation
(1− nt − xt) =
(
ζcθt
w
)1/σ
(2.5)
Notice that the labor choice cannot be separated from the choice of time with the offspring, so that
an increase in the future value of investment in the offspring will yield, ceteris paribus, to a variation in
labor time.
Taking derivative with respect to xt yields
ζ(1− nt − xt)−σ = µtAαxα−1t e1−αt (2.6)
where µt is the multiplier associated to the investment equation at time t, which encompasses the
combination of the productivity of investment and the shadow value that each agent attributes to her
offspring's future skills.
Equation 2.6 states that in an interior optimum, the marginal value of leisure must equal the marginal
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value of investment in the offspring. Substituting equation 2.5 inside 2.6 yields
wc−θt = µtAα
( et
xt
)1−α
. (2.7)
which makes clear the trade-off faced by agents between consumption and investment; working time
(hence consumption) must be traded off with time invested in the offspring.
In an interior solution, investment goods are proportional to the wage w of the agent and to total
time spent with the offspring xt.
et = w
(1− α
α
)
xt (2.8)
This property follows from the Cobb-Douglas form of the investment function, which gives a unique
optimal ratio between the two variables. The solution is always interior in the baseline model; however,
results are easily extendable to the case in which there exists a government that transfers resources
to households, so that the latter might work zero hours if such transfers are large enough. If nt = 0,
investment goods satisfy instead the equation
et =
(1− α)
α
ζ(1− xt)−σxt(zt − et)θ (2.9)
where zt represents lump sum transfers from the government. Equation 2.8 is a particular case of
equation 2.9, in which equation 2.5 is used to simplify the marginal utility of leisure and of consumption.
Notice that equations 2.8 and 2.9 give the solution for et even in the boundary case in which child care
time xt is equal to zero; this can occur if the marginal product of investment is finite for It = 0. Since
the technology of skills formation is of the CES form, this happens if the complementarity parameter φ
is lower than zero; for φ > 0, the solution for xt is always interior.
As a straightforward consequence of equations 2.2 and 2.8, the investment function in an interior
solution becomes
It = Axt
[
w
(1− α
α
)]1−α
(2.10)
so that both the wage and time spent with children matter for the evolution of skills.
Clearly, in the terminal period T + 1, since households cannot influence their child anymore, maxi-
mization implies xt, et = 0; nt still satisfies equation 2.5.
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If the share of time in the investment function is larger than the share of goods (α > 1/2), two
main features of the model arise from the FOCs. First, households will spend more time in child care in
the most productive stage; second, depending on the parameters of the utility function, they may also
choose to work less hours.
Proposition 1: Consider the multipliers µt associated to the constraint It = Ax
α
t e
1−α
t as the function
µt = µt(Kt, St, xt), where
∂µt
∂Kt
> 0.
• Suppose that α > 1/2; then we have that ∂xt
∂Kt
> 0, that is, agents respond to increased productivity
in investment by increasing time invested in the offspring.
• If α > 1/2, preferences satisfy Balanced Growth Path (θ = 1) and we have that σ ∈ [0, 1], ζ > 1−α
ασ
,
then ∂nt
∂Kt
< 0, that is agents respond to higher productivity in investment by decreasing hours of
work.
2.4 Data and Calibration
I choose calibration targets from the dataset of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) and from
surveys of work hours and child care time carried out from 1975 to 2000. The dataset of CHS is a
collection of variables regarding 2207 firstborn white children from the CNLSY/79 sample. Children in
the dataset have been assessed every 2 years, along with their mothers, starting in 1986. Assessments
start at birth and end at age 14; they include several measures of cognitive achievements, such as the
PIAT mathematics and reading comprehension tests, and measures of noncognitive achievements such
as temperamental scores. For very early ages (0-2), the best predictors of future tests are measured;
for instance, for estimating cognitive skills at birth, the authors use gestation length, birth weight and
motor-social development.
I obtain part of the targets from the estimation of skills factors from assesments of children
and mothers. Following CHS, the statistical tool employed is factor analysis; the idea is that a set
[Z1, ..Zi, ..ZM ] of variables, such as tests of mathematical and reading abilities, are error-contaminated
measurements of the underlying cognitive and noncognitive abilities {sC , sN} of an individual. Then,
each measurement i is assumed to be related to the unobservable skills of individual j at time t according
to
Zi,j,t = αi,t + βi,tlog(sC,j,t) + i,j,t (2.11)
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so that the underlying latent variables sC,j,t, sN,j,t can be identified from the covariance between
measurements up to the normalization of one of the coefficients βi,t
14. In this study, the latent variables
are simply obtained by taking the first principal factor of several different measurements for cognitive
skills and noncognitive skills, taken in the same year; the underlying identifying assumption is that,
for two measurements i, j of the same child such that i 6= j, COV(i,t, j,t) = 0. Cunha, Heckman and
Schennach identify the factors within the estimation procedure of the technology; I choose a different
strategy because of simplicity and transparency, but in principle I could use the same factors as targets
for the model. Part of the correlation matrix between offspring's skills and parental skills at the end of
early childhood will be taken as targets of the model. For consistency in the use of the technology, I
estimate the factors following closely the choice of variables described in Cunha, Heckman and Schennach
(2010).
Table 2.1 provides basic statistics on the variables in the dataset for ages 5-6 and 13-14, along with
the portion of variance that can be accounted for by the corresponding factor; this is represented by
the R2 of the OLS regression in equation 2.11, where Zi is the measurement in question. CHS report
a similar statistic for their variables; the patterns I report are very close to those of CHS, which means
that the factors I obtain are comparable. It is easy to see how the estimated factors account for a large
fraction of the variance of the tests.
In line with Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) I consider parental skills to be the mother's
skills, skills of the offsprings at the end of early childhood to be the latter's skills at ages 5-6 and final
skills to be offspring's skills at age 13-14. Such skills have a data counterpart in the factors calculated
from tests. In the Appendix I present the estimated correlation matrix for offspring's skills and parental
factors, at the end of early childhood (table 2.16) and at ages 13-14 (table 2.17); I choose part of these
to be targets for calibration.
Targets and stylized facts for child care time are calculated on the dataset of Ramey and Ramey
(2010), which is the merge of several surveys of time uses from 1965 to 2008. I choose to target averages
from the 1975 and 1985 waves of the American Heritage Time Use Survey (AHTUS) because the dataset
of Cunha et al. starts measurements of children and mothers in 1986, and child care time averages have
been remarkably stable from the 70s to the 90s (see Bianchi (2000). I do not use time diaries data
for 1993 because, as Ramey and Ramey notice, several researchers have doubted its comparability with
other surveys (see for instance Allard et al. (2007), Robinson and Godbey (1999), Bianchi et al. (2004)).
14See Cunha, Heckman, Schennach (2010) for a discussion of the application of such methodology in the context of skills
formation.
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Mean Std. Dev. Skewness N R2 of factor
Child's Cognitive Factor, Age 5-6
Peabody Picture Vocabulary 0.475 0.906 -0.103 809 31.4 %
PIAT Math 0.271 1.039 0.886 1101 37.9 %
PIAT Reading Recognition 0.246 1.015 1.466 1074 96.5 %
PIAT Reading Comprehension 0.240 0.978 1.294 1025 95.1 %
Child's Noncognitive Factor, Age 5-6
Behavior Problem Index/ Antisocial Raw Score 0.092 0.937 -1.107 1453 55.9 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Anxiety Raw Score -0.066 1.067 -0.820 1461 49.9 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Headstrong Raw Score -0.098 0.996 -0.039 1462 72.3 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Hyperactive Raw Score 0.010 0.972 -0.417 1461 58.1 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Conflict Raw Score 0.064 0.905 -1.882 1463 41.1 %
Child's Cognitive Factor, Age 13-14
PIAT Math 0.424 0.921 -0.220 1063 64.5 %
PIAT Reading Recognition 0.336 0.876 -0.639 1064 78.8 %
PIAT Reading Comprehension 0.427 0.937 -0.270 1056 72.4 %
Child's Noncognitive Factor, Age 13-14
Behavior Problem Index/ Antisocial Raw Score 0.117 0.971 -1.148 1125 63.5 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Anxiety Raw Score -0.088 1.053 -0.595 1138 64.8 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Headstrong Raw Score -0.07 0.998 0.002 1143 68.3 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Hyperactive Raw Score 0.044 0.974 -0.715 1138 59.3 %
Behavior Problem Index/ Conflict Raw Score -0.024 1.033 -1.577 1142 52.4 %
MOTHER's Cognitive Factor
Mom's Arithmetic Reasoning Test Score 0.172 0.933 0.168 2207 83.7 %
Mom's Word Knowledge Test Score 0.302 0.822 -0.836 2207 70.9 %
Mom's Paragraph Composition Test Score 0.377 0.827 -1.121 2207 66.0 %
Mom's Numerical Operations Test Score 0.343 0.875 -0.469 2207 54.7 %
Mom's Coding Speed Test Score 0.468 0.879 -0.445 2207 41.1 %
Mom's Mathematical Knowledge Test Score 0.185 0.972 0.269 2207 77.4 %
MOTHER's NonCognitive Factor
Mom's Self-Esteem: I am a person of worth 3.534 0.516 -0.343 2207 43.1 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I have good qualities 3.382 0.531 0.025 2207 48.5 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I am a failure 3.477 0.580 -0.649 2207 52.9 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I am as capable as others 3.326 0.549 -0.217 2207 36.7 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I have nothing to be proud of 3.480 0.625 -1.082 2207 46.0 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I have a positive attitude 3.200 0.576 -0.250 2207 51.6 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I wish I had more self-respect 2.876 0.787 -.206 2207 38.2 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I feel useless at times 2.650 0.774 0.300 2207 32.5 %
Mom's Self-Esteem: I sometimes think I am no good 3.005 0.808 -0.298 2207 41.9 %
Mom's Rotter Score: I have no control 2.897 1.156 -0.600 2207 5.5 %
Mom's Rotter Score: I make no plans for the future 2.543 1.159 -0.002 2207 8.1 %
Mom's Rotter Score: Luck is big factor in life 3.154 0.974 -1.107 2207 4.5 %
Mom's Rotter Score: Luck plays big role in my life 2.426 1.144 -0.025 2207 2.5 %
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Variables used to identify latent Cognitive and Noncognitive Factors.
Source: data extract from NLSY79/CNSLY79 by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
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I also do not target later averages because, as Ramey and Ramey (2010) and Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
show, child care time from 1995 onwards increases dramatically for all groups, and in particular for
college-educated parents. Hence I compute 1975-1985 averages for married working fathers and mothers
by education and by developmental stage of their youngest offspring; I follow the authors' definition of
child care time, considering it as the sum of primary, educational and recreational child care time. My
results are comparable to those of Hurst's comment to Ramey and Ramey; more details on how the
averages have been calculated can be found in the Appendix.
2.4.1 Calibration
Two of the main ingredients of the model are taken from the paper of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach
(2010): the parametrization of the technology of skills formation and the initial distribution of skills at
birth. Parameters of the technology are reported in table 2.14, including the variance of the shocks to
skills; the authors estimate several versions of the technology under different sets of assumptions, such
as the existence of unobserved heterogeneity across households and endogeneity of investment; I choose
the latter estimation as it already accounts for endogeneity of the investment function, making it more
suitable for inclusion in a decision theoretic model.
In line with CHS, cognitive and noncognitive skills at birth and parental skills are assumed to be
jointly lognormally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ. The parametrization of the
covariance matrix is taken from the appendix of the paper of CHS and available in table 2.13 in the
Appendix to this paper, along with the correlation matrix to allow an easier interpretation.
The technology has been estimated on two years intervals, hence I set the time span of the model
so that one period corresponds to two years. Periods 1,2,3 correspond to early childhood, from when a
child is born to when he is 6; periods 4,5,6,7 correspond to late childhood so that skills development is
assumed to end at age 14, and period 8 corresponds to the terminal period.
The discount factor β is set to 0.92, which is equivalent to 0.96 at the yearly level, a standard value
in the macroeconomics literature.
Following Osuna and Rios Rull (2003), I set the time endowment of households to be 200 hours per
week, excluding sleep and personal maintenance.
The baseline value of risk aversion θ is set to 1, which implies that utility of consumption is given by
log(ct). As Erosa, Fuster and Kambourov (2012) argue, values of θ different from 1 imply that different
hours of work across lifetime income groups, while the data show that individuals with different levels
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of lifetime income tend to work roughly the same amount of hours. I perform sensitivity analysis with
the values of 0.8 and 1.2.
The curvature of leisure σ (at the micro level) is relevant for the analysis as it determines the
substitution between investment in children and leisure. I set the baseline value in order to obtain a
plausible elasticity of labor supply at the household level; a wide literature attempts to estimate such
elasticity. For instance Pistaferri (2003) argues for a value near 0.7, while Erosa, Fuster and Kambourov
(2012) use a value of about 0.6. Keane (2011) also shows that estimates of labor supply elasticity vary
widely in the literature, and the average of the estimates is around 0.85. I target the value of 0.6,
which lies in the upper range of the micro estimates of the early literature, and well within the range
surveyed by Keane (2011). The baseline value of σ is set to 3.5, which implies a Frisch labor supply
elasticity ηλ = 0.58 in the first stage for the median household, 0.53 in the second stage; I perform
several robustness checks for different values. I use as a reference point the median household because
the model generates a distribution of elasticities of labor supply, due to the fact that households choose
jointly different levels of child care time and of labor supply.
The parameter ζ targets the average hours of work of married households aged 25-44. A well-known
stylized fact is that per-capita hours of work in the US have not moved much in the last 50 years; As
the average hours per week in 1980 were around 42 for married men and 26 for married women in the
25-34 and 35-44 years old age groups (without children or with a child older than 6), this gives 68 hours
per household which means 68/200 = 34 % of available time per week15.
The share of time α in the investment function implies a larger role for time and a smaller role for
income in explaining the variation of final offspring's skills. Hence α is chosen as to match the correlation
between final cognitive skills of the offsprings and the residual of a Mincer regression of household income
on parental skills, as observed in the NLSY/79. the rationale for this choice is that I want to isolate
the effect of additional income from the effect of parental skills; the latter have a positive effect both on
parental income and on the productivity of investment.
The scale A of the investment function implies a normalization of final skills; the chosen normalization
is that the logarithm of final cognitive skills generated by the model has mean zero, i.e. the average
skills of mothers and offsprings are equal at the end of the developmental process. One possible concern
is that the psychometric literature reports that several countries have experienced massive increases (up
to 1.2 standard deviations) in cognitive test scores in the last 50 years, the so called Flynn effect (see
15These numbers come from McGrattan and Rogerson (2004), which give data on hours worked of individuals from 1950
to 2000.
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Flynn (2009)). However, whether this represents a generalized increase in cognitive abilities or, instead,
an increase in the ability to perform well in tests, is a matter of debate. To answer this possible critique,
I perform a robustness check in which the scale A targets another possible normalization. Results do
not change very much depending on the chosen normalization, although taking into account the Flynn
Effect yields results that are slightly further from the data.
Income at the household level depends on parental skills and on the labor supply choice; while the
dataset provides the former, the latter are unobserved. I use indirect inference to make the income pro-
cess generated by the model consistent with the NLSY/79 data. I first run a Mincer regression between
household log income and parental cognitive and noncognitive factors, uncovering Mincer returns for
the two skills16;
log Yt = const+ βCsC,P + βNsN,P + Γcontrols+ t (2.12)
then, returns to skills for wages in the model are calibrated so that, when performing an analogous
Mincer regression on model-generated data, the estimated coefficients match the data counterparts β1
and β2.
Controls include a full set of year dummies and a cubic polynomial in age of the mother. To make the
coefficients of the regression consistent with the scale of parental skills in the model, factors estimated
from the data are rescaled using the covariance matrix in table 2.13. Moreover, as the model has 2-years
time periods, the regression is performed on the sum of 2 years of log income17, which allows to get a
better fit by diminishing the amount of income variance due to idiosyncratic shocks. Table 2.2 reports
results from the estimation by random effects on the dataset.
Household-specific heterogeneity in wages wP is assumed to be normally distributed, independent
of skills and it is calibrated to have the same variance as that observed in the residual of the Mincer
regression t estimated above.
Finally, the choice of the utility functionW is somewhat more difficult, as many adult outcomes may
contribute to the value parents attribute to investment in the offspring; the chosen functional form for
utility given by quality of children is
16I use only the mother's factors because the dataset does not provide information on the father's skills. However, using
only mother's skills allows to account for the correlation between fathers and mothers while economizing state variables
in the model.
17The concept resembles the idea of permanent income; in order to get better estimates, one could sum income of
more years. However, the NLSY data does not provide enough consecutive observations of income, a shortcoming that
would make the estimation sample smaller and the estimates less precise.
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Dep. Variable: Log Household Income
Mincer Equation
Norm. Mom Cognitive Factor 0.334***
(0.03)
Norm. Mom NonCognitive Factor 0.249***
(0.09)
Constant 1.334***
(0.18)
R2(within) 0.022
R2(between) 0.211
R2(overall) 0.177
N
significance levels: * = 0.1, ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001
Table 2.2: Mincer regression: Log Household Income in the NLSY/79 as a function of Log Cognitive
and Noncognitive Factors of the mother; years 1988-2002, household with child older than 6 present.
Controls include a full set of year dummies and a cubic polynomial in age (omitted). Source: data
extract from NLSY79/CNSLY79 by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
W (sC,t, sN,t) = χ
(
sψC,ts
1−ψ
N,t
)1−ξ
1− ξ
χ gives the relative importance of the future of the offspring with respect to consumption of the
family and leisure. The higher χ, the higher will be the value of the offspring's skills for households, the
higher will be investment. Hence, this parameter targets the average amount of time parents spent in
early primary child care in 1975-1985, from when the offspring is born to when he/she is five years old;
I target the average of early child care time as observed in the American Heritage Time Use Survey of
1975-1985 for married parents, which is around 9 % of the available endowment18.
ψ determines the relative importance of cognitive skills w.r.t. noncognitive skills and ξ encompasses
the risk aversion in the future of the offspring. The two parameters are identified by targeting the pattern
of correlations between parental skills and offspring's skills observed in the data. As skills evolve, such
correlations change over time. First, a lower risk aversion implies that high-skilled parents have stronger
incentives to invest, because marginal returns are higher than those of consumption; hence, a lower risk
aversion increases the intergenerational persistence of skills. Following this intuition, I use ξ to match
18The number is calculated by taking the sum of average hours per week spent by mothers and of average hours per
week by fathers, and dividing it by the stock of available hours per week, assumed to be 200 hours. This target may be
very different depending on the definition of child care time / time with children that are considered as investment; see for
instance Ramey and Ramey (2010), Bianchi (2000), Sandberg and Hofferth (2001), Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall (2012)
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the correlation between parental skills and offspring's skills at the end of early childhood. Finally, the
relative weight of cognitive skills ψ implies that households will invest more in the first stage. From the
parametrization of the technology (table 2.14), it can be seen that in the first stage noncognitive skills
contribute to the production of cognitive skills (γ1,C,2 = 0.062); if investment in this stage is increased,
this reduces the relative relevance of noncognitive skills for the production of cognitive skills. Hence,
the observed correlation between cognitive and noncognitive skills is negatively affected by ψ: then I
use this parameter to target this last correlation at the end of early childhood.
Tables 2.3 (externally set parameters) and 2.4 (endogenously determined) summarize the proposed
calibration; the model has no trouble in matching the targets very closely.
Parameter Value
Technology of Skills Formation Cunha, Heckman, Schennach (2010)
(see table 2.14 in the Appendix)
Covariance Matrix of Initial Conditions Cunha, Heckman, Schennach (2010)
(see table 2.13 in the Appendix)
Duration of One Period 2 years
β 0.92
θ 1
σ 3.5
Table 2.3: Calibration of parameters/functional forms set exogenously.
The calibration shows first of all that goods by themselves are relatively unimportant for child
development: the calibrated value of α = 0.77 suggests that parental time plays the central role, and
that the pattern of investment is mainly explained by the pattern of child care time.
Second, ψ = 0.60 suggests that cognitive skills are relatively more important to households than
noncognitive skills; as I will show, this implies that early childhood investment is higher than later
investment. As the productivity of investment for cognitive skills is higher during early childhood,
households concentrate their efforts there.
Finally, ξ = 0.65 suggests that risk aversion in the quality of children is lower than risk aversion in
consumption; in fact, sensitivity analysis on the risk aversion for consumption θ shows that calibrated
values of ξ are always lower than θ.
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Parameter Value Target Data Model
Preferences
ζ 0.63 Hours worked 0.34a 0.34
χ 0.65 Avg. Time in Child Care 0.091b 0.092
when child < 6
ψ 0.60 Correlation(sC,4, sN,4) 0.16
c 0.16
ξ 0.65 Correlation(sC,4, sC,P ) 0.28
c 0.28
Income Equation
βC,model 0.35 Mincer returns to sC,P 0.33 0.34
βN,model 0.26 Mincer returns to sN,P 0.25 0.25
Variance(wP ) 0.48 Var. of Mincer Residuals 0.48 0.48
Investment
A 17.1 Mean(sC,3) = 0
α 0.77 Correlation(sC,T+1, 
w
P ) 0.09
c 0.09
a See McGrattan and Rogerson (2004).
b Source: own calculations on 1975-1985 AHTUS.
c Source: own calculations on CNLSY/79.
Table 2.4: Calibration of parameters endogenously determined; targets, data moments and simulated
moments.
2.5 Results and Discussion
I solve the model and explore how the model performs in explaining non-calibrated stylized facts of
child care time and intergenerational persistence. The model presents some computational challenges,
as there are 5 continuous state variables and the dynamic problem changes at all periods due to finite
life and different technologies for different phases of childhood19. I use polynomial approximation of the
value function to solve the model. For this particular application, polynomial approximation gives very
precise and reliable results; I discuss in detail the algorithm in the Appendix.
In the first subsection I focus on the behavior of child care time and labor supply over the life
cycle, and on the college vs noncollege differential in child care time. In the second part, I compare the
intergenerational correlations of test scores generated by the model with those in the NLSY/79, and
with those that have been estimated in the literature.
19In principle I could discretize state variables and rely on interpolation techniques between grid nodes. However, this
approach requires an enormous amount of computational time, even with very rough approximations. Moreover, I find it
to yield very high approximation errors.
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2.5.1 Investment and Child Care Time
First I look at how time with children varies across parental education and across developmental stages.
It is well known that parental time in child care is higher when a child is ages 0 to 5. Moreover, Ramey
and Ramey (2010) and Guryan, Hurst and Kearney (2008) show that higher educated parents spend
more time with their children, especially during early childhood. This was already true in 1985 (see the
comment of Hurst to the paper of Ramey and Ramey), but is particularly relevant from 1995 onwards;
nowadays child care time by college-educated parents is about 35 % higher than that of noncollege-
educated. Table 2.6 reports a comparison of key moments generated by the model with stylized facts
observed in the data for 1975 and 1985; unconditional means are calculated on the data of Ramey
and Ramey (2010) for parents aged 25-44. Unfortunately the AHTUS does not have information on
the extent of assortative mating, i.e. when it happens that college-educated mothers are married to
college-educated fathers. I partially overcome this problem by constructing two limiting cases: the
case in which college-educated women are always married to college-educated men, and the case in
which college-educated women are married randomly. For simplicity, these will be referred to as the
college-mating case and the random-mating case. The true averages of household child care time
by education are likely to lie between these two extrema; for instance Schwartz and Mare (2005) report
that in the 1960s it was 3 times more likely to marry someone of a similar level of education than
someone with a different one, and that this figure has increased steadily until the 2000s.
In order to generate college/noncollege differentials in the model, I first estimate a probit model
using the dataset of CHS (2010). Then, I use the estimated probit to partition households in the model
economy into those with a college-educated mother and households with a less-than-college-educated
mother.
Table 2.6 summarizes the results. The model overestimates by 12 % the ratio of average early to late
child care time; in the data, parents of children under 5 years old spend in early child care about 2.5
times the amount of time they put in later years, and the model replicates quite well this pattern. The
model also predicts that child care time is slightly smoother for college-educated than for non-college,
i.e. it has a lower early/late ratio, consistently with the data. Also, the model replicates very well the
decline in work hours among parents of very young children.
The reason behind the large difference in early and late child care time is that households care for
the cognitive development of their offsprings; since cognitive skills can be boosted primarily during early
childhood, due to a combination of higher productivity of investment and higher elasticity of substitution
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Dep. Variable: College Prob.
Norm. Mom Cog Fac 1.360***
(0.09)
Norm. Mom NonCog Fac 0.217
(0.22)
constant -0.373***
(0.05)
Pseudo R2 0.27
N 915
significance levels: * = 0.1, ** = 0.01 *** = 0.001
Table 2.5: Probit model: being a college-educated mother as a function of her Cognitive and Noncog-
nitive skills; sample includes all mothers aged > 24. Source: data extract from NLSY79/CNSLY79 by
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
between inputs, households direct most of their efforts during this stage. Moreover, the high elasticity
of substitution makes returns to investment high for all households, so that even low-skilled parents
prefer to invest in early childhood rather than later. However, in the later phase inputs are strongly
complementary: this gives rise to two mechanisms. First, households anticipate that they will have to
sustain the skills of their children also in the later stage, when it will be unlikely and costly to increase
them. As a result, they invest more smoothly than what they would do if elasticities were the same.
In counterfactual exercises in which elasticities are held the same in the two stages, the ratio of early to
late child care time goes from 4 to 12 depending on the value of such elasticities. The second mechanism
is that, since inputs are strongly complementary, low-skilled households invest less smoothly because
they anticipate that they will have a lower productivity in the second stage; then, they prefer to invest
strongly in the first stage, and to give up afterwards. This generates the observed difference in ratios
early/late child care time across education groups, and a sizeable correlation between offspring's skills
and parental skills at age 14, as we will see in next section.
Results also show that the model is able to explain 60 % of the differential in early child care
time between college-educated and noncollege-educated, in the college-mating case-scenario. The late
childhood differential in the data is more robust to the two different scenarios than the early one, and
the model generates 89 % of the college-mating case average.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 provide a summary of investment across quantiles of skills and income; such
differences shed light on what underlies the college vs noncollege differential and why noncollege-educated
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Parents with Early Time Early Time Late Time Late Time Early/Late Early/Late
same education (model) (1975, 1985) (model) (1975, 1985) (model) (1975, 1985)
Mean 9.2 % (calibr.) 9.1 % 3.3 % 3.6 % 281 % 251 %
(0.3 %) (0.1 %)
Mean (College) 9.6 % 9.9 % 3.5 % 4.0 % 273 % 244 %
(0.5 %) (0.3 %)
Mean (NonCollege) 8.9% 8.8 % 3.1 % 3.5 % 287 % 247 %
(0.3 %) (0.1 %)
∆ College/NonCollege 7.4 % +12.6 % 12.7 % +14.3 % -4.7 % -1.2 %
Educated Mother, Early Time Early Time Late Time Late Time Early/Late Early/Late
all fathers (model) (1975, 1985) (model) (1975,1985) (model) (1975,1985)
Mean (College) 9.6 % 9.2 % 3.5 % 3.8 % 273 % 242 %
(0.5 %) (0.3 %)
Mean (NonCollege) 8.9 % 9.1 % 3.1 % 3.6 % 287 % 252 %
(0.3 %) (0.1 %)
∆ College/NonCollege 7.4 % +1.8 % 12.7 % +6.1 % -4.7 % -4 %
Early Work Early Work Late Work Late Work Early/Late Early/Late
(model) (1980, 1990) (model) (1980,1990) (model) (1980,1990)
Mean 30 % 31 % 34 % (calibr.) 34 % 89.3 % 91.2 %
Table 2.6: Summary statistics for Time invested in children generated by the model and data equivalents;
data are the author's calculations on the 1975-1985 American Heritage Time Use Survey, on married
parents aged 25-44 of children aged 0-4 for early time and 5-17 for late time. Numbers are obtained
by summing average primary child care time of mothers and average time of fathers, and dividing by
the assumed time endowment of 200 hours. For parents with same education I sum the unconditional
mean of mothers and fathers with same education; for the second case, I sum the average of mothers by
education with the overall unconditional mean of fathers. All observations are weighted as recommended
by the AHTUS; standard errors are reported in parentheses. Work hours data come from McGrattan
and Rogerson (2004) and are calculated as the sum of average working hours for married males plus
average working hours for married females.
spend relatively more time during early childhood.
Two main mechanisms drive investment; higher parental skills grant higher productivity and higher
income. Goods are complementary to time: hence higher income families have a comparative advantage
for investing in children. Since marginal returns to skills are higher than those to consumption, college-
educated households choose to invest more time in their children, despite their higher opportunity cost.
Notice also that even higher income parents invest more time in their children, even after controlling
for skills; the latter comparison highlights the role of complementarity alone, separated by the effect of
skills.
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D1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Investment (time and goods)
by Cog Skill 98.8 100.0 101.3 101.8 103.0
by NCog Skill 87.4 91.4 98.8 103.9 112.1
by ParCog Skill 78.4 84.8 97.7 106.1 117.5
by ParNCog Skill 90.9 93.4 99.9 102.7 109.9
by Income 72.8 79.7 94.4 106.2 125.8
by Inc, Q2 Cog 79.0 84.4 95.7 104.7 119.2
Time Investment
by Cog Skill 101.9 101.6 100.3 99.2 97.6
by NCog Skill 88.9 92.0 97.8 101.7 107.2
by ParCog Skill 86.5 90.8 98.4 102.6 106.8
by ParNCog Skill 94.2 95.6 98.8 100.2 103.9
by Income 90.7 93.2 98.0 101.4 106.0
by Inc, Q2 Cog 95.9 96.9 99.0 100.7 102.8
Table 2.7: Simulated Data: Total early investment (time and goods) and Time Invested as per-
centage of the unconditional median; by first decile and quartiles of parental Cognitive Skills, parental
NonCognitive Skills, parental Income and parental Income inside second quartile of Cognitive Skills.
D1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Investment (time and goods)
by Cog Skill 68.9 76.7 93.6 108.1 135.3
by NCog Skill 77.1 83.6 97.3 107.6 125.1
by ParCog Skill 73.1 81.3 97.8 109.2 125.4
by ParNCog Skill 87.6 91.2 100.9 105.0 116.4
by Income 75.4 82.2 96.7 108.1 126.7
by Inc, Q2 Cog 84.2 88.6 97.5 104.5 115.6
Time Investment
by Cog Skill 74.1 80.3 94.3 106.5 127.1
by NCog Skill 79.7 85.3 97.1 106.0 119.9
by ParCog Skill 81.3 87.7 99.3 106.4 114.8
by ParNCog Skill 91.3 93.8 100.3 103.1 110.7
by Income 94.4 96.6 100.8 103.6 107.2
by Inc, Q2 Cog 102.4 101.9 101.1 100.7 99.9
Table 2.8: Simulated Data: Total late investment (time and goods) and Time Invested as percentage of
the unconditional median; by first decile and quartiles of parental Cognitive Skills, parental NonCognitive
Skills, parental Income and parental Income inside second quartile of Cognitive Skills.
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2.5.2 Intergenerational Correlations
The model provides a framework to understand the persistence of cognitive and noncognitive achieve-
ment, and of income as caused by the former. In this subsection I look at correlations between parental
skills and children's skills, and at their model counterparts. This is both a result and a consistency check:
the fact that the model replicates well the pattern of correlations means that simulated investment is
consistent with the data.
Table 2.9 reports simulated correlations between parental skills and their offspring's skills, as observed
in the model and as calculated using factor analysis in the dataset of Cunha et al. I also compute the
implied intergenerational persistence of income by calculating what would be the future wage implied
by the final skills of the offspring, using the Mincer coefficients for males and females calculated by
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) on the NLSY/79.
The model performs quite well on almost all correlations, in the sense that they reside within 95
% confidence bands of the data equivalents, with one exception. One of the most interesting results is
that the model can account very precisely for the observed correlation between cognitive tests of the
mother and cognitive tests of her offspring at age 14 (0.45 in the model against 0.43 in the data). A
recent strand of the literature looks at the intergenerational correlation of IQ scores: for instance Black,
Devereux and Salvanes (2008) find that such correlation is around 0.32 between fathers and sons using
Norway military data. Anger and Heineck (2009) find higher numbers for Germany: the father-son
correlation is around 0.38 and the mother-daughter one is 0.48. The model generates a correlation that
is fully compatible with these findings. Also, the model predicts quite well the correlation between
both cognitive and noncognitive skills and household income, which shows up already at the end of
early childhood, and is even reinforced at age 14. The model predicts a mother-offspring correlation of
noncognitive skills at age 14 that is 30 % higher than in the data (0.20 against 0.16), but still inside the
95 % confidence bands.
The implied intergenerational correlation of earnings is 0.08 for males and 0.09 for females, and is
calculated adjusting for the variance of income unexplained by skills20; Jäntti et al. (2006) show that
20The number is calculated as follows. Final skills of the offspring translate into future average income α+βCsC,T+1+
βNsN,T+1, where the Mincer coefficients for males and females are taken from Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006), and
skills are standardized to have variance = 1. Given the R2 of this regression, it follows that the true variance of income
is 1/R2 times the variance explained by skills alone, which implies that the standard deviation is
√
1/R2 times the one
implied by skills alone. Then I compute
ρ(Offspring's Income,HH Income) = ρ(α+ βCsC,T+1 + βNsN,T+1,HH Income)
√
R2
where R2 = 0.099 for males and R2 = 0.128 as in Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, which gives the numbers shown in the
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Data Model
End of early childhood
ρ(sC,4, sC,P ) 0.28 0.28
(0.20 - 0.36) (calibr.)
ρ(sC,4, sN,P ) 0.15 0.20
(0.06 - 0.24)
ρ(sN,4, sC,P ) 0.21 0.19
(0.16-0.26)
ρ(sN,4, sN,P ) 0.20 0.20
(0.15 - 0.25)
ρ(sC,4, sN,4) 0.16 0.16
(0.07 - 0.24) (calibr.)
ρ(sC,4,HH Income) 0.19 0.27
(0.06 - 0.31)
ρ(sN,4,HH Income) 0.20 0.16
(0.13 - 0.26)
End of late childhood
ρ(sC,T+1, sC,P ) 0.43 0.45
(0.38 - 0.48)
ρ(sC,T+1, sN,P ) 0.18 0.21
(0.12 - 0.24)
ρ(sN,T+1, sC,P ) 0.15 0.21
(0.07 - 0.19)
ρ(sN,T+1, sN,P ) 0.14 0.19
(0.09 - 0.20)
ρ(sC,T+1, sN,T+1) 0.25 0.27
(0.19 - 0.31)
ρ(sC,T+1,HH Income) 0.30 0.32
(0.24 - 0.36)
ρ(sN,T+1,HH Income) 0.22 0.20
(0.16 - 0.28)
ρ(Offspring's Wage age 30,HH Income) 0.36 0.08
(males)
ρ(Offspring's Wage age 30,HH Income) 0.16 0.09
(females)
Table 2.9: Correlations between offspring's achievements and parental skills; estimates in the data have
95 % confidence bands in parentheses. Simulated correlations outside confidence bands are displayed in
bold. Correlations of data factors are computed using results from the data of Cunha, Heckman and
Schennach (2010).
in the US in 1980 the intergenerational correlation of the offspring's earnings with family income was
about 0.36 for males and 0.16 for females. Couch and Dunn (1997) report lower numbers, although their
table. Clearly, this approach does not account for changes in prices of skills that are likely to have occurred in later years.
86 A Quantitative Theory of Early Skills Formation and Parental Choices
results depend on the year of the survey and on the inclusion or exclusion of years in which zero earnings
were reported. I compare simulation results with the higher numbers reported by Jäntti: the model
can explain 22 % of the persistence of income for males and 56 % for females. This is not surprising as
the variance of wages that can be explained by skills at age 14 is at most 13 %; one possible reason is
that parental income plays a significant role also for later human capital development, i.e. for college
attendance or job search choices.
2.6 Robustness Checks
I present here a discussion of the key assumptions and of the performance of the model under alternatives;
most of the main results of robustness checks are presented in table 2.18 in the Appendix.
2.6.1 A two-periods model
One might think that, once the technology has been identified for early childhood and late childhood,
most results can be obtained also with a simpler two-periods model in which there is one period of
early childhood, t = 1 and one period of late childhood t = 2, in the spirit of the policy experiment
of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010). However, given the technology of skills formation, having
many periods of child development reinforces the correlation between parents and children every period.
To see why, consider a very simple model of child development, in which future skills only depend on
the child's own skills and parental skills in a linear fashion:
st+1 = γst + (1− γ)sP
where γ ∈ (0, 1). It follows that at period t+ k,
st+k = γ
kst + (1− γk)sP
so that parental skills account for a larger fraction of the child's skills at t+ k,∀k > 1.
Simulation results suggest that a two-periods-only model can roughly account for the patterns of
child care time, but fails in delivering intergenerational correlations that are quantitatively consistent
with the NLSY/79, because such correlations require more periods to build up.
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2.6.2 The role of preferences
In order to study whether most of the results are a consequence of assumptions on the utility function, I
compute a version of the model in which parents care for the skills of their children only in the terminal
period. While such a model can be successfully calibrated to the data and is still capable of delivering
quantitatively consistent intergenerational correlations of skills, many other of its implications are highly
counterfactual. Due to depreciation of skills in the technology, which is particularly important in early
childhood, it predicts an increasing pattern of child care time over the life cycle, which is completely
inconsistent with the data. Also, it predicts that hours of work rise during early childhood, too low a
final correlation between cognitive and noncognitive skills and college/noncollege differentials in child
care time that are too small compared to those in the data.
2.6.3 Equal elasticities across stages
I produce a counterfactual simulation in which elasticities of substitution are equalized to 1 in all
stages for all skills; that is, φ1,C = φ2,C = φ1,N = φ2,N = 0, so that the technology becomes of the
Cobb-Douglas form. Detailed results are reported in table 2.18 in the Appendix. First of all, in order
to match the intergenerational correlation at the end of early childhood, the model requires a very
high weight of cognitive skills w.r.t. noncognitive (ψ = 1), and a low risk aversion in parental utility
from offspring's skills (ξ = 0.47), as opposed to the more balanced results of the standard technology
(ψ = 0.60, ξ = 0.65). As a consequence, the equal-elasticities model predicts that households invest
over 6 times more in early childhood than in later childhood, which is inconsistent with the AHTUS
data. However, the model is still capable of generating differentials in child care time between college-
educated and noncollege-educated that are compatible with those observed in time diaries. Finally, such
model performs relatively well on most correlations, but undershoots the intergenerational persistence
of cognitive skills by 20 %.
2.6.4 A Model with Cognitive Skills only
CHS show that the two-skills assumption is extremely relevant for policy analysis; when they estimate a
cognitive-skills-only production function, policy prescriptions move investment from disadvantaged chil-
dren to advantaged ones. To investigate how a one-skill model would perform on the data, I calibrate a
version of the model in which the two-skills production function is replaced with the one-skill production
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function estimated by CHS in the Appendix to their paper (shown in table 2.15. Results are available
upon request.
The one-skill model presents two main quantitative issues; first, it is impossible to match the observed
intergenerational correlation of cognitive skills at the end of early childhood, which the model grossly
overestimates (0.62 against 0.28). As a result, the model predicts an intergenerational correlation at
offspring's age 14 of 0.92, which is inconsistent with any study on such correlations. Second, the model
cannot generate a large early/late child care time ratio, and predicts that college-educated parents spend
less time than noncollege ones with their children: such predictions are inconsistent with the data on
time uses.
2.6.5 Sensitivity Analysis
I explore whether some of the externally set parameters are playing a large role in shaping the results; for
this purpose, I recalibrate the model modifying risk aversion in consumption θ and curvature of leisure σ
and see how the main results change. Also, I take into account the possibility that skills of offsprings at
age 14 are, on average, larger than those of their mothers (the Flynn effect) by recalibrating the model
in such a way that final cognitive skills increase by 0.5 standard deviations in a generation (which would
be roughly compatible with an increase of 1 standard deviation over 50 years). Results are summarized
in table 2.10.
Most of the exogenous parameters play a negligible role in shaping the main results. Higher (lower)
risk aversion θ leads to a lower (higher) marginal utility of consumption; hence college parents, who
have higher wages on average, tend to spend more (less) time with their children compared to noncollege
parents when θ is higher (lower). The intergenerational correlation of cognitive skills is not affected by
assumptions on the parameters, but the existence of the Flynn Effect would imply a higher correlation
than what is observed in the NLSY/79.
2.7 Policy Experiment
In this section I explore the effects of applying the German scheme of child allowances (Kindergeld) in
the US economy. The Kindergeld is one of several transfer programs, and must be distinguished from
parental allowances (Elterngeld) and Maternity Pay (Mutterschaftsgeld).
The Kindergeld transfer program started in 1936; in 2012, the Kindergeld granted a monthly payment
A Quantitative Theory of Early Skills Formation and Parental Choices 89
Baseline θ = 0.8 θ = 1.2 σ = 2.5 σ = 5 Flynn Effect
Share of time α 0.77 0.64 0.88 0.77 0.76 0.74
Ratio Early/Late Time Invested 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9
∆ College/NonCollege (early) +7.4 % +4.2 % +11.0 % +7.7 % +7.4 % +6.5 %
∆ College/NonCollege (late) +12.7 % +8.9 % +16.8 % +13.1 % +12.8 % +10.6 %
Ratio Early/Late Hours of Work 89.3 % 90.1 % 88.8 % 91.2 % 87.4 % 89.6 %
Interg. Correlation of Cog. Skills 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.50
Interg. Correlation of NonCog. Skills 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Corr. Cog Skills / NonCog. Skils 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.24
Corr. NonCog Skills / HH Income 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33
Table 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis: effect of changes in externally set parameters on Share of time, Ratio
of Early to Late child care time, Difference between College and NonCollege time, Ratio of Early to
Late hours of work, Intergenerational correlation of skills, final correlation between offsprings' cognitive
and noncognitive skills, final correlation between offspring's skills and Income.
of 184 euros per child to virtually all households who have a child under the age of 18, although it can be
extended to age 25 if the child is in school, at university or is doing professional training. The payment
is performed for each child in the household, and raises to 190 euros for the third child and 215 for
each additional child. The payment extends to citizens of EU countries and of several other countries,
provided that they reside in Germany, and is not means-tested21.
The 2012 Kindergeld for the first and second child amounted to approximately 5 % of the average
household income in Germany22. For simulation purposes, I perform a flat transfer of 5 % of the model-
generated average income to all households from birth of the child to age 14 and compare the effect of
such policy with respect to the baseline model. Results for aggregate averages are summarized in table
2.11.
As expected, the transfer has a negative effect on labor supply, which drops by almost 4 % during
early childhood and by 3 % during late childhood; however, additional income has a positive effect on
21Source: Social Security Throughout the World (http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/).
22In 2012, yearly average household income in Germany was 43500 euros. Source: http://www.voxeu.org/article/are-
germans-poorer-other-europeans-principal-eurozone-differences-wealth-and-income, data from ECB Household Survey
2013.
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Aggregate Effects Baseline Policy
Final Cog Skills
Mean + 3.0 %
Std. Dev. + 1.4 %
Final NonCog Skills
Mean + 3.5 %
Std. Dev. + 1.8 %
Correlation(sC,T+1, sC,P ) 0.454 -0.2 %
Correlation(sN,T+1, sN,P ) 0.186 -1.8 %
Correlation(sC,T+1,HH Income) 0.306 -5.1 %
Correlation(sN,T+1,HH Income) 0.194 -10.8 %
First Stage Second Stage
Baseline Policy Baseline Policy
Portion of Transfer Consumed 94.1 % 98.4 %
Consumption, Avg. + 2.9 % + 3.2 %
Hours Worked, Avg. 0.302 -3.7 % 0.333 -2.7 %
Time Investment, Avg 0.092 + 4.8 % 0.033 + 3.7 %
Table 2.11: Changes from baseline to flat transfer of 5 % of average income; aggregate variables. Changes
in skills are reported as percentage of a standard deviation of baseline skills.
the time investment of households, increasing it by almost 5 % during early childhood and by 4 % in late
childhood. As a result, average final cognitive achievements of children increase by 3 % of a standard
deviation, while noncognitive achievements increase by 3.5 %. A closer look at how gains are distributed
across households (table 2.12) reveals heterogeneity in the returns of the policy.
Stronger effects can be observed among low income households (first decile of the income distribu-
tion), who experience gains in cognitive/noncognitive skills of their offspring as large as 5 % and 7 % of
a standard deviation, respectively. This is because the transfer has a larger negative effect on the labor
supply of low-income households, freeing up resources and time for children; as a result, the correlation
between parental income and final cognitive skills of the offspring decreases by 5.1 %, and that with
noncognitive skills by almost 11 %.
The table also provides an intuition for why the intergenerational correlation of cognitive skills does
not change noticeably when the policy is applied. When the transfer is performed, low-income households
increase their time investment by more than higher-skilled households, because the latter face a higher
opportunity cost of time. However, differences in absolute levels of investment between skills groups are
smaller, because higher-skilled groups have higher wages, hence they use more resources for investment.
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D1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Cognitive Skills
by Child's Cog Skill 3.0 % 3.0 % 3.0 % 3.1 % 3.1 %
by Child's NCog Skill 2.8 % 2.9 % 3.0 % 3.1 % 3.2 %
by Parental Cog Skill 1.8 % 2.2 % 3.0 % 3.4 % 3.6 %
by Parental NCog Skill 2.8 % 2.9 % 3.0 % 3.0 % 3.2 %
by Income 4.9 % 4.3 % 3.2 % 2.7 % 2.0 %
NonCognitive Skills
by Child's Cog Skill 3.5 % 3.5 % 3.5 % 3.5 % 3.4 %
by Child's NCog Skill 3.2 % 3.3 % 3.4 % 3.6 % 3.7 %
by Parental Cog Skill 4.3 % 4.0 % 3.6 % 3.4 % 2.9 %
by Parental NCog Skill 3.5 % 3.4 % 3.5 % 3.5 % 3.5 %
by Income 7.0 % 5.7 % 3.7 % 2.7 % 1.8 %
1st Stage Time Invested (percentage)
by Child's Cog Skill 5.01 % 5.01 % 5.02 % 4.96 % 4.90 %
by Child's NCog Skill 5.52 % 5.37 % 5.06 % 4.89 % 4.58 %
by Parental Cog Skill 7.67 % 6.79 % 5.23 % 4.42 % 3.45 %
by Parental NCog Skill 6.14 % 5.82 % 5.14 % 4.83 % 4.17 %
by Income 11.68 % 9.03 % 5.13 % 3.57 % 2.16 %
2nd Stage Time Invested (percentage)
by Child's Cog Skill 3.84 % 3.83 % 3.81 % 3.75 % 3.68 %
by Child's NCog Skill 4.10 % 4.00 % 3.82 % 3.72 % 3.52 %
by Parental Cog Skill 5.60 % 5.01 % 3.97 % 3.40 % 2.68 %
by Parental NCog Skill 4.60 % 4.37 % 3.89 % 3.66 % 3.19 %
by Income 8.70 % 6.76 % 3.90 % 2.73 % 1.67 %
1st Stage Investment (absolute)
by Parental Cog Skill 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07
by Parental NCog Skill 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
by Income 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.05
2nd Stage Investment (absolute)
by Parental Cog Skill 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
by Parental NCog Skill 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
by Income 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
1st Stage Hours Worked
by Parental Cog Skill -5.4 % -4.9 % -3.8 % -3.3 % -2.6 %
by Parental NCog Skill -4.4 % -4.2 % -3.8 % -3.5 % -3.1 %
by Income -8.2 % -6.5 % -3.8 % -2.7 % -1.7 %
2nd Stage Hours Worked
by Parental Cog Skill -4.0 % -3.6 % -2.8 % -2.4 % -1.9 %
by Parental NCog Skill -3.2 % -3.1 % -2.7 % -2.6 % -2.3 %
by Income -6.1 % -4.8 % -2.8 % -1.9 % -1.2 %
Table 2.12: Changes from baseline to flat transfer of 5 % of average income; changes in final cognitive
and noncognitive skills as percentage of the baseline standard deviation.
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Finally, higher-skilled parents are still more productive than low-skilled parents. As a result, cognitive
skills of children of high-skilled households increase by more compared to the children of low-skilled
households, so that the policy has little effect on the intergenerational persistence of cognitive skills.
This result may help understand why in Germany the intergenerational correlation of test scores is
similar to that of the US (Anger and Heineck (2009)) although the US have no child allowance policy.
Child allowances can reduce the impact of income by itself, that is the fact that higher-income households
have more resources for their children, but cannot influence the fact that higher-skilled parents are more
productive in raising skillful children.
2.8 Conclusions
I develop a model of skills formation and household choices, grounded in the literature on Cognitive and
NonCognitive Skills, and I show that it can help explaining several stylized facts on child care time and
cognitive/noncognitive achievement. Results suggest that differences in returns to investment between
early childhood and late childhood can explain why child care time of children aged 0-5 is more than twice
as large as later child care time and a sizeable fraction of the differential in child care time between
college-educated and noncollege-educated parents. Finally, the model is also capable of replicating
endogenously the observed pattern of correlations between parental skills and cognitive/noncognitive
achievements of their children, and accounts for a sizeable portion of the intergenerational correlation
of income.
Results are robust to a number of alternative assumptions on externally set parameters; I also show
that a similar cognitive-skills-only model is not able to capture several important features of the data.
I simulate the effect of applying the 2012 German scheme of child allowances in the US economy;
results show that such policy could improve average cognitive skills by 3 % and noncognitive skills by
3.5 %, and reduce the correlation between cognitive skills of a child and household income by 5 %.
However, the policy has a negligible effect on the intergenerational persistence of cognitive skills; such
result is compatible with the fact that the mother-offspring correlation of cognitive achievement is of
similar magnitude in the US and in Germany.
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Appendix
2.A Analytical Results
First order conditions for consumption ct give
c−θt = λt
where λt is the multiplier associated to the budget constraint of the household. First order conditions
with respect to labor time nt gives
(1− nt − xt) =
(
ζ
wλt
)1/σ
substituting the first equation inside the second yields that households trade off leisure and con-
sumption according to the equation
(1− nt − xt) =
(
ζcθt
w
)1/σ
Taking first order conditions with respect to et yields
λt = µtA(1− α)
(xt
et
)α
substituting the multiplier λt and dividing the last expression by 2.7 yields
et = w
(1− α
α
)
xt (2.13)
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2.B Relations between investment and parameters
Consider the multipliers µt associated to the constraint It = Ax
α
t e
1−α
t as the function
µt = µt(Kt, St, xt)
where the function expresses the marginal productivity of investment as a function of the stage t,
of the parameters Kt encompassing the efficiency of investment
23, of the state St and of the amount of
time spent with the child xt. By definition ∂µt/∂Kt > 0; moreover, since the technology has decreasing
returns to every single input, ∂µt/∂xt < 0 .
Proposition 1 (1). Suppose that
• A1: α > 1/2;
then we have that ∂xt
∂Kt
> 0, that is, households respond to increased productivity in investment by
increasing time invested in the offspring.
Furthermore, if we have that
• A2: Preferences satisfy Balanced Growth Path, that is θ = 1;
• A3: σ ∈ [0, 1], ζ > 1−α
ασ
;
then ∂nt
∂Kt
< 0, that is households respond to higher productivity in investment by decreasing hours of
work.
Proof. First of all, by implicit function theorem we have
∂F
∂nt
∂nt
∂Kt
+
∂F
∂xt
∂xt
∂Kt
= − ∂F
∂Kt
Call equation 2.5 F1 and equation 2.6 F2; substituting expression 2.8 for et and the budget constraint
in equation 2.5 and applying the result above yields
23In practice, many coefficients may enter Kt; for instance, in a Cobb-Douglas specification of the technology of skills
formation, Kt includes the scale of the function and the exponent of the investment variable. In a CES specification, Kt
includes the coefficient that multiplies the investment variable inside the CES aggregator.
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[
−σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 − θ(wnt − w(1− α
α
)xt)
θ−1
]
∂nt
∂Kt
+[
−σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 + 1− α
α
θ(wnt − w(1− α
α
)xt)
θ−1
]
∂xt
∂Kt
= 0[
σζ(1− nt − xt)−σ−1
]
∂nt
∂Kt
+
[
σζ(1− nt − xt)−σ−1
]
∂xt
∂Kt
= (
∂µt
∂Kt
− ∂µt
∂xt
)Aααw1−α(1− α)1−α
Trivial manipulation of the two equations yields
∂nt
∂Kt
= − ∂xt
∂Kt
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 − 1−αα θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 + θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
∂nt
∂Kt
= − ∂xt
∂Kt
+ (
∂µt
∂Kt
− ∂µt
∂xt
)
Aααw1−α(1− α)1−α(1− nt − xt)σ+1
σζ
Solving the system for ∂xt
∂Kt
we have
∂xt
∂Kt
[
1− σζ(1− nt − xt)
σ−1 − 1−α
α
θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 + θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
]
=
(
∂µt
∂Kt
− ∂µt
∂xt
)
Aααw1−α(1− α)1−α(1− nt − xt)σ+1
σζ
It is clear that the right hand side is always positive, being the product of only positive terms,
because ∂µt
∂Kt
> 0 by construction and ∂µt
∂xt
< 0 because of the CES form of the skills formation technology
and of the utility of skills. Hence, we have that ∂xt
∂Kt
> 0 if and only if
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 − 1−αα θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 + θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
< 1
and since leisure (1 − nt − xt) is always positive and consumption wnt − w(1−αα )xt is always bigger
than zero (by the fact that marginal utility approaching zero is infinity), this can be trivially shown to
be equivalent to
α > 1/2
which proves the first statement. Suppose now that α > 1/2, that is ∂xt
∂Kt
> 0; by the previous
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equation,
∂nt
∂Kt
= − ∂xt
∂Kt
[
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 − 1−αα θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 + θ(wnt − w(1−αα )xt)θ−1
]
Since the denominator is positive, ∂nt
∂µt
< 0 if and only if
σζ(1− nt − xt)σ−1 > 1− α
α
θ(wnt − w(1− α
α
)xt)
θ−1 (2.14)
and in the case of Balanced Growth path (θ = 1), a sufficient condition for 2.14 to hold is that
σ ∈ [0, 1], ζ > 1−α
ασ
, completing the proof.
It is not possible to state the proposition generally for any value of the concavity of leisure and
any risk aversion parameter; however, condition 2.14 suggests that if the share of goods 1 − α in the
investment function is low and ζ is higher than 1, the solution should satisfy the condition in the majority
of cases for reasonable values of labor supply and time spent with children, but may possibly be violated
in extreme cases.
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2.C The Technology of Skills Formation - Parameters
Covariance Matrix
Child's Cog. Child's NonCog. Mother's Cog. Mother's Noncog.
Skills at birth Skills at Birth Skills Skills
Child Cog. Skills 0.1777
Child NonCog. Skills -0.0204 0.2002
Mother's Cognitive 0.0182 0.0592 0.5781
Mother's Noncognitive 0.0050 0.0261 0.0862 0.0667
Correlation Matrix
Child's Cog. Child's NonCog. Mother's Cog. Mother's Noncog.
Skills at birth Skills at Birth Skills Skills
Child Cog. Skills 1.0000
Child NonCog. Skills -0.1081 1.0000
Mother's Cognitive 0.0569 0.1741 1.0000
Mother's Noncognitive 0.0463 0.2260 0.4390 1.0000
Table 2.13: Variance/Covariance Matrix and Correlation Matrix for initial conditions of parental and
offspring's skills [source: Cunha, Heckman, Schennach (2010), Appendix].
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Technology of Cognitive
Skills Formation
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Cog Skills γ1,C,1 0.485 γ2,C,1 0.884
NonCog Skills γ1,C,2 0.062 γ2,C,2 0.011
Investment γ1,C,3 0.261 γ2,C,3 0.044
Parental Cog γ1,C,4 0.035 γ2,C,4 0.051
Parental NonCog γ1,C,5 0.157 γ2,C,5 0.011
Complementarity φ1,C 0.585 φ2,C -1.220
Elasticity of Substitution 1/(1− φ) 2.409 0.450
Variance of Shocks η1,C 0.165 η2,C 0.098
Technology of NonCognitive
Skills Formation
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Cog Skills γ1,N,1 0.000 γ2,N,1 0.002
NonCog Skills γ1,N,2 0.602 γ2,N,2 0.857
Investment γ1,N,3 0.209 γ2,N,3 0.104
Parental Cog γ1,N,4 0.014 γ2,N,4 0.000
Parental NonCog γ1,N,5 0.175 γ2,N,5 0.037
Complementarity φ1,N -0.464 φ2,N -0.522
Elasticity of Substitution 1/(1− φ) 0.683 0.657
Variance of Shocks η1,N 0.203 η2,N 0.102
Table 2.14: The Technology for Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation; estimated by Cunha,
Heckman, Schennach (2010) [pag. 919] taking into account Investment endogeneity; skills linearly
anchored to educational attainment; factors normally distributed, standard errors in parentheses.
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Technology of Cognitive
Skills Formation
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Cog Skills γ1,C,1 0.303 γ2,C,1 0.448
NonCog Skills γ1,C,2 0 γ2,C,2 0
Investment γ1,C,3 0.319 γ2,C,3 0.098
Parental Cog γ1,C,4 0.378 γ2,C,4 0.454
Parental NonCog γ1,C,5 0 γ2,C,5 0
Complementarity φ1,C -0.180 φ2,C -0.781
Elasticity of Substitution 1/(1− φ) 0.847 0.561
Variance of Shocks η1,C 0.193 η2,C 0.050
Table 2.15: The Technology for Only Cognitive Skill Formation (used for counterfactual experiment);
estimated by Cunha, Heckman, Schennach (2010) [Online Appendix] taking into account Investment
endogeneity; skills linearly anchored to educational attainment; factors normally distributed, standard
errors in parentheses.
2.D Solution Algorithm
The algorithm uses first order conditions when possible and solves the household's problem backwards,
using polynomial approximation of next period's value function. Shocks are approximated with a three-
state symmetric shock, that has mean zero and variance as in table 2.14. The reason is that shocks
are independent, hence for n-state shocks the next period's value function must be computed n2 times,
greatly increasing the computational burden. A brief description of the algorithm follows:
1. Start from final period t = T + 1; extract 105 points in the continuous state space of ST+1 =
{sC,T+1, sN,T+1, sC,P , sN,P , wP}, distributed as uniform Sobol numbers from -10 to +10 standard
deviations of the covariance matrix in table 2.13. The algorithm oversamples the tails on purpose
(the true distribution is jointly normal at the initial period, and roughly normal in later periods),
because it is more difficult to approximate the value function far from the median. Also, simulations
show that the variance of offspring's skills increases by approximately 70 % from period 1 to period
T+1, so it is important to consider a more dispersed final distribution. I use Sobol numbers because
they span the state space more efficiently than uniform random numbers.
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2. Given the state, the solution at period t is found as follows. The objective function at time t,
before maximization, is
Qt(St, ct, nt, et, xt) =
c1−θt
1− θ + ζ
(1− nt − xt)1−σ
1− σ +W (sC,t, sN,t) + βE
[
Vt+1(St+1)
]
which is a function of the state St = {sC,t, sN,t, sC,P , sN,P , wP} and of the controls ct, nt, xt, et.
Clearly, Vt = max{ct,nt,xt,et}
Qt(St, ct, nt, xt, et), subject to all the constraints of the dynamic problem in
section 3. In all periods, the choices xt and et map offspring's skills sC,t, sN,t into next period's skills
sC,t+1, sN,t+1, hence in the state St+1 and in the value function Vt+1(St+1). Then it is necessary
to predict next period's value function. At period T + 1 such prediction is unnecessary, because
VT+2 = 0. Assume that the map from the state St+1 to the value function Vt+1(St+1) is known.
3. Start with a guess xt. Given xt and the state St, one of the controls et is the explicit solution to
equation 2.7 in the optimum; call it e∗t (xt). Given e
∗
t (xt), consumption ct can be backed out from
the budget constraint given the labor choice nt. Then nt is the solution to the equation 2.5, which is
solved by bisection method; denote these last two choices as c∗∗t (xt),n
∗∗
t (xt). As a result, given the
state St, now Qt is only a function of the state St and of the choice of xt, because all other controls
are functions of xt. Denote this objective function as Qt(St, c
∗∗
t (xt), n
∗∗
t (xt), e
∗
t (xt), xt). Notice that
Qt(St, c
∗∗
t (xt), n
∗∗
t (xt), e
∗
t (xt), xt) is not equal to max
ct,nt,et
Qt(St, ct, nt, et, xt) for all xt, except in the
optimum x∗t , because c
∗∗
t , n
∗∗
t , e
∗
t are not the optimal controls given a suboptimal xt since they
exploit the first order conditions of the problem, which are jointly true only in the optimum.
However,
Qt(St, c
∗∗
t (xt), n
∗∗
t (xt), e
∗
t (xt), xt) ≤ max
ct,nt,et
Qt(St, ct, nt, et, xt)
because, for given xt, all other controls are suboptimal. Finally,
max
xt
Qt(St, c
∗∗
t (xt), n
∗∗
t (xt), e
∗
t (xt), xt) = max
ct,nt,et,xt
Qt(St, ct, nt, et, xt)
which ensures that the solution is the same. Then, V˜t(xt, St) is maximized on xt using golden search.
The algorithm gives the solution at arbitrary precision for every state point; the chosen precision is
10−7. One possible concern is that, given the transformation described above, the function might
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lose single-peakedness, which is a strict requirement of golden search. Using another algorithm,
i.e. grid-based maximization methods, delivers substantially the same results but is much slower
and produces greater approximation errors. Finally,
Vt(St) = max
ct,nt,et,xt
Qt(St, ct, nt, et, xt)
so the maximizers for Qt given St deliver the desired policy functions.
4. Now we have 105 values of the value function V (sC,t, sN,t, sC,P , sN,P , 
w
P ) associated to state points
St. Name Xt the 10
5 × K matrix which stores an n-th degree polynomial24 in the values of the
extracted state points at time t. To explain further, Xt includes columns of 10
5 realizations of
1, sC,t, s
2
C,t, sC,P , s
2
C,P , sC,tsC,P , ... and so on. A polynomial regression is performed:
Vt = XtβVt + t (2.15)
which coefficients are stored in the K × 1 vector βVt .
5. Now go back one period and back to point 2, predicting next-period value function Vt+1 by using
βVt+1 . The algorithm stops at the solution of period 2 because predicting V1 is unnecessary.
After the household's problem is solved, I extract random jointly lognormal initial conditions for
every household using the variance/covariance matrix 2.13 and I solve again each household's problem,
starting in period 1, to obtain policy functions. The reason is that the value function is easier to
approximated by polynomial approximation than the policy functions for nt, xt, et.
The most nonstandard part of the algorithm is the polynomial approximation, which has to be
reliable in order not to produce large errors in the solution. In this case the approximation is quite
precise; define the relative ex-post approximation error approx as
approx =
Vˆt(St)− Vt(St)
std(Vt(St))
that is, the difference between the ex-ante prediction of the value function Vˆt(St) and the ex-post
solution to the problem Vt(St), found with maximization, normalized by the standard deviation of Vt(St).
24It follows that the number of terms K is given by
(
n+5−1
n
)
, where n is the degree of the polynomial and 5 is the
number of variables.
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The average of such relative error is always under 10−4 for every t and the maximum relative error is
under 10−2.
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2.E Correlation Matrices of Data Factors
Cog. Skills NonCog. Skills Mom's Cog. Mom's NonCog.
at age 6 at age 6 Skills Skills
Cog. Skills at age 6 1.0000
NonCog. Skills at age 6 0.1566* 1.0000
0.0007
Mom's Cog. Skills 0.2836* 0.2097* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000
Mom's NonCog. Skills 0.1528* 0.2021* 0.4167* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2.16: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Skills Factors, with significance level (* = 0.001 significance);
all families (minimum N = 460). Calibration targets are displayed in bold. Source: data extract from
NLSY79/CNSLY79 by Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
Cog. Skills NonCog. Skills Mom's Cog. Mom's NonCog.
at age 14 at age 14 Skills Skills
Cog. Skills at age 14 1.0000
NonCog. Skills at age 14 0.2494* 1.0000
0.0000
Mom's Cog. Skills 0.4303* 0.1336* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000
Mom's NonCog. Skills 0.1844* 0.1444* 0.4167* 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2.17: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Skills Factors, with significance level (* = 0.001 significance);
all families (minimum N = 1009). Source: data extract from NLSY79/CNSLY79 by Cunha, Heckman
and Schennach (2010).
104 A Quantitative Theory of Early Skills Formation and Parental Choices
2.F Data on Child Care Time
The data of Ramey and Ramey (2010) consist in 13 time diary surveys for US, for years 1965, 1975,
1985, 1992-1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, and all years from 2003 to 2008. I use the time diaries for 1975 and
1985 to compute the averages with which I compare the model. The online Appendix of Ramey and
Ramey provides details on how child care time is computed, i.e. which activity codes have been included
in total child care time.
I compute the averages selecting only married parents; hence I use a total of 2837 observations. Of
these, 1312 (46 %) are males. College-educated individuals are 624 (22 %), of which 355 are males (57
% of college-educated). Of all parents, 1218 (43 %) have a child under the age of 5. I use the AHTUS
recommended weights for computing averages. Results for averages and ratios are robust to the inclusion
of older individuals.
I calculate two limiting cases: the college-mating case in which college mothers are always married
to college fathers, and the random-mating case in which college mothers are randomly mating with
all fathers. Denote the averages for different cases as x¯i,j,k where i ∈ {1, 2} stands for the stage of
development of the child (1 for ages 0-5, 2 for subsequent ages), j ∈ {f,m} stands for the sex of the
parent and k ∈ {C,NC,ALL} stands for college/noncollege/all. Then the household-level averages for
stage i and education k are obtained by
x¯college-matingi,k =x¯i,f,k + x¯i,m,k
x¯random-matingi,k =x¯i,f,k + x¯i,m,ALL
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Baseline Final Preferences Equal Elasticity = 0 Two Periods
Share of time α 0.77 0.67 0.76 0.76
Ratio Early/Late Time Invested 2.8 0.9 6.4 3.2
∆ College/NonCollege (early) +7.4 % +4.7 % +8.1 % +15.9 %
∆ College/NonCollege (late) +12.7 % + 3.5 % +13.9 % +14.0 %
Ratio Early/Late Hours of Work 89.3 % 104.8 % 87.4 % 90.6 %
Interg. Correlation of Cog. Skills 0.45 0.42 0.36 0.33
Interg. Correlation of NonCog. Skills 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19
Corr. Cog Skills / NonCog. Skils 0.26 0.17 0.22 0.21
Corr. NonCog Skills / HH Income 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.25
Table 2.18: Robustness Checks: effect of changes in model structure and technology assumptions on
Share of time, Ratio of Early to Late child care time, Difference between College and NonCollege time,
Ratio of Early to Late hours of work, Intergenerational correlation of skills, final correlation between
offsprings' cognitive and noncognitive skills, final correlation between offspring's skills and Income.
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Chapter 3
Parental Links and Employment Prospects:
Evidence from the UK
3.1 Introduction
We explore how parental links affect labor market choices and employment prospects of individuals;
more specifically, we look at how the job finding and job separation rate are affected by the fact that
parents are employed rather than unemployed, and we investigate patterns of occupational mobility
across generations. We construct detailed monthly job histories using information from the British
Household Panel Survey and exploit information on household structure and friends from the same
dataset. In particular, we improve upon the existing literature by linking each individual to his family
members, and measuring how the employment prospects of an individual are affected by the labor
market status of his relatives or his spouse. Finally, we compare the strength of family ties with that of
other relevant ties such as friends.
Our contribution is twofold: first, we document the extent of intergenerational occupational mobility
and we argue that using contemporaneous information on parental occupation, rather than retrospective
information, is important for measuring such mobility. Second, we establish that the father's employment
has an impact on the offspring job finding probability, and we argue that such impact is due to parental
networks being an important determinant of employment prospects.
The importance of social networks in determining labor market outcomes has been recognized in the
literature in the last decades1. Networks are a common way to alleviate information frictions, largely
1Rees (1966) and Granovetter (1973) were the first ones to investigate the important role played by social networks
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used by both workers2 and firms3.
Our work looks at the workers' side, i.e. individual transitions from unemployment to employment
and viceversa. Several papers have tried to quantitatively assess how belonging to a particular network
affects labor market variables such as job finding, job separation and wages4. One usual shortcoming
of the data is that only indirect measures of networks are available. Some researchers rely on estimates
of social networks, in order to assess their impact. As a consequence, the estimates produced by these
studies are likely to be affected by measurement error, due to the impossibility of exactly identifying the
network members. Our work studies social networks at a disaggregated scale and uses direct information
on social contacts, thus limiting the extent of measurement error.
The main focus of this work is on parental links. The exogenous nature of parental links individuals
do not choose their parents makes it easier to quantify their effects and reduces problems of double
causality. Fathers and mothers are also commonly recognized to be strong ties in the network literature,
and it is therefore interesting to analyze the extent to which parents can influence the labor market
choices and outcomes of their offspring.
Moreover, such influence is likely to affect the intergenerational persistence of social and economic
status. In this sense, the choice of the data is particularly appealing for our analysis: among developed
countries, the UK ranks relatively high in terms of socio-economic persistence across generations5.
In order to motivate our econometric specification, we first postulate a stylized model of intergener-
ational transmission of networks in the labor market. In the model, offspring inherit a fraction of the
father's network, and then develop their own contacts while employed. As they spend more and more
time in employment, the correlation between their employment status and the father's one fades out over
time. This motivates our empirical strategy based on difference-in-differences estimation, employing a
threshold age to distinguish between treatment and control group. We also report the results of other
linear probability models, controlling for individual fixed effects. We show that the effect of parental
links is larger when the individual looks for a job in the same occupation of the father. Although one
might think that parental links play the most important role in helping the offspring to find his very first
in labor markets. Montgomery (1991) proposed a simple model to capture the features of a labor market with personal
connections. More recently, Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004) studied the dynamic implications of networks, shedding
new light on the possible effects of policy.
2See for instance Holzer (1988) and Pellizzari (2010).
3See for instance Ioannides & Loury (2004) and Topa (2011).
4See for instance Topa (2001), Munshi (2003), Beaman (2012).
5The intergenerational earnings elasticity in UK is estimated to be about 0.5, one of the highest among developed
countries, again very similar to that of the US, which ranges from 0.5 to 0.6 depending on the estimation method (Corak
(2006)).
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job, we document that large and persistent differences in the job finding are related to father's labor
market variables for a number of years, rather than only at the beginning of one's career.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to analyze how parental links affect transitions in
and out of unemployment, rather than non-employment as other studies in the literature. We are also
the first to document the existence of a strong positive effect of father's employment on these transitions
by exploiting direct information on such links. We choose to look at employment and unemployment
because the choice of participating to the labor force can be influenced by parental background and
employment, which in turn would confound the effect of parental links on nonemployment to employment
transitions. By looking at unemployment vs. employment, we are selecting those individuals who are
participating to the labor force to begin with.
We document that in the UK occupations tend to be persistent across generations; for instance, sons
are from 26 % to 167 % (depending on the sector) more likely to end up working in similar occupations
as their fathers, with some exceptions. Similar considerations apply to daughters and mothers.
We find that having an employed (rather than unemployed) father increases the employment rate
by about 8 percentage points, with an effect on the job finding rate of at least 5 percentage points,
compared to an average in-sample job finding rate of 11 %. Moreover, if an individual searches for a job
in the same sector in which his father is currently employed, the effect on the job finding rate is magnified
by a further 4 percentage points. Such results are robust to alternative specifications and to several
robustness checks. Overall, the evidence is strongly consistent with our model of intergenerational
networks. Moreover, by means of a number of empirical tests we are able to rule out several other
possible mechanisms that could potentially generate our results. We do not find similar effects for
mothers. For the sake of comparison, an additional employed friend increases the job finding rate by 1 -
3 % depending on the estimation method, while the spouse's employment status has a strong association
with the individual job finding rate (with a similar magnitude to the father's one).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the literature in greater detail,
emphasizing the differences between our work and the others. In Section 3.3 we introduce the data, along
with some descriptive statistics of interest. In Section 3.4 we present a stylized model of intergenerational
networks, in order to justify the empirical models employed for the analysis (explained in Section 3.5).
Results are shown in Section 6 and discussed in Section 7. We performs some robustness checks in
Section 8 and conclude in Section 9.
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3.2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to the extensive literature on intergenerational occupational and income mobility.
In particular, our work suggests two possible sources of income persistence across generations. One is
through higher chances of being employed, and the other one is through occupational persistence. As
long as wages differ across occupations, then the influence of parental background on occupational choices
can be potentially very important in explaining income persistence. The literature on the persistence
of income across generations dates back to Becker & Tomes (1986). Solon (1992) is one of the earliest
assessments of the measurement error issues affecting the estimation of intergenerational elasticities,
finding high values of persistence for the US. A comprehensive survey of the literature is provided in
Corak (2006), who performs a cross-country study. Jäntti et al. (2006) also perform a study of the
intergenerational earnings mobility across several countries, while Björklund et al. (2012) focuses on
Sweden, with a particular emphasis on the top of the distribution. On the link between occupational
and income persistence across generations, see also Corak & Piraino (2011).
We offer direct evidence of the positive impact of family ties' employment on labor market transitions.
Many empirical studies try to identify the effect of belonging to a particular network on labor market
outcomes. Several papers rely on indirect measures of networks. For instance, Topa (2001), Bayer
et al. (2008) and Schmutte (2010) use geographical proximity and group affiliation as proxies for social
interactions. Beaman (2012) uses data on political refugees resettled in the US and proxies for networks
using nationality. Overall, these studies find evidence of positive effects of social interactions on labor
market outcomes. Similarly, Khan & Lehrer (2013) use a random assignment to a unique intervention
to identify the impact of changes in the size of a social network. Access to the program successfully led
to gains in the number of weak ties but these changes did not translate into improved employment out-
comes. Herault & Kalb (2009) look instead at parental links; using retrospective parental information
from Australian data, they find significant persistence in employment across generations.
Our paper is more closely related to that strand of this literature that exploits direct identification of
network members.
O'Regan & Quigley (1993) study the correlation of employment status of urban youth with the em-
ployment status of their family members (parents and siblings) in the US, finding strong and positive
correlations. Further, they observe that the industry affiliation of the network members is a good pre-
dictor of the industry affiliation of the individual. Magruder (2010) examines to which extent parents
help children in finding jobs in South Africa. He finds that fathers help sons (but not daughters), while
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mothers are not helpful in finding jobs. Differently from these works, our analysis is dynamic and focuses
on transitions from unemployment to employment and viceversa, rather than on employment status ver-
sus nonemployment. Also, our data allows us to employ different estimation techniques and to compare
parental effects to similar effects by other strong ties. Kramarz & Skans (2014) investigate parental
networks at the firm-level. They analyze Swedish graduates, finding that it is quite frequent that their
first job is in the same plant where their parents work. With respect to their paper, rather than focusing
only on the entry in the labor market, we follow individuals over their life-cycle, investigating whether
the advantages derived from their network persist over time.
Finally, Pistaferri (1999) uses Italian data and finds that informal networks use is associated with higher
job finding rates and lower wages. Similarly, Bentolila et al. (2010) find that individuals who use social
contacts to find their job are characterized by higher job finding rate (lower unemployment duration)
and slightly lower wages. They suggest that the trade-off between job finding rate and wage could still
make individuals choose to enter the same sector as their network members. Indeed, we document pat-
terns of intergenerational persistence in occupations; along with our regression results, this is consistent
with a model of occupational choice in the spirit of Bentolila et al. (2010).
Closely related to our work is the study of Cappellari & Tatsiramos (2011), who also use data from the
BHPS and a similar methodology. Nonetheless, some relevant traits differentiate the two works: first,
we focus on parental links, instead of friendship ones; second, we identify monthly transitions (rather
than yearly); third, we look at transitions within the labor force while they consider transitions from
non-employment to employment; fourth, we document how searching for a job in the same occupational
sector magnifies the effects we find.
Several studies in the literature have tackled the issue of understanding the effects of social networks
by means of a theoretical model. One of the first papers to include personal contacts in a job search
framework was Mortensen & Vishwanath (1994). In their model the information about vacancies comes
from two different sources: direct application to employers or indirect contact through friends. As a
consequence, better connected individuals have more chances to find a job. Similarly, Montgomery
(1991) finds that well connected workers perform better in the labor market, both in terms of wages and
of higher job finding rates. Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004) also develop a model where workers can
obtain information through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts. In their model, belonging
to a network with less employed members implies worse employment prospects, and this effect is persis-
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tent over time. Other models of networks and job search are in Fontaine (2008) and Calvó-Armengol &
Zenou (2005), with a particular focus on networks' dynamics. More recently, Galenianos (2014) embeds
networks explicitly into a search and matching model and finds that referral mechanisms have important
macroeconomic implications.
A distinctive feature of all these works is that networks exhibit a positive effect on labor market outcomes
of individuals. These studies constitute the theoretical ground on which we base the interpretation of
our results.
3.3 The Data
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey, a representative sample from the UK following
individuals since 1991. The BHPS is a yearly survey taken by about 10,000 individuals per year and
the last available wave for this study is 2008. The follow-up rate is very high and the great majority
(more than 90%) of individuals are interviewed also in the subsequent year. Besides these, every year a
certain number of new individuals enter the sample. A total of 32,377 individuals are interviewed in the
BHPS in the period 1991-2008. Even though the survey is yearly, individuals report their job history
in the last year, listing all the employment (unemployment) spells along with several characteristics of
each job. This allows us to identify monthly transitions and build long time series for each individual,
up to 216 months. Details on how we construct job histories for individuals are included in Appendix
A.
We retrieve the employment status of individuals exploiting the job histories, distinguishing between
employees and self employed. The employment status of individuals is assigned at the monthly frequency.
Differently from other studies, we do not consider individuals who are out of the labor force in our
transitions. We define the job finding rate as the probability of transiting from unemployment (rather
than non-employment, as for instance in Cappellari & Tatsiramos (2011)) to employment. The job
separation rate is defined accordingly. We restrict our sample to individuals aged between 16 and 656
and, as it is standard in the literature, we drop armed forces and registered disabled. Eventually we are
left with 27,278 individuals, for a total of 2,232,528 monthly observations.7
6That is, our intergenerational sample will include couples of parents and offspring if and only if both are in this age
range.
7We also check whether our final sample is representative of the UK economy between 1991 and 2008. We compute
the in-sample unemployment rate and compare it with the harmonized unemployment rate according to OECD statistics
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Along with a detailed job history, for each individual a large amount of information is typically
available, including sex, age, education, occupation, race, marital status, region of residence and much
more. More interestingly, the identification number of parents and spouse is available, allowing us to
connect individuals to their family members and follow them together over time8. In addition to this,
the data include information on the employment status of the three closest friends and the occupation
of the closest friend. This information is collected only every second wave, starting in 1992. At the core
of the analysis, we consider the relationship between the employment status (and the occupation) of
the parents and the employment prospects of respondents. We also compare parental effects to similar
effects by spouse and friends. Since friends' job histories are not reported, in order to keep the monthly
frequency we extend their employment status and occupation in the following 12 months after each
observation. Furthermore, we use a simple procedure to attribute the occupational sector to unemployed
and to extend non-varying or spell-dependent variables, as described in Appendix A. Especially for the
occupation, the data contain many missing values, both for respondents and connected individuals: we
assume that these values are missing at random and simply exclude the incomplete observations from
the estimation, when it is not possible to replace them according to the procedure described in Appendix
A. The final size of the estimating sample varies, depending on the dependent variable we use in each
regression9.
Table 3.14 (in Appendix 3.A.5) displays some descriptive statistics of interest for our analysis. As we
can see, the period 1991-2008 is characterized by a relatively low level of unemployment in the UK. More
than 93% of the population in the labor market has a job, 12% of which is self employed. The average
monthly job finding rate, that is the probability of transition from unemployment to employment, is
slightly above 7%. Conversely, the average job separation rate is relatively small (0.4%). This implies
that in the period considered the UK economy was characterized by a high level of security for those
who had a job. On the other hand, it was somewhat hard to find an occupation for those who were
unemployed: on average, the expected waiting time in unemployment was about one year. In other
words, the reason behind the low unemployment rate is the tightness of the monthly outflow from
employment rather than a large inflow from unemployment. Compared to other OECD countries, the
UK economy has an average performance in terms of search variables10. A comparison among genders
(figure 3.6 in the Appendix). The average unemployment rate of our sample replicates quite well the pattern of the OECD
series.
8Unfortunately, it is possible to do so only for about 19% of the whole sample for fathers and 25% for mothers (those
who report the parental PID numbers).
9By construction, the job finding rate (job separation) is defined only over unemployment (employment) spells.
10For a cross-country comparison of estimates of the standard search variables see Hobijn and Sahin (2007). As shown
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shows that females in the labor force tend to have slightly better outcomes than males. About 53% of
our sample is female and the average individual is aged 39. We define four educational groups and nine
occupational sectors, following the SOC aggregation by major group, as established by the Employment
Department Group and the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. We identify an occupational
sector Oi,t for each individual (parents included), for both unemployed and employed individuals. When
employed, the occupational sector is defined in a straightforward manner. When unemployed, the
occupational sector is interpreted as the sector in which the individual seeks for a job, and is assumed
to be the one in which the individual eventually finds a job. For instance, if an individual i starts being
unemployed at time t, is unemployed for 10 months and then finds a job in sector 3, we assume that the
individual was indeed searching in sector 3 for those 10 months: Oi,t = Oi,t+1 = ... = Oi,t+10 = 3. If we
have no information on the occupation of arrival, for instance because the individual exits the sample
or goes out of the labor force, we use the occupation prior to the unemployment spell when available.
The rationale behind our choices and further details are explained in Appendix A11. The distribution of
workers across occupational sectors is shown in Table 3.1, along with several labor market statistics of
the sectors.
Table 3.1: Distribution of workers across sectors and sectoral labor market statistics. Source: BHPS
(1991-2008)
Occupational Sector Abs. Freq. Rel. Freq. Unempl. Rate JF Rate JS Rate
Managers & Administrators 221396 14.88 2.08 10.15 0.25
Professional 147698 9.92 1.82 11.96 0.20
Associate Professional & Technical 174160 11.70 2.59 11.18 0.22
Clerical & Secretarial 235157 15.80 4.35 12.16 0.43
Craft & Related 178628 12.00 6.22 8.10 0.53
Personal & Protective Service 170551 11.46 6.72 8.03 0.52
Sales 108502 7.29 6.39 10.59 0.62
Plant & Machine 131936 8.86 7.82 8.95 0.67
Agriculture & Elementary 120345 8.09 9.66 7.55 0.73
Total 1488373 100.000 4.94 9.38 0.43
We see that labor market outcomes are not independent from sectors. While it is known that
high-skilled jobs are better paid, it seems like there are also relatively large differentials in terms of
unemployment rate (and search variables). One possible explanation is a relative scarcity of high-skilled
workers in the UK in those years, compared to the high profitability of those sectors (managerial and
by other studies, the European economies perform much worse than the US to this extent. For instance, the job finding
rate is estimated to be about 30%-40% in the US (Shimer (2012)).
11Our results are robust to alternative assumptions: we tried using only the future occupation, the past occupation or
a combination of the two.
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professional). In the first three sectors the unemployment rate ranges between 1.8% and 2.1%, with a
job finding rate of 10-12% and a job separation rate of about 0.2%. On the other hand, we also notice
that restricting the sample to the observations for which the occupation is available induces some degree
of sample selection. The average job finding rate (unemployment rate) is indeed higher (lower) than in
the whole sample. This happens because originally all the individuals assigned to a sector are employed,
and our sector imputation only considers the next and the last labor spell. Therefore, due to the large
number of missing values for occupation, we lose many observations of unemployed (typically, the long-
term unemployed) when imputing the sector. Unfortunately, without making any stronger assumptions
than the ones we already make, it is not possible to get rid of this issue. However, notice that the sam-
ple selection problem only affects the unemployment rate and the job finding rate, as shown in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Patterns of Occupational Mobility across Generations
While many studies on occupational mobility across generations rely on single observations for the oc-
cupation of parents, the BHPS allows us to follow parents over time. In this way, besides the answer to
What was your parents' occupation when you were 14?, our data provides a better source of informa-
tion on parents' side.
First of all, we compare the distributions of parents and offspring across sectors. Table 3.2 shows the
distribution of sons and daughters, parents when offspring (respondents) were 14 and parents who are
followed over time. We immediately notice that a large degree of sex segregation characterizes the distri-
bution across sectors. Managerial and craft occupations are typically covered by men, while secretarial
and sales jobs are more intensively taken by women. This phenomenon seems to be persistent over gen-
erations, given that no relevant differences can be detected when comparing the distribution of offspring
and parents to this extent. Another interesting feature is the large structural change that characterized
the UK economy in the last decades. Sectors such as craft or machine occupation shrunk significantly
in relative terms, while managerial, professional and especially technical occupations employ nowadays
a larger share of the working force than before. For this reason, the distribution of offspring is more
directly comparable with the distribution of parents who are followed over time, as in this way we are
comparing occupational choices within the same economy.
In what follows, we argue that there exist important differences in occupational mobility computed
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Table 3.2: Distribution of sons and parents across sectors, relative frequencies. Source: BHPS (1991-
2008)
Offspring 1991-2008 Parents when offspring 14 Parents 1991-2008
Occupational Sector Sons Daughters Fathers Mothers Fathers Mothers
Managers & Administrators 18.92 11.96 16.81 7.36 22.48 9.90
Professional 10.23 10.60 8.05 6.04 8.69 9.19
Associate Professional & Technical 10.83 13.35 4.05 7.61 7.11 9.19
Clerical & Secretarial 7.91 24.39 5.00 19.16 6.41 25.61
Craft & Related 21.12 2.12 27.44 5.40 22.43 2.20
Personal & Protective Service 5.90 16.55 5.11 14.90 4.70 18.06
Sales 4.60 9.81 3.71 11.66 4.36 10.87
Plant & Machine 13.41 3.29 18.26 7.84 18.35 3.82
Agriculture & Elementary 7.07 7.93 11.58 20.03 5.46 11.16
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
using retrospective information and using contemporaneous information, and that these differences are
crucial for understanding occupational mobility across generations. In order to investigate the degree
of occupational mobility across generations we build Markov matrices, computing the transition prob-
abilities from a sector to another. As parental occupation, we use both the current one and the one
as reported when offspring were 14. If individuals rarely switch occupation over the life cycle, the two
sources of information on parental occupation will be highly correlated. Consistently with the degree
of sex segregation that we found in the data, we report the tables for couples of the same gender: fa-
thers with sons, and mothers with daughters. For males, even though with some heterogeneity, we note
that there is a general level of persistence in the same sector as their father's one as reported when
respondents were 14. Table 3.3 reveals that the persistence is particularly high at the top (managerial
and professional occupations) and at the bottom (plant and machine occupations) of the distribution,
with another peak for craft occupations. Instead, when considering the contemporaneous occupation,
persistence drops significantly at the top while it strongly increases in the mid-sectors.
When considering women (in Table 3.4), similar considerations can be made: for instance, the
persistence with mother's sector as reported when daughters were 14 is strikingly high for managerial
and professional occupations. Again, when we look at the contemporaneous occupation, the persistence
at the top almost disappears while it becomes more substantial in the middle and at the bottom of the
distribution. Overall, women are very attached to clerical and secretarial occupations: the probability
of falling into that category is very high regardless of parental background.
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Table 3.3: Markov matrix of occupational mobility: fathers-sons, relative frequencies. Source: BHPS
(1991-2008)
Son's sector
Father's sector
when son is 14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 31.99 13.76 12.42 6.44 12.56 5.10 4.38 8.30 5.06
2 23.72 26.11 21.35 7.55 6.51 4.04 3.38 4.65 2.69
3 25.86 15.75 17.53 7.84 12.67 5.16 3.35 8.72 3.13
4 16.98 16.94 13.80 12.07 16.71 4.97 3.26 9.69 5.57
5 16.65 9.55 9.32 7.43 27.86 5.31 3.76 13.73 6.40
6 18.26 11.61 11.81 10.02 17.87 8.68 5.33 11.73 4.68
7 25.09 9.73 13.27 8.88 15.46 2.52 8.42 11.55 5.07
8 15.06 7.03 8.38 6.50 24.20 6.50 3.66 22.13 6.55
9 14.52 5.47 6.44 7.43 25.18 4.49 4.63 19.37 12.47
Father's sector
contemporaneous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 13.46 7.51 13.11 11.80 22.34 6.94 10.26 5.49 9.09
2 10.77 13.32 19.95 16.82 13.02 5.97 10.71 4.46 4.98
3 9.22 7.92 19.74 18.96 15.47 5.18 8.36 10.00 5.16
4 13.65 7.85 16.44 16.03 17.37 3.82 8.18 10.20 6.46
5 7.99 1.64 8.78 10.95 40.49 5.39 7.32 10.28 7.16
6 12.20 1.76 11.69 18.40 17.66 16.93 6.87 6.64 7.86
7 7.76 6.47 14.77 13.22 21.95 8.95 9.95 11.89 5.03
8 8.95 2.26 6.70 8.50 30.91 7.89 5.51 20.89 8.39
9 6.16 4.61 13.16 12.31 23.45 5.35 5.65 8.18 21.13
The large differentials in the patterns of persistency obtained by using retrospective instead of current
information on parental occupations implies the existence of a substantial degree of occupational mobility
of parents over their life cycle. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 (in the Appendix) show that fathers and mothers
have a sizeable probability of moving between occupations during their worklife. Studies that focus only
on retrospective information on parental occupations cannot account for this important feature of the
data.
In order to ease the interpretation of the statistics just shown, we construct likelihood ratios dividing
the probabilities shown in the diagonal of the matrix by the unconditional probability that a son (or
daughter) belongs to each particular sector. This produces a synthetic measure of the "effect" of parental
occupational sector on individual choices. Table 3.5 shows that, when compared to the actual job
distributions, the attachment to parental sector is indeed very large. On average, sons (daughters) are
76 % (191 %) more likely to be in the father's (mother's) occupational sector than expected if the
assignment of sector was random.
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Table 3.4: Markov matrix of occupational mobility: mothers-daughters, relative frequencies. Source:
BHPS (1991-2008)
Daughter's sector
Mother's sector
when daughter is 14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 18.77 12.38 15.46 20.77 1.94 15.32 9.03 1.06 5.26
2 13.96 30.97 17.75 19.36 0.58 9.26 4.83 0.56 2.73
3 14.72 12.54 21.03 21.81 1.28 15.51 6.20 1.95 4.96
4 13.78 16.87 16.28 29.64 1.74 11.70 5.51 1.09 3.40
5 12.44 8.30 10.85 22.72 2.92 16.39 11.65 4.39 10.33
6 10.86 8.15 13.39 23.85 2.03 20.11 9.43 2.57 9.60
7 12.79 8.55 11.93 29.41 1.71 14.61 11.92 3.15 5.92
8 10.32 5.02 8.97 26.61 2.76 17.93 10.25 6.98 11.15
9 8.89 6.29 13.21 21.58 1.98 20.26 11.50 4.18 12.12
Mother's sector
contemporaneous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 16.74 13.52 9.61 21.04 0.58 19.90 10.83 1.27 6.51
2 13.50 15.91 17.27 25.06 1.93 11.80 10.59 0.53 3.41
3 10.01 9.99 14.89 25.73 1.30 23.05 9.59 1.35 4.08
4 10.75 7.51 10.45 37.10 0.87 18.49 11.01 0.44 3.37
5 6.00 9.25 0.89 23.13 9.65 19.29 24.80 3.74 3.25
6 8.07 7.17 10.85 25.41 1.19 24.59 16.28 1.15 5.29
7 5.60 3.25 6.02 31.47 2.74 23.57 18.31 5.30 3.74
8 6.54 0.94 4.79 23.47 5.87 24.61 13.01 10.92 9.84
9 14.12 5.04 9.23 30.27 1.03 19.23 13.98 2.78 4.31
Table 3.5: Likelihood ratios: each cell represents the probability that a son (daughter) belongs to a given
occupational sector conditional on father (mother) being in the same sector, divided by the unconditional
probability of belonging to that sector. Results are shown separately by gender (sons with fathers, and
daughters with mothers). Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Occupational sector Likelihood ratio
contemporaneous Males Females
Managers & Administrators 1.29 1.93
Professional 2.59 2.36
Associate Professional & Technical 1.63 1.72
Clerical & Secretarial 1.26 1.55
Craft & Related 1.55 7.26
Personal & Protective Service 1.58 1.44
Sales 1.34 1.73
Plant & Machine 1.94 7.07
Agriculture & Elementary 2.67 1.17
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In the next subsection, in order to understand and interpret the patterns of occupational persistence,
we study whether parental labor market variables (such as their employment status and their sectoral
belonging) affects individuals' labor market outcomes.
3.3.2 Employment Prospects across Generations
Before entering the regression-based analysis, we look at the relationship between labor market per-
formances across generations. In particular, we compute the average unemployment rate and search
variables of individuals conditional on the employment status of parents. We also investigate whether
these intergenerational correlations vary when individuals are in the same occupational sector as their
parents.
Table 3.6: Employment prospects across generations: unemployment rate, JF and JS rate conditional
on parental employment status/occupation. Source: BHPS (1991-2008).
Father Mother
Variable Subsample Unemployed Employed
Same
Sector
Unemployed Employed
Same
Sector
All Sample 20.67 7.84 4.74 17.86 7.86 7.38
Unemployment Rate Males 24.14 9.11 5.02 20.83 9.18 8.02
Females 14.35 6.23 4.01 15.17 6.28 6.87
All Sample 4.85 11.02 15.23 7.45 11.05 12.89
Job Finding Rate Males 4.88 10.58 14.85 7.65 10.64 14.17
Females 4.86 11.82 16.13 7.20 11.79 11.68
All Sample 1.16 0.75 0.58 1.23 0.74 0.79
Job Separation Rate Males 1.34 0.85 0.58 1.42 0.84 0.94
Females 0.87 0.62 0.57 1.07 0.63 0.66
Table 3.6 reveals the existence of strong correlations across generations. Having employed (rather
than unemployed) parents is associated with better labor market outcomes. For instance, the average
unemployment rate which is 21% for those whose father is unemployed drops to 8% for those whose
father is employed, decreasing further up to less than 5% when the father is in the same sector as the
offspring. Similar percentages characterizes the mother's employment status, with the difference that
there does not seem to exist any additional effect linked to sector belonging. The job finding rate more
than doubles on average (it increases from 4.9 to 11%) when the father is employed, while the effect of
the mother's employment status is less pronounced but still large (from 7.4 to 11%). Again, when the
father is employed in the same sector, individuals experience an even higher job finding rate on average
(about 15%). Interestingly, the job finding rate of males appears to be affected also by having the
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mother in the same sector. Finally, the job separation rate is also correlated with parents' employment
status in the same direction. It is roughly 1.1% for those with unemployed father and it drops to 0.75%
for those whose father is employed. Mother's employment status has approximately the same effect on
this conditional average. An extra reduction in the job separation rate is found when the sector of the
offspring coincides with the one of the father, while no relevant differences with respect to the sector of
the mother.
Overall, significantly better labor market performances are found to be associated with the employment
status of the parents. Such advantages are larger when individuals are in the same occupational sector
as their father. The additional premium is about 40-50% the size of the effect of having an employed
father12.
We investigate whether the differences between these groups change over the life cycle. We find that
especially for the very young the difference is very large. Figure 3.1 shows that having the father
employed is associated with up to 20 to 30 percentage points more in the average employment rate.
This difference steadily declines over the life cycle and eventually disappears. The higher employment
rate13 can be generated by higher job finding rates, lower job separation rates or a combination of the
two. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 reveal that the job finding rate is driving the bulk of the difference, yielding
large and persistent variations across groups. Conversely, the job separation is substantially lower for
offspring of employed fathers especially at early ages, whereas the gap greatly reduces later on in the
life cycle. Nevertheless, small differences in absolute value are actually large in relative terms and have
a strong impact on individual worklife.
The correlations found so far are interesting per se, even though they do not necessarily represent
any direct effects of parents on offspring' labor market outcomes. Several other correlations, for instance
educational attainment, human capital accumulation or genetical transmission, might well explain these
differences in the conditional averages. Moreover, it could also be the case that respondents' outcomes
affects parental ones, instead of the other way around. In any case, the differences in the other observables
across these groups (Table 3.17 in Appendix 3.A.5) are not large14. In Section 3.5 we outline our empirical
strategy to address these and other related issues, in order to try to establish a causal relationship and
estimate the effect of parental links on offspring' employment prospects.
Before that, we now proceed to postulate a simple of model of intergenerational networks, in order
12Remarkably, we do not find that these patterns are substantially different by gender.
13It is defined as 1− unemployment rate.
14Not surprisingly, those who belong to the same sector as their father tend to be more often males. Also, they are
slighlty older, more educated, more often married and white.
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Figure 3.1: Employment Rate (Employed 1, Unemployed 0) as a function of age: cross sectional averages.
Source: BHPS.
Figure 3.2: Job Finding Rate as a function of age: cross sectional averages. Source: BHPS. Ages 30-32
are cut because of limited availability of observations.
to motivate our empirical strategy and illustrate the source of variation we want to exploit for the
identification of a causal relationship.
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Figure 3.3: Job Separation Rate as a function of age: cross sectional averages. Source: BHPS.
3.4 A Simple Model of Intergenerational Networks
This model is a simple adaptation of Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004). Individuals look for jobs when
they are unemployed, and in order to do so they exploit their network of social contacts. Employed
parents help their unemployed offspring in that they let them use their own social network.
Suppose the economy is populated by identical workers, indexed by worker i, family j and age t. Every
period, all workers of age T have an offspring of age 0. We assume that individuals stop being connected
with their parents when they have children, so that at each point in time only two generations are
connected15. In the first period of their lives (t = 0), agents draw an initial network size nji,0 = 
j
i,0 from
a normal distribution. From that moment onwards, the total network of an offspring (t < T ) at time t
is denoted by nˆji,t and it is given by the following expression:
nˆji+1,t = βn
j
i,t+TS
j
i,t+T + n
j
i+1,t ∀t < T (3.1)
where i + 1 represent the offspring of father i within family j, nji,t denotes the natural logarithm of
work connections held by worker i in family j at time t and Sji,t+T denotes the employment status of the
father i at age t+ T .
Fathers' total networks necessarily have to coincide with their personal networks:
15This assumption is made for simplicity and does not alter our results.
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nˆji,t = n
j
i,t ∀t ≥ T (3.2)
Workers can be in either of two states S ∈ {E,U}, employed or unemployed. When employed, they
lose their job with constant probability γ. Work connections positively affect the probability of finding
a job, as such connections allow workers to reduce informational frictions. Hence we have that, when
unemployed, the job finding probability f is:
f ji,t = 1− e−Nˆ
j
i,t (3.3)
where Nˆi,t = e
nˆi,t . We assume that the timing is as follows: first, shocks to the employment status
(f and γ) take place; second, personal networks nji,t evolve stochastically according to the following law
of motion:
nji,t+1 =
α + (1− δ
E)nji,t + 
j
i,t if S
j
i,t = E
(1− δU)nji,t + ji,t if Sji,t = U
(3.4)
where ji,t ∼ N(0, σ). These equations encompass the idea that a worker gains useful connections
while working, and may randomly lose/gain more connections every period. While not working, however,
such connections depreciate every period because workers progressively lose contact with their former
colleagues. In principle the rates of depreciation {δE, δU} do not need to be equal, but the difference
between them is not important for our results.
It is clear that the correlation between labor market status of fathers and offspring is highest for
t = 0; at the initial period, connections of offspring are mainly defined by those of their fathers because
the former did not have the opportunity yet to form many useful work connections. As time goes
by, the careers of fathers and offspring evolve independently and those that were common contacts at
the beginning might be still useful contacts for one, but lost touch with the other. As a consequence,
the correlation between labor market status fades out along with the correlation between parental and
offspring's networks.
Showing formally that the covariance between the employment status of fathers and offspring dies out
over time is not straightforward, because the correlation at one point depends on the whole history of
employment/unemployment of both the father and the offspring. However, we provide simulation results
to show that indeed such correlation fades out as workers get older. These results are shown in Figure
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Figure 3.4: Simulated correlation between fathers and offspring network (left) and employment sta-
tus (right). α = 0.05, β = 0.5, δE = 0.03, δU = 0.03, γ = 0.05.
Figure 3.5: Simulated paths of average employment status for individuals with high (red line) and low
(blue line) initial networks. α = 0.05, β = 0.5, δE = 0.03, δU = 0.03, γ = 0.05.
3.4, in which we assign values to the parameters of the model and report the results of our simulations.
Another way to see that differences induced by initial networks vanish over time is to look at the
probability of being employed over the life cycle, by different initial conditions. Figure 3.5 shows how
individuals with high, rather than low, initial networks have a higher probability of being employed at
the beginning of their careers; as time goes by, such difference goes to zero, as we observe in the data.
Shocks to the employment status of the father will have an impact on the employment prospects of
offspring mostly at the beginning of their career. This motivates our strategy of looking at the difference
in correlation of employment status between ages 20-30 and later ages. As careers evolve independently,
the correlation fades out and offspring after age 30 constitute a proper control group for identifying the
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effect of networks early on.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in understanding the partial correlation between individual employment prospects16
and the employment status of their parents. First of all, we define an employment status variable Ei,t
using information on job histories. Ei,t is equal to 1 if individual i is employed at time t, and 0 in case
of unemployment. In all periods of different labor market status (retired, in further education etc.), Ei,t
is not defined.
Then we define the transition variables Jfi,t and J
s
i,t, respectively the job finding and job separation
events for an individual. Jfi,t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual i moves from un-
employment to employment at time t (that is, Ei,t−1 = 0, Ei,t = 1), and 0 if the individual remains
unemployed (Ei,t−1 = Ei,t = 0). In all periods of employment or labor market status different from
unemployment, Jfi,t is not defined. Conversely, J
s
i,t takes value 1 in case of transitions from employment
to unemployment and zero otherwise.
Next, we link individuals and parents using personal identification numbers of relatives provided in
the BHPS. For all individuals i for which such information is available, we associate a father, a mother,
a spouse and three friends. Call Efatheri,t the employment status of the father of individual i at time t
and similarly for the mother, the spouse and all friends.
In principle we could just use the raw employment status data in our regressions. However, since we
have monthly job histories, we are not capable of determining precisely whether jobs ending at time t are
covering the full month representing time t or only a small portion of it. The problem is relevant because
a correct identification of the timing of spells is crucial to correctly estimate the partial effect of interest:
suppose for instance that a father is employed until December 20th when he becomes unemployed, while
his offspring obtains a job on December 10th. Since job histories are written in monthly format, it is
possible that the father will result unemployed in December, while his offspring will result employed from
December onwards. However, it is not clear whether we should have considered the father employed
rather than unemployed, since the labor market spell of his offspring began during his employment
spell. In order to exclude these controversial cases, we consider only labor market statuses that are
unambiguously assigned in a given month, that is we exclude those cases in which the labor market spell
16As of now, the focus of our analysis is exclusively on individual employment status and transitions from unemployment
to employment (and viceversa). In future work, we are planning to include the wage in our analysis.
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changes between two months. Basically, instead of using EFatheri,t as defined above, we use
EFather, ongoingi,t =
E
Father
i,t if E
Father
i,t+1 = E
Father
i,t
missing if EFatheri,t+1 6= EFatheri,t
We construct similar variables for mothers and, for comparison purposes, spouses.
3.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
In order to identify the effect of parental networks on employment prospects, we divide our sample in
two groups, one of which is assumed not to be affected by parental networks. Consistently with the
stylized model presented in Section 3.4, the control group is made up by all those workers who are not
very young anymore. In particular, we employ an age threshold of 27 for discriminating between control
and treatment group17. The rationale behind this definition of the control group is that individuals
accumulate social contacts while working so that their pool of contacts become more and more different
from those of their family connections over time. For this reason, an alternative definition of the control
group is based on the experience of individuals18. For both definitions of control group, we run linear19
regression models of the form
Yi,t = β0 + β1E
Father, ongoing
i,t−1 + β2Ti,t + β3Ti,tE
Father, ongoing
i,t−1 + γXi,t + i,t (3.5)
where Ti,t takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to the treatment group (as explained before).
The employment status of the father EFather, ongoingi,t−1 has a one period lag, in order to avoid problems
of double causality (i.e. when the offspring is employed, the father becomes employed thanks to the
offspring). Xi,t is a vector of control variables and the dependent variable Yi,t will be, alternatively, the
employment status, the job finding rate Jfi,t and the job separation rate J
s
i,t. Controls will include a third
degree age polynomial, dummies for gender, education, occupational sector (observed for employed,
imputed for unemployed), marital status, ethnic group, smoking behaviour, region of residence and
17Results are robust to changes in the threshold age. Using any age between 25 and 29 yields a coefficient that yields
between 6 and 8 p.p., that is significantly different from zero.
18In a robustness check, we define the control group as those workers who have at least a given number of years of
potential experience (defined as years elapsed after the completion of education) in the labor market.
19In principle, linear models are not ideal for analyses that involve probability because they might predict negative or
bigger than one probabilities. We choose linear models over probit/logit formulations because of the easier interpretation
of marginal effects. When we run similar logistic regressions, we obtain substantially the same results. Results are now
available upon request and will be included in the Appendix of a future version of the paper.
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quarterly dummies. We are interested in the estimation of β3, which will give us the effect of parental
networks on labor market outcomes. The identifying assumption is that all other factors affecting the
outcome variable other than parental networks affect the offspring of employed and unemployed in
the two groups in the same way. That is, we only need that the relative difference in the way these
factors affect individuals remains unchanged across the treatment and the control group. Under this
assumption, our estimator βˆ3 will identify the effect we are looking for:
βˆ3 = (Y¯T,EF=1 − Y¯T,EF=0)− (Y¯C,EF=1 − Y¯C,EF=0) . (3.6)
3.5.2 Other Linear Probability Models
In order to check that our results hold when changing the model specification, we also employ three
other types of regressions: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, Random Effects GLS and Fixed Effects. In
this case we do not use any control group and our identification strategy with FE estimation estimation
crucially depends on the time-invariance of the other factors affecting the outcome variables. The
estimating model is a reduced version of the previous one and reads as follows
Yi,t = β0 + β1E
Father, ongoing
i,t−1 + γXi,t + i,t (3.7)
We are interested in the estimation of the coefficient β1. While the POLS is the standard empirical
baseline, we are more interested in empirical models that exploit the time structure of the data. In par-
ticular, the time-invariant individual heterogeneity captured by the Fixed Effects estimator might affect
our results significantly if fixed individual characteristics not captured by controls Xi,t are correlated
with labor market outcomes of parents20. We run such regressions for both parents and, for comparison
purposes, spouses and the three best friends.21
For a more in-depth analysis, later on we restrict the sample to those individuals who have employed
parents only: that is, an observation is included in the sample if and only if EFather, ongoingi,t−1 = 1.
Using the occupations Oi,t, defined for both employed and unemployed individuals as explained in
the Data subsection, we compute a new variable Si,t, where S stands for same sector:
20For instance the IQ, motivation, social skills or whatever other factors that are likely to be transmitted across gener-
ations and have an impact (directly or indirectly) on the performance in the labor market.
21Although we would like to run the same regressions for all these variables at the same time, the low amount of data
for which all variables are available does not allow us to do so.
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Si,t =

1 if Oi,t = O
Father
i,t
0 if Oi,t 6= OFatheri,t
missing otherwise
Such variable captures whether an unemployed individual is assumed to be (or not) seeking a job
in the same sector of his employed father, or whether an individual is currently working (or not) in the
same sector of his employed father.
We run regressions similar to those explained above, where the job finding events Jfi,t is regressed
on the same sector indicator Si,t. Notice that in this case the sample will include only those individual
whose parents are employed, meaning that any correlation associated to Si,t will be additional to those
obtained when looking at the correlation with the employed status of parents.
With the expection of our diff-in-diff specification, in all regressions described above we include
individual-level fixed effects, in order to take out fixed individual characteristics that can be correlated
with job market outcomes. Moreover, we cluster standard errors at the parents' level, because within-
families correlations are likely to be important and to bias standard errors downwards if not properly
accounted for.
In the Robustness section we question our empirical strategy, allowing for a more flexible specification;
we show that our strategy yields the most "conservative" estimates, and we argue that what seems to
be the most "obvious" approach leads to upward biased estimates of the marginal effects. Furthermore,
the more flexible specification yields negligible gains in efficiency.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
In Table 3.7 we report the results of our diff-in-diff specification. The estimates indicate that having a
father employed (rather than unemployed) increases in the individual employment rate of about 8 p.p..
We then decompose this result between an higher job finding rate and a lower job separation, simply
by running the same regression changing the dependent variable. Column 2 and 3 of Table 3.7 shows
that the bulk of the economic advantage lies in a much higher job finding rate (the effect estimates is 11
p.p.). We want to stress how the effects estimated by our regression are very large and significant. In
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Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3)
Emp.Status Job Finding Job Separation
Father's emp. status (2m, lagged) -0.00329 -0.0439 -0.000594
(0.016) (0.048) (0.002)
Younger than 27 -0.0745*** -0.131** 0.00162
(0.023) (0.052) (0.003)
Younger than 27*Father's emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0822*** 0.114** -0.00253
(0.023) (0.049) (0.003)
N 115823 7912 105727
R2 0.066 0.040 0.006
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.7: Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status, Job Finding and Job Separation.
The control group is given by individuals aged at least 27. We report the coefficient of the employ-
ment status of father, of belonging to the treatment group and the interaction term (the
effect we want to estimate). Standard errors are clustered at the father level. All regressions include
a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking be-
haviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment, defined according to the
assumptions described in Appendix A.
section 3.6.2 we report the results of other linear probability models in which we control for individual
unobserved heterogeneity22.
Other DD results
The results shown in the last section are perfectly consistent with our stylized model of intergenera-
tional transmission of networks. Importantly, the estimates are robust to alternative definitions of the
treatment group. In Table 3.18 (in Appendix 3.A.5), we run again the same regressions using years of
potential experience in the labor market (years elapsed from completion of education), instead of age.
The control group is defined as all the individuals with more than 10 years of potential experience. The
results are virtually unchanged.
We also investigate whether the effect depends on individual characteristics such as age and educa-
22If we were to include individual fixed effects in the DD regressions, the identification of the father's effect would rely
almost exclusively on cross-sectional variation, in the absence of a large number of individuals who happen to belong to
both groups over their life-cycle. In other words, the DD specification would not work properly. On the other hand, the
presence of individuals who belong to both the control and the treatment over their life-cycle can also create problems to
the identification. Nevertheless, we tried to run the regressions excluding such individuals from the sample and results
(available upon request) are substantially unchanged.
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tion. In Table 3.19 (in Appendix 3.A.5), we estimate again the baseline regression adding a full set of
interaction terms with a gender dummy (in column 1) and a college-education dummy (in column 2).
The estimates indicate that the effect of the employments status of the father does not differ by gender,
but instead it greatly diminishes when the individual has a college degree. This might reflect the fact
that parents are more willing to help their offspring when the latter ones are more disadvantaged (for
instance, less educated). Otherwise, this could also mean that the help received by college graduates
lies in a better employment, rather than on the margin between employment and unemployment23.
Finally, we do not find that the same results hold for mothers. Table 3.20 (in Appendix 3.A.5) shows
that mothers are not useful work connections for their offspring: in particular, even though the effect on
the employment status (column 1) is positive and significant, column 2 reveals that this effect does not
arise through higher job finding rates. Therefore, the empirical evidence rejects that having the mother
employed help the offspring find a job.
3.6.2 Job Finding Rate - Parental Links
In the remainder of the paper, we focus uniquely on the job finding rate since, as we show in the previous
section, the differences in employment prospects of individuals by employment status of the father are
mainly driven by differences in finding rates. Table 3.8 shows that having the father employed rather
than unemployed has a strong and significant effect on the job finding rate of the offspring, perfectly
in line with the results outlined above. The partial correlation observed in POLS models, including all
relevant controls, lays in the region of 5-6 p.p. These effects are quite large (to be compared with a
12% in-sample average job finding rate) and robust to several model specifications. Panel regressions
with RE yield a similar coefficient (6.4 p.p.). Importantly, the coefficient keeps the same size and it is
estimated with a similar precision even in fixed effects models. This suggests that the effects captured
by the coefficient do not depend on fixed factors (e.g. genes) that might be transmitted across gener-
ations. Notice that the in-sample average job finding rate is higher than the average job finding rate
of the overall sample, consistent with the lower average age of the estimating sample. We estimate the
baseline POLS regression separately by gender, finding that the father has a large and significant effect
both on males and on females.
Conversely, mothers do not appear to have any significant effect on the job finding rate of offspring,
23Among college graduates, the unemployment rate is just 3%.
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Panel A Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS POLS (men) POLS(women) GLS FE
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0559∗∗∗ 0.0965∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗∗ 0.0566∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.028) (0.016) (0.021)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.1 22.4 21.6 22.1 22.1
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.120 0.114 0.131 0.120 0.120
N 7772 5051 2721 7772 7772
R2 0.041 0.052 0.061 0.030
N of groups 753 753
Panel B Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS POLS (men) POLS (women) GLS FE
Emp. Status (mother, lagged) 0.0365∗∗ 0.0457∗ 0.0498 0.0365 0.0266
(0.018) (0.025) (0.035) (0.022) (0.026)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.6 22.8 22.2 22.6 22.6
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.123 0.118 0.131 0.123 0.123
N 7384 4640 2744 7384 7384
R2 0.045 0.052 0.078 0.033
N of groups 703 703
Panel C Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS POLS (men) POLS (women) GLS FE
Emp. Status (Father, lagged) 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.0764∗
(0.021) (0.029) (0.033) (0.027) (0.039)
Emp. Status (Mother, lagged) -0.000429 -0.0192 0.0195 0.00135 -0.00587
(0.024) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.1 22.3 21.8 22.1 22.1
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.126 0.119 0.137 0.126 0.126
N 5420 3473 1947 5420 5420
R2 0.047 0.062 0.082 0.037
N of groups 573 573
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.8: Linear regressions of Job Finding Rate (transition from Unemployed to Employed); coeffi-
cient for employment status of father and mother (1 for employed, 0 for unemployed), standard
errors (clustered at the father level), average age and average job finding rate in the sample of the
regression. Models 1-3 are pooled OLS regressions, model 4 is a random effects GLS regression, model
5 is a fixed effects regression. All models include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for
education, gender, region of residence, smoking behaviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation
of search/employment, defined according to the assumptions described in Appendix A.
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neither for males nor for women. The coefficients are ranging between 3 and 4 p.p. but their estimates
are less precise, even when we use the data as repeated cross-sections (Table 3.8, panel B).
As the employment status of couples is likely not to be independently distributed, our models might be
suffering from omitted variable bias. In order to control for correlations between the employment status
of the father and of the mother, we estimate the model including both regressors. The results shown
in Table 3.8 (panel C) confirm the patterns shown in the separate regressions, yielding the father's em-
ployment status as the only important predictor of offspring's transitions. This is consistent with other
studies as for instance Magruder (2010). The effect of having the father employed ranges between 7.6
and 11 p.p., while the effect of the mother is not stable across specifications and never significantly dif-
ferent from zero. This suggests that the positive effects of mother's employment status shown in panel
B of Table 3.8 were almost entirely driven by within-couple correlation in employment status. Notice
that, even though standard errors rise in fixed effects estimation, the father's coefficient keeps having
the same size (or even higher). This indicates that such effects do not depend on within-household
correlation in employment status.
In order to get further insights on the father effects found so far, we test whether these are magnified
when the occupational sectors of the offspring and of the father coincide. That is, we investigate whether
individuals who search for a job in the same sector where their father is employed have additional ad-
vantages. As shown in Table 3.9, such additional advantages are estimated to be in the region of 4
p.p.24. The size of the coefficient is again robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects. This is a
substantial difference and it might be one of the main factors driving the occupational persistence across
generations that we find in the data.
We do not find any effects for mothers, consistently with our previous findings. Mothers' employment
status does not appear to provide any advantages to offspring, not even when their job is similar to the
one their offspring are looking for (the associated regression table is available upon request).
24This implies that having the father employed in the same sector where individuals are looking for jobs generates an
effect that is at least 1.6 larger than having the father employed in some other sector. The effect found in Table 3.8 is
a composition of the effect of fathers in the same sector and fathers in other sectors. For this reason, computing the
additional effect as the ratio between the two estimates (0.4/0.6=0.66..) simply provides a lower bound.
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Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3)
POLS GLS FE
Emp. in Same Sector (father) 0.0422∗∗ 0.0447∗∗ 0.0407
(0.018) (0.021) (0.026)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 22.0 22.0 22.0
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.130 0.130 0.130
N 6257 6257 6257
R2 0.045 0.031
N of groups 666 666
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.9: Regressions of Job Finding; coefficient for father in same sector (0 employed in other sector,
1 employed in same sector), standard errors (clustered at the father level), average age and average job
finding rate in the sample of the regression. Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression, model 2 is a random
effects GLS regression, model 3 is a fixed effects regression. All models include a third-degree polynomial
in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking behaviour, marital status,
ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment, defined according to the assumptions described in
Appendix A.
3.6.3 Job Finding Rate - Comparison with other strong Links
In this section we consider the employment status of the three closest friends and of the spouse, investi-
gating whether these partial correlations are similar in magnitude to the parental ones we documented
in the previous section. To ease the comparison we employ the same empirical strategy and model speci-
fications. The only difference is that we do not distinguish between males and females in the regressions.
In the first model, we consider the number of employed friends25, among the three closest as reported
by individuals. Table 3.10 reveals that friends' employment status has a significant impact on the prob-
ability of transition from unemployment to employment. Having an additional employed (rather than
unemployed) friend raises on average the individual job finding rate by 3 p.p. Notice that this coefficient
is significantly smaller than the father's coefficient (about half in magnitude). Moreover, the friends' co-
efficient drops with the inclusion of fixed effects in the model, suggesting that individual characteristics
are producing a bias in the baseline regressions. Some fixed factors are positively correlated with both
the ability of finding a job and having good (employed) friends. Our estimates are in line with those of
Cappellari et al. (2010), who find an effect of about 7.4 p.p. on yearly transitions.
25We follow the same strategy as Cappellari & Tatsiramos (2011).
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Panel A Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3)
POLS GLS FE
Num. Employed Friends (lagged) 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0110
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 33.5 33.5 33.5
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.101 0.101 0.101
N 14127 14127 14127
R2 0.028 0.031
N of groups 1919 1919
Panel B Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3)
POLS GLS FE
Emp. Status (spouse, lagged) 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.015) (0.022)
Avg. Age (in-sample) 43.3 43.3 43.3
Avg. JF rate (in-sample) 0.100 0.100 0.100
N 10580 10580 10580
R2 0.027 0.021
N of groups 1075 1075
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.10: Regressions of Job Finding Rate (transition from Unemployed to Employed); coefficient
for number of employed friends (from 0 to 3) employment status of spouse (0 or 1), standard
errors (clustered at the individual level), average age and average job finding rate in the sample of the
regression. Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression, model 2 is a random effects GLS regression, model
3 is a fixed effects regression. All models include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for
education, gender, region of residence, smoking behaviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation
of search/employment, defined according to the assumptions described in Appendix A.
As Table 3.10 shows, spouse links seem to be stronger than those of friends. According to regression
results, individuals whose spouse is employed experience a job finding rate that is 5-6 p.p. higher than
that of individuals who are married to an unemployed spouse. One possible concern is assortative mating,
i.e. the fact that people who are more likely to be employed tend to marry among them. However, the
fact that the size of the estimated coefficient is robust to fixed effects estimation strategies suggests that
this mechanism is not driving the results. Summing up, spouse effects are comparable in size to father's
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ones, while friendship ties seem to be a less important factor in the determination of the job finding rate.
3.7 Discussion
In this section we discuss our results and provide some possible alternative mechanisms that can explain
the partial correlations observed in the data. The focus of our discussion is exclusively on the effects of
fathers' variables on offspring' job finding rates, which we consider as the most important of our results.
At a first glance, these positive effects are consistent with standard models of networks in the labor mar-
ket (Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004)). Information flow on vacancies and job opportunities probably
represents one of the main channels through which individuals belonging to the same social network
help each other. Of course, the partial correlations uncovered by our regressions possibly include several
other mechanisms.
Genetical and Human Capital Transmission
For instance, genetical and human capital transmission across generations might be driving the results.
To this respect, we have to consider that for each of the models we estimate, we always include fixed
effects as the last specification. In this way we capture fixed individual characteristics that have an
effect on the dependent variable and are possibly correlated with the explanatory variables of interest
26. Genetical endowments are an example of such individual characteristics that are properly controlled
for in fixed effects models, assuming that their effect is linear and non time-varying. With respect to
human capital, even though it could at least in part be assimilated to fixed factors in adult individ-
uals, this is certainly not true for young individuals. Human capital is a time-varying factor that can
be potentially relevant in our estimates. The presence of educational group dummies in our regression
attenuates this problem, as education is a good proxy for human capital. However, if the effects were
due to the transmission of human capital or work ethics, then we should find that the exact timing of
the employment status (or the sectoral belonging) of the father does not matter much. Indeed, such
transmission mechanisms are supposed to be long-lasting, and it is also reasonable to think that they
take some time in order to produce their effects. Hence, as a further robustness check we include in our
26To some extent, father's fixed effect might be better at capturing fixed characteristics that are transmitted across
generations. Including such fixed effects in our regression -rather than individual ones- leaves the results unchanged.
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regression several lags of the employment status of the father. Interestingly, columns 1-4 of Table 3.11
reveals that only the contemporaneous employment status and sector of the father have an effect. The
coefficient of the lags considered (3, 6 and 12 months) are actually negative or not significant, indicating
that human capital transmission is not a relevant factor in our estimates. Since strong collinearity might
be causing a bias in our coefficients, we also estimate a regression including only the 12-months lag of
our variables of interest (columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.11). We find this to have, if anything, a slightly
negative effect on the job finding rate. Repeating the same test for both the employment status and the
occupational sector provides a test for, respectively, a general and an occupation-specific human capital
interpretation. As we can see, the empirical evidence is strongly at odds with this interpretation. The
fact that the coefficients of the current variables are even higher now reveals that in the baseline models
these coefficients were picking up the negative correlations of the lagged variables, which are serially
correlated.
Direct Hiring
Second, another possible channel is direct hiring of individuals by their father. Even though it is
unclear whether this should be considered as an informational advantage or another kind of mechanism,
we investigate whether a major part of the effects we find can be attributed to this channel. We study
whether having a father who hires employees (rather than employee or self-employed without employees)
boosts the advantages in terms of job finding rate. Column 5 of Table 3.11 shows that, if anything,
having a father who is an employer has a negative effect on the individual job finding rate. This is
strongly inconsistent with an interpretation of our results as direct hiring.
Local Labor Market Conditions
Another possibility is the existence of common shocks affecting both parental employment status and
offspring' performances. For instance, if an individual and his father both live in a region that has
experienced a positive shock, their employment statuses will be correlated as they will be caused by the
same fundamental shock. Similar considerations can be made with respect to the occupational sector.
If the partial correlations we find are due to local labor market conditions, then we should expect these
correlations to be stronger when the offspring lives together with his father. To this purpose, we use
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Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lags Lag 12 only Sector lags Sector lag 12 only Fat. Hires Employees
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0759∗ 0.0577∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.019)
Emp. Status (father, 3 months lag) -0.0275
(0.036)
Emp. Status (father, 6 months lag) -0.0238
(0.030)
Emp. Status (father, 12 months lag) 0.00726 -0.0257
(0.025) (0.024)
Father in Same Sec. (lagged) 0.0790∗∗
(0.040)
Father in Same Sec. (3 mths lag) 0.00338
(0.051)
Father in Same Sec. (6 mths lag) -0.0197
(0.040)
Father in Same Sec. (12 mths lag) 0.00691 -0.0117
(0.028) (0.021)
Father Hires Employees -0.106
(0.082)
N 6621 7648 4841 5855 8563
R2 0.026 0.024 0.035 0.029 0.027
N of Groups 654 719 554 624 791
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.11: Discussion: Human Capital and Direct Hiring. All regressions are fixed effects estimates.
All regressions include all controls discussed in previous sections. Standard errors are clustered at the
father level.
the region of residence, generating a dummy that takes the value 1 when the region of residence of
the offspring does not coincide with the one of the father. Column 1 of Table 3.12 shows that the
partial correlation of father's employment with offspring' job finding rate is instead magnified when the
offspring lives in a different region from his father, even though the estimate of the difference is not very
precise. In our regression we control for regional changes of offspring, to account for the possibility that
individuals migrate in order to find a job, which would bias the estimate of the father's employment
coefficients. Individuals who belong to different regions definitely belong to different local labor markets,
and therefore we have to conclude that local labor market conditions are not an important driver of the
correlations we find. In order to control further for local labor market conditions, we also compute the
average unemployment rate by sector and by region. We then add these new variables to our regressions
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Dep. Variable: Job Finding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local Conditions Sector Unemp. Region Unemp. Sector*Year Region*Year
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Father emp. (in other region) 0.0619
(0.049)
Father unemp. (in other region) -0.121
(0.150)
Has Changed Region X
from last year
Unemployment of Sector X
Unemployment in Metropolitan X
Area of residence
Interactions Sector × Year X
Interactions Region × Year X
N 7816 8563 8563 8563 9246
R2 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.047 0.062
N of Groups 754 791 791 791 828
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.12: Discussion: Local Labor Market Effects. All regressions are fixed effects estimates. All
regressions include all controls discussed in previous sections. Standard errors are clustered at the
father level.
as additional controls. As shown in columns 2-5 of Table 3.12, the partial correlations are unchanged
by the inclusion of all these possible controls. In particular, we are including dummies for the sector
interacted with the year in column 4 and for the region interacted with the year in column 5, controlling
for possible booms or busts of given segments of the labor market. Nonetheless, this does not appear to
capture at all the effects outlined so far.
3.8 Robustness Checks
In this section we explore whether our results are robust to different choices of the sample and to
different empirical strategies. First, we want to understand whether the composition of our sample
might be driving our estimates. The fact that our estimating sample includes many individuals who
are still at school or at the university might be creating problems of sample selection. To control for
this possibility, we try to exclude individuals with a college degree from our sample. Column 1 of table
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3.13 presents results of this estimation: although the size of the estimate is somewhat lowered, it still is
statistically and economically significant, showing that college-educated individuals are not driving the
bulk of the correlations we find.
Then, we consider the possibility that only very young workers (aged 16-20) are affected by the
employment status of their father. However, when we include only individuals aged more than 20 years
of age in the estimation (column 4), we maintain the size of the coefficient, despite losing more than
one-third of our original sample.
Also, we consider the possibility that our assumptions on sectors of search might be important for
our results: by using future and past occupations as proxies of current sectors of search, we are de
facto excluding those individuals who are always unemployed in the BHPS, or who never report their
occupation. To account for this possibility, we exclude controls for occupation from our estimations.
Results are reported in column 2: the coefficient is lowered by about 1 percentage point, maintaining
statistical and economical significance.
Finally, we question our empirical strategy and consider the possibility that a more flexible model may
allow us to better capture the nature of the correlations we find. That is, we do not keep only fathers who
are on an ongoing spell but rather all the observations which are not missing. Specifically, we construct
four indicators based on the two months of job history of the father during the offspring's transitions:
hence we have one dummy for father unemployed past month and current, one for father unemployed
past month but employed on current and so on. Column 3 shows the results of such experiment: while
the coefficient roughly corresponding to our empirical strategy (employed past month and current)
maintains substantially the same magnitude and standard error, the coefficient corresponding to father
unemployed last month, employed today is strikingly high. Such a coefficient is due to a relatively
large number of transitions taking place at the same time (for both fathers and offspring) and does
not correctly capture any direct effect of fathers on offspring. There are at least two main issues: first,
common high-frequency shocks that we are not able to properly control for might be a common cause
for these contemporaneous events. Second, there is the possibility that in fact offspring are affecting
fathers (instead of the other way around), producing a large upward bias due to reverse causality.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
No College No Sectors Different Model Age > 20
Emp. Status (father, lagged) 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025)
Father U-E 0.172∗∗
(0.072)
Father E-U 0.0526
(0.057)
Father E-E 0.0632∗∗∗
(0.019)
N 7826 9246 8644 5889
R2 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.031
N of groups 671 828 792 576
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.13: Robustness Checks: regression without college graduates (column 1), no sectoral dummies
(column 2), more flexible specification (column 3), Only individuals aged > 20 (column 4). Omitted
category: Father U-U. All regressions are fixed effects estimates. All regressions include all controls
discussed in previous sections. Standard errors are clustered at the father level.
3.9 Conclusion
We tested whether parental links affect labor market outcomes of individuals using rich panel data
from the British Household Panel Survey. Our results indicate that, on average, those whose father
is employed rather than unemployed experience an employment rate that is about 8 percentage points
higher, with job finding rates which are higher by 5 percentage points and job separation rates which
are lower by 0.3 p.p.. We also show that such difference is larger when individuals work in occupations
similar to those of their father. We do not find similar correlations for mothers, and we show that
father's effects are similar in magnitude, or larger, to those of other supposedly relevant links. We also
document that the job separation rate is on average lower for individuals whose father is employed in
similar occupations to theirs.
By means of a number of robustness checks, we show that our results are unlikely to be attributable
to human capital transmission, to common shocks driving both outcomes at the same time or to the
fact that fathers directly hire their offspring. Our conclusion is that parental networks are likely to play
an important role in determining labor market outcomes.
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Appendix
3.A The Data
3.A.1 Construction of Job Histories
The BHPS is a yearly survey, and therefore its basic structure contains yearly observations for each indi-
vidual. Among the available variables, individuals report what their employment status and occupation
is at the moment of the interview and when the current spell began. In addition to the main dataset,
there is a separate annex in which individuals list their detailed job history in the last 12 months. Each
single spell is identified with a start date and an end date. When the month of the start date is missing,
we replace it with the month of the interview (if the spell began in the same year) or with December
(if the spell began in some previous year). In this way, we partly exploit those spells, that otherwise
would be completely missing. For each spell we are provided with the employment status, occupation
and other information.
We replace the yearly observations by 12 monthly observations for each individual. Then, we fill in
the employment status exploiting the information provided. Constructing correctly the job histories is
not a straightforward exercise, as the spells reported by individuals sometimes overlap or conflict with
each other. In order to solve this issue, we need to set a hierarchical order of the available information.
Importantly, we never replace the variables we copy over time once they are assigned, even if they get
into conflict with some future source of information. We give priority to the current spell report, as the
amount of recall needed to report it correctly is smaller than for past spells. Therefore, first of all we
copy the current employment status over time, from the start date of the current spell to the date of
the interview. Second, we use past spells to fill in the remaining missing values. Again, we assume that
recalls closer in time are more reliable and therefore we first consider the very last spell, then the second
last and so on.
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We fix 12 as the maximum number of difference in months between the interview (moment of the recall)
and the variable to assign (object of the recall). For individuals who are interviewed every year this
choice has virtually no effect, as their employment sequences are constructed simply using for each given
year the information provided in the interview of the same year. For the others, this choice is meant
to limit the amount of measurement error generated by imperfect recall. We noticed that individuals
often change their answer to the lenght of the current spell or modify the order or the nature of a job
spell, even after years. This implies that without fixing a maximum time difference for assigning the
variables, we would end up with a dataset that included pieces of different spell, oftern misreported, one
after the other.
3.A.2 Employment Status Imputation of Friends
Individuals are asked about the employment status of their friends once per two years. What is available
in the basic structure of the BHPS is therefore a unique observation. Unfortunately we cannot construct
the job histories of friends, as no identification number is reported. In order to keep the monthly
frequency, we replicate the information on friends over the following 12 months. This is done also to
keep relatively large the sample size. Our imputation procedure is based on the assumption that the
employment status features a relatively large degree of persistence over time. This is certainly true
for employment spell, as the job separation rate in the sample is small and implies long average job
duration. It is also true for unemployment spells, as the average unemployment spell duration is above
one year. By replicating the employment status in the following 12 months we are simply assuming that
those spells of friends are average ones. The only risk we bear is to misplace them in time.
3.A.3 Sector Imputation of Unemployed
The unemployed, by definition, do not belong to any occupational sector. One might even argue that
unemployed are simply looking for some job, regardless of any occupational classification. Instead, we
believe that we gain useful insights by imputing sector of search to the unemployed. From the data
we see that individuals do not change occupational sector often and, even when they do so, the change
is usually not dramatic (e.g. movements from sector 2 to sector 3). Moreover, it seems reasonable to
think that individuals target their job search to some particular sector of the economy, consistently with
their educational level, qualifications and past occupations. Therefore we treat unemployed workers
-for which the sector is in principle missing- as if they were still belonging to some occupational sector.
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Furthermore, for the purpose of our analysis we need to assign them to some sector.
The problem is that we do not really know in which sector they are seeking jobs. The idea behind
our imputation is very simple: by logic, the sector where an unemployed worker finds a job is just the
sector where he was seeking jobs. The only limitation is that we assign the whole unemployment spell to
that particular sector, without allowing for movements across sectors within the spell. When the sector
after the unemployment spell is not reported, then we use the previous sector. In any case, to limit the
amount of measurement error generated by our imputation, we only consider spells that immediately
follow (or precede) the unemployment spell of interest.
3.A.4 Educational and Occupational Classification
For constructing educational groups, we consider the highest educational qualification achieved by indi-
viduals. The original variable contains more than ten possible values, with an elevated degree of details.
We collpase those ten groups into four. The first group corresponds to those who hold a Bachelor's
degree or some higher degree. The second group includes the individuals with a high school diploma or
qualifications for teaching or nursing. Individuals with an A level or O level fall into the third group.
Finally, the fourth group is for those who hold no qualification whatsoever.
With respect to the occupational classification, we follow the aggregation in major group of the SOC as
proposed by the Employment Department Group and the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys.
The BHPS uses the SOC90 (Standard Occupational Classification), a three-digit code, for describing
occupations. At the most disaggregated level we have 347 categories, and in order to analyze the
persistence across sectors we need to aggregate them. We choose the aggregation in major groups (9
categories) as the one able to preserve some substantial degree of persistence while keeping a satisfactory
level of details.
For further details, refer to Standard Occupational Classification - Structure and Definition of Major,
Minor and Unit Groups, Volume 1
144 Parental Links and Employment Prospects: Evidence from the UK
3.A.5 Representativeness of the BHPS sample
Figure 3.6: In-sample unemployment rate compared to the Harmonized Unemployment Rate in UK,
1991-2008 (Source: OECD).
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Appendix B - Additional Tables
Summary Statistics
Table 3.14: Summary statistics of labor market outcomes. Source: BHPS (1991-2008).
Variable Subsample Mean N
All Sample 6.15 1685930
Unemployment Rate Males 7.24 865469
Females 5.00 820051
All Sample 7.21 99532
Job Finding Rate Males 7.15 60356
Females 7.32 39121
All Sample 0.42 1549143
Job Separation Rate Males 0.49 786531
Females 0.34 762282
3.A.6 Markov Matrices
Table 3.15: Markov matrix of occupational mobility: fathers when sons are 14-fathers over their life-
cycle, relative frequencies. Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Father's sector
when son is 14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 59.32 4.41 6.16 7.32 6.31 1.63 6.33 7.10 1.42
2 16.03 68.07 9.13 3.07 0.72 0.33 1.12 0.66 0.86
3 11.72 11.11 54.46 10.82 4.28 0.18 4.85 1.01 1.58
4 14.72 2.10 2.60 49.86 3.38 8.08 15.22 4.04 0.00
5 5.16 2.54 3.89 1.85 65.88 3.19 0.37 12.75 4.37
6 9.54 0.19 18.41 21.96 3.61 38.66 1.94 3.51 2.18
7 27.79 0.00 1.59 9.95 4.58 0.00 33.60 18.49 4.01
8 8.24 3.47 1.08 1.11 8.91 1.86 1.15 70.11 4.07
9 14.81 15.68 0.50 4.16 12.28 5.45 4.18 22.36 20.59
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Table 3.16: Markov matrix of occupational mobility: mothers when daughters are 14-mothers over their
life-cycle, relative fequencies. Source: BHPS (1991-2008)
Mother's sector
when daughter is 14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 46.01 0.00 6.78 21.68 0.00 16.29 1.54 6.36 1.33
2 0.98 62.87 19.81 7.57 0.00 0.94 0.00 2.29 5.53
3 1.61 7.20 69.76 4.66 0.72 10.90 0.76 0.68 3.70
4 17.05 3.21 5.88 62.81 0.88 2.11 5.04 0.27 2.75
5 2.25 0.00 3.56 43.34 12.66 9.10 16.60 6.94 5.53
6 13.49 2.59 6.14 12.88 0.23 46.58 6.44 1.68 9.97
7 7.61 5.80 1.91 12.83 4.92 13.02 40.40 0.81 12.70
8 3.02 0.98 13.06 28.24 9.71 3.59 8.00 28.41 4.98
9 7.08 4.60 5.21 6.17 0.28 12.29 12.83 3.19 48.34
Descriptive Statistics of different groups
Table 3.17: Descriptive statistics (averages) of different groups: offspring of unemployed fathers, em-
ployed fathers and employed fathers in their same occupational group. Source: BHPS (1991-2008).
Variable Father unemployed Father Employed Father in Same Sector
% Female 45 48 32
% Smoker 27 25 30
Age 21.44 22.22 23.49
% College-educated 6 12 13
% Married 6 10 13
% Non-White 7 3 1
Modal Sector 6 4 5
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Diff-in-diff: Alternative Definition of Control Group
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3)
Emp.Status Job Finding Job Separation
Father's emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.00415 -0.0254 -0.000894
(0.025) (0.037) (0.003)
Less than 11 yrs. of pot. experience -0.0563 -0.0876** 0.000791
(0.038) (0.043) (0.003)
Less than 11 yrs. of pot. experience* Father's emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0770** 0.103*** -0.00102
(0.036) (0.038) (0.003)
N 117110 8160 106833
R2 0.069 0.041 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.18: Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status. The control group is given by
individuals with more than 10 years of potential experience in the labor market. We report the coefficient
of the employment status of father, of belonging to the treatment group, the interaction
term (the effect we want to estimate). Standard errors are clustered at the father level. All regressions
include a third-degree polynomial in age and dummies for education, gender, region of residence, smoking
behaviour, marital status, ethnicity, quarter, occupation of search/employment, defined according to the
assumptions described in Appendix A.
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Diff-in-diff: Heterogeneity Analysis
Dependent Variable
(1) (2)
Emp.Status Emp.Status
Father's emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0120 0.0155
(0.032) (0.026)
Younger than 27 -0.0834 -0.0613
(0.051) (0.040)
Younger than 27*Father's emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0856* 0.0802**
(0.051) (0.039)
Younger than 27*Father's emp. status (2m, lagged)*Female -0.0307
(0.066)
Younger than 27*Father's emp. status (2m, lagged)*College -0.105**
(0.052)
N 120460 120460
R2 0.068 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.19: Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status. The control group is given
by individuals aged at least 27. We report the coefficient of the employment status of father, of
belonging to the treatment group, the treatment effect and the treatment effect interacted
with Female in Column 1 and with College in Column 2 (the differential effect we want to estimate).
Interactions between Female (or College, respectively) and the Employment Status of Father and the
treatment group indicator are also included in the model, altough the coefficients are not reported.
Standard errors are clustered at the father level. All regressions include all controls previously discussed.
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Diff-in-diff: Regressions for Mother
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3)
Emp.Status Job Finding Job Separation
Mother's emp. status (2m, lagged) -0.00894 0.0664*** 0.00394*
(0.027) (0.024) (0.002)
Younger than 27 -0.0779** 0.0283 0.00624
(0.040) (0.038) (0.005)
Younger than 27*Mother's emp. status (2m, lagged) 0.0835** -0.0376 -0.00753
(0.039) (0.032) (0.005)
N 110711 7728 100897
R2 0.060 0.044 0.006
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.20: Difference-in-differences regressions of Employment Status, Job Finding and Job Separation.
The control group is given by individuals aged at least 27. We report the coefficient of the employment
status of mother, of belonging to the treatment group, the interaction term (the effect we
want to estimate). Standard errors are clustered at the mother level. All regressions include all controls
previously discussed.
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